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To my mother and father,
who gave me life,
something too beautiful
if it can be enjoyed in conditions of dignity,
for anyone,
no matter where they are, 
and on behalf of any idea,
to think they have the right to deprive anyone of it.
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INTRODUCTION
The world today is inevitably disconcerted and disoriented 
regarding a certain kind of armed conflict and acts of pure 
terrorism, which are revealing the limits of diplomacy and 
even military actions to at least stop the expansion and brutal 
behaviour of some armed actors, such as the Islamic State. Every 
day, the media show attacks with a huge impact, sometimes 
because they are selective but usually precisely because they are 
indiscriminate and particularly affect the civilian population. 
There is an expanding sense that we must be doing something 
wrong when terror proliferates everywhere, small children are 
trained to be murderers and terrorism is attractive for a sector 
of the population, even sectors close to us.
This kind of criminal conflictiveness, which today is clearly 
out of control and intractable for the time being, dominates 
our thinking about what armed conflict is in general, the most 
common kind on the planet. Although it is still brutal, armed 
conflict has characteristics different to the kind of violence 
mentioned above. Therefore, no matter how difficult it might 
be, it does have the possibility of being managed, at least in terms 
of its flow of physical violence. In other words, the majority of 
armed conflicts today can be the subject of negotiations and 
can enter a peace process that puts an end to the armed clash. 
Broadly speaking, and according to figures from June 2015, two 
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out of every three armed conflicts are already in the negotiation 
phase, which fills us with hope and poses a huge challenge to 
what we call “peace diplomacies”. There are conflicts for which 
we still have no answer because we can barely grasp them. 
However, the majority are manageable and as the decades go by, 
more and more conflicts that are entering the negotiation phase.
This book aims to share a few ideas on the necessary 
job of managing armed conflicts to eradicate the violence 
they bring with them. It begins with a look at the nature of 
contemporary armed conflicts, the complexity of many of 
them and the consequent difficulty addressing them in order 
to lower their levels of lethality and destruction, as well as their 
vast humanitarian impact. It then continues with a chapter 
that contains a reflection on the magical moment when, 
warriors (and this is a job historically dominated by men, 
perhaps because they have associated their virility with the 
use or threat of forced) sometimes glimpse a new horizon of 
peaceful coexistence without having to use weapons. Without 
this previous visualisation, it is very difficult for a peace process 
with prospects of success to emerge. Otherwise, if there is a 
real desire to work on the unspeakable to stop the spirals of 
violence, there are enough experiences from which to learn how 
to build peace and transform societies for the better. The third 
chapter, which is based on the author’s experience, observation 
and reflection, pinpoints possible designs and architectures 
for launching and sustaining a peace process, in which many 
people or institutions have to take part, playing different 
and complementary roles, an issue examined in the fourth 
chapter, while also using the imagination and simple acts called 
alternative diplomacy which, if done strategically, enhance the 
more conventional byways of traditional diplomacy. The book 
ends with appendixes which carry clear messages: the majority 
of armed conflicts end up being resolved at a negotiating table; 
the existence of international courts is not incompatible with 
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achieving negotiated political agreements; bilateral ceasefires 
should be reached in order to negotiate; it is common for 
armed groups to turn into political parties and run in elections 
after a peace agreement; and finally, we should never forget that 
the most difficult thing is not writing a peace agreement but 
carrying it out.

15
I –ARMED CONFLICTS IN THE WORLD 
TODAY.
Without a doubt, the 20th century was the most lethal 
century in the history of humanity. A total of 110 million people 
perished in armed conflicts during that century, with two world 
wars that scattered the dead upon five continents (16 million 
deaths in the first and 36 million in the second) and a long Cold 
War which meant the export of death to the Southern countries, 
to the periphery, in what came to be called “proxy wars”, where 
the large powers resolved their struggles for interests through 
third countries (Angola, Mozambique, Afghanistan, Nicaragua, 
etc.). The 1980s was a time of “controlled insecurity”, with low-
intensity wars, a profusion of guerrillas and a predominance of 
external factors in the development of the conflicts. In contrast, 
the next decade, the 1990s, was characterised by “widespread 
disarray”, with a blossoming of ethnopolitic conflicts, a 
weakening of the states and a predominance of civil wars. Wars 
between states, so typical in the past, had virtually disappeared.
Without counting the two world wars, the deadliest 
conflicts in the past century were the Korean War (2.9 million 
dead), the Cambodian genocide (2 million), the Nigerian civil 
war (2 million), the Vietnam War (2 million), the civil war in 
South Sudan (2 million), India’s invasion of Bangladesh (1.5 
million), the civil war in Russia (1.3 million), the Spanish civil 
war (1.2 million), the Armenian genocide (1 million), the 
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struggles between Muslims and Hindus in India (800,000), 
the genocide in Rwanda (600,000), the war between Ethiopia 
and Eritrea (545,000) and the Iran-Iraq war (400,000). Other 
conflicts led to more than 100,000 deaths. Overall, the sum is 
catastrophic in terms of human beings’ ability to regulate their 
disputes via peaceful means.
Will the 21st century follow in the same destructive 
footsteps as the previous century, or, to the contrary, are there 
reasons to believe that we have entered a new cycle in terms of 
conflictiveness? Fortunately, all signs point to the fact that the 
lethal experience of the 20th century will not necessarily repeat 
itself, despite the deaths amassed in the recent conflicts in Syria 
(around 250,000 deaths in four years), Iraq and Afghanistan. 
The figures from the Conflict Programme at the University of 
Uppsala1 show that we have gone from having 51 armed conflicts 
in 1991 to 32 in 2003 and 2012, and then a resurgence of up 
to 40 conflicts in 2014, 11 of which were described as “wars” as 
they led to more than 1,000 deaths in one year. In 2014, only 
one conflict was between states, while 26 were intra-state and, 
even more importantly, 13 were internationalised conflicts, a 
phenomenon which is on the rise and deserves regional peace 
strategies. Following a different methodology, the Conflict 
Programme at the School of Peace Culture counted 25 cases of 
internationalised internal conflicts at the end of 2014, meaning 
that one of the parties in the dispute was from the outside or 
the clashes spread to the territory of other countries.2 Therefore, 
we are not yet witnessing the disappearance of wars in any way, 
but in view of a steady downswing for two decades, we can 
interpret this as meaning that this social phenomenon of war 
can be dealt with by lowering its levels of violence, as has been 
happening for a relatively long period of time. Looking at half 
1  Journal of Peace Research, July 2015.
2  School of Peace Culture, “Alert 2015! Report on conflicts, human rights and 
peacebuilding”, Icaria editorial, 2015.
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a century of conflicts, we see that in the 1960s, 80% of civil 
wars ended with the military victory of one of the sides. In 
the 1990s, this percentage dropped to 25%, and between 2000 
and 2014, the percentage is at around 17.2%, although in the 
past five years the trend started to surge again. Therefore, with 
a broader perspective, we can claim that we are witnessing a 
new reality. We are still living in a conflictive world, but the 
conflicts are a different kind than three or four decades ago; 
they follow different patterns, and negotiation plays an even 
more important role.
Period in which peace agreements were signed
1990-94 1995-1999 2000-2004 2005-2009 2010-2014 TOTAL
9 6 6 15 8 44
Period in which conflicts ended through the military victory of one of the sides
4 1 - 2 4 11
% of conflicts that ended with a peace agreement
69.2 85.7 100 88.2 66.7 80
Source: Database of the Peace Processes Programme of the School for a Culture of 
Peace  (Appendix I of this book).
According to the database of the Conflict Programme at 
the School of Peace Culture, in mid-2015 there were 34 armed 
conflicts underway, meaning any clash involving regular or 
irregular armed groups whose goals are perceived as incompatible, 
in which the continuous, organised use of violence: a) leads to 
at least 100 deaths per year and/or a serious impact on the land 
(destruction of infrastructures or nature) and human safety 
(such as an injured or displaced people, sexual violence, food 
insecurity, impact on mental health and the social fabric or the 
disruption of basic services); b) aims to achieve objectives which 
are distinguishable from the objectives of everyday violence, 
usually associated with demands for self-determination and 
self-governance, or identity-based aspirations; or opposes the 
political, economic or social system of a state or the internal 
or international policy of a government, which in both cases 
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diferenciables de los de la violencia común y normalmente 
vinculados a demandas de autodeterminación y autogobierno, 
o aspiraciones identitarias; la oposición al sistema político, 
económico, social o ideológico de un Estado o a la política 
interna o internacional de un gobierno, lo que en ambos casos 
motiva la lucha por acceder o erosionar al poder; o al control 
de los recursos o del territorio”. A partir de esta definición 
podían identificarse 12 conflictos armados en el continente 
africano, mientras que Asia concentraba a 11 conflictos. 
La duración media de los conflictos armados existentes a 
principios de 2015 fue de unos 15,8 años, aunque este dato debe 
ser relativizado por el elevado número de conflictos armados 
actuales que han padecido ciclos de violencia con anterioridad, 
como por ejemplo Israel-Palestina, Iraq, Tailandia (sur), Sudán 
(meridional) o Afganistán. En todos los casos analizados, 
el Estado fue una de las partes contendientes, aunque en 
numerosos conflictos se produjeron frecuentes enfrentamientos 
entre actores armados no estatales y se registraron altos niveles 
de violencia intercomunitaria. Por regiones, Colombia, con 50 
años de conflicto, es el de más duración. Le siguen los asiáticos 
(25.4 años de existencia), los africanos (10.4 años), los de 
Oriente Medio (6 años) y los europeos (2.7 años de media, 
aunque 9.5 años si contamos el conflicto kurdo). Esta estadística 
apunta, pues, que los conflictos asiáticos son los más difíciles de 
resolver, con gran diferencia sobre los demás.
Duración media de los conflictos existentes a principios de 2015, en años
África Asia Europa Oriente Medio Colombia Media Global
10.4 25.4 9.5(2.7 sin Turquía) 6.0 50.0 15.8
En cuanto a las causas de los conflictos, cabe destacar que, 
según los datos de la ECP, un 58.3%  de los conflictos armados 
están vinculados a demandas de autogobierno y a cuestiones 
motivates the struggle to gain or erode power; or seeks control 
over the resources or the land. Based on this definition, we can 
identify 12 armed conflicts in Africa and 11 conflicts in Asia.
The average length of the armed conflicts currently 
underway in early 2015 is 15.8 years, although this figure 
should be nuanced by the higher number of armed conflicts 
underway today that have suffered from previous cycles of 
violence, such as Israel-Palestine, Iraq, Thailand (south), Sudan 
(south) and Afghanistan. In all the cases analysed, the state was 
one of the rival sides, although in many of the conflicts analysed 
there were frequent clashes among non-state armed actors and 
high levels of inter-community violence were recorded. By 
region, Colombia’s conflict is the longest, at over 50 years, 
followed by the Asian conflicts (25.4 years), the African ones 
(10.4 years), the conflicts in the Middle East (6 years) and the 
European conflicts (2.7 years on average, although 9.5 years if 
we count the Kurdish conflict). Therefore, these statistics show 
that Asian conflicts are the most difficult to resolve, far more 
than the others.
Average length of conflicts existing in early 2015, in years
Africa Asia Europe Middle East Colombia TOTAL
10.4 25.4 9.5(2.7 without Turkey) 6.0 50.0 15.8
Regarding the causes of the conflicts, we should note 
that according to figures from the School of Peace Culture, 
58.3% of the armed conflicts are associated with demands 
for self-governance and identity issues. This kind of conflict is 
particularly relevant in Asia and Europe. On the other hand, 
there are many cases (2/3 of armed conflicts) in which the 
most important incompatibility is associated with opposition 
to a state’s government or political, economic or ideological 
system. Other times, the main cause of the conflict is access to 
governance. In some of these cases, the armed groups did not 
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have enough strong-arm capacity to seize power, but they kept 
up their armed activities in a bid to erode the government, to 
keep their underlying demands active and visible, or simply to 
express their opposition. On the other hand, in several cases what 
motivated the armed action of insurgent groups was the goal 
of subverting the system (not only opposing the government). 
These groups started their armed struggle in the 1960s and are 
currently among the longest-standing in the world. In this same 
kind of conflict sparked by opposition to the system, there is 
a significant number of cases in which some of the rival sides 
have announced their intention to create an Islamic state or part 
of one (Algeria, Afghanistan, Philippines, Iraq, Mali, Nigeria, 
Pakistan, Russia, Somalia, Syria and Yemen).
For the media there only seem to exist a handful of armed 
conflicts: the one pitting Israel against Palestine (which 
has the greatest symbolic charge), the ones stemming from 
international intervention (Iraq and Afghanistan), both of 
which are in a non-terminal phase but are experiencing changes 
in their dynamic due to the gradual withdrawal of US troops 
and the presence of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. There 
are only occasional reports on the remaining conflicts, although 
some of them, such as the one in DR Congo, have indirectly 
led to the death of four million people due to the illness and 
hunger caused by the conflictive context in a failed, corrupt 
and disintegrated state. In other contexts, such as Pakistan, 
unmanned flights are the primary feature, with their attacks on 
civilians who were mistaken for the Taliban. In the wars in the 
Caucasus, the complicit silence of the international community 
conceals a situation of extreme human rights violations and 
repression. Therefore, it should come as no surprise that the 
countries where human rights have been violated the most are 
the ones in situations of conflict.
As mentioned above, almost all the current armed conflicts 
are intra-state, that is, they are happening within a country. 
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Wars between states have practically disappeared, and according 
to the University of Uppsala, in 2014 the only one recorded 
was the conflict between India and Pakistan over Kashmir. The 
School of Peace culture would add the conflict between Israel 
and Palestine. Therefore, the majority of 21st-century conflicts 
are internal, some of them civil wars, others limited to given 
zones within a country, rendering it extraordinarily difficult to 
gauge the scope of the conflict when there are zones that are not 
affected by it.
While in past wars national armies clashed with each other, in 
contemporary conflicts armed forces have to fight against a wide 
range of guerrillas or militias, the new actors of the 21st century. 
The fact that regular wars among armies have disappeared also 
signals the disappearance of the old codes of conduct in war. In 
contemporary conflicts, there are hardly any rules and anything 
goes, including the mutilation and decapitation of civilians, 
massive rapes of women, the execution of prisoners, pillaging 
villages, the wholesale destruction of entire neighbourhoods, 
the destruction of the cultural heritage, the use of anti-personnel 
mines and artefacts for indiscriminate purposes, and, in short, 
anything that triggers terror in the civilian population, which is 
the main victim. This dehumanisation of conflicts comes hand 
in hand with the pillaging of natural resources in regions rich 
in raw materials and strategic minerals, which serve to feed 
the war as the sustenance of armed groups and the mechanism 
through which they exchange natural riches for weapons in an 
infernal circle in which multinational corporations participate 
as they benefit from the lack of oversight in these regions and 
the absence of a state regulator. Unfortunately, many countries 
in conflict are rich in raw materials, and this is precisely why the 
conflict is taking place, a curse in which, once again, the civilian 
population is the main victim.
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Armed conflicts in recent years
Armed conflicts in December 2009: Algeria, Chad, Ethiopia 
(Ogaden), Nigeria (Niger Delta), Central African Republic, DR Congo 
(east), Somalia, Sudan (south), Sudan (Darfur), Uganda (north), 
Colombia, Afghanistan, Philippines (NPA), Philippines (MILF), 
Philippines (Abu Sayaf), India (Assam), India (Jammu and Kashmir), 
India (Manipur), India (CPI-M), Myanmar, Pakistan (Balochistan), 
Pakistan (northwest), Thailand (south), Russia (Chechnya), Russia 
(Ingushetia), Turkey (PKK), Iraq, Israel-Palestine and Yemen.
Total 
conflicts 
(December)
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Years New Ended
2010 Russia (Dagestan) - 30
2011
Burundi
Ivory Coast
Nigeria (Boko Haram)
Sudan (Kordofan and Blue Nile)
Russia (Kabardino-Balkaria)
Iran (northwest)
Yemen (AQPA)
Libya
Syria
Yemen
Chad
Nigeria (Niger Delta)
Ivory Coast (military 
victory)
37
2012 Mali
Philippines (MILF)
Iran (northwest)
Yemen
35
2013 -
Burundi
Russia (Chechnya)
Russia (Ingushetia)
32
2014
DR Congo (east-ADF)
China (Eastern Turkestan)
Ukraine
Egypt (Sinai)
India (Manipur)
Russia (Kabardino 
Balkaria)
34
June 
2015 - - 34
Source: School for a Culture of Peace, “Alert! Report on conflicts, human rights and 
peacebuilding”, 2011 to 2015, and “Barómetro”, June 2015.
Among the conflicts that existed in 1999 and the ones 
that joined them in the six subsequent years, the lethality and 
political, economic, humanitarian, cultural, religious and social 
impact of the armed conflicts in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq 
(the three longest-standing), Libya and Syria,  are worth noting. 
Some of them are interconnected, and they have all had a huge 
destabilising impact on their region, with military interventions 
by third countries and the presence of extremely radicalised 
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Muslim groups. This is an explosive cocktail that is difficult to 
manage, and in some cases impossible to negotiate, at least for 
the time being. Knowing how to interpret the underlying issues 
in each of these conflicts, the deep-seated culture of their actors, 
the existing play of alliances, the limited effect of primarily aerial 
attacks due to the “zero casualties” syndrome of the attackers, 
and other factors, are a prime challenge for political decision-
making centres all over the world, for non-military and military 
defence organisations, for academia, for research into peace 
and for peace, solidarity and human rights movements, not 
to mention for humanitarian organisations, which are totally 
overwhelmed by the number of deaths, injuries, displaced 
persons and refugees, casting doubt on the conflict-prevention 
policy, which was totally non-existent for these cases, and the 
humanitarian response when this prevention fails, which has 
come late and been totally insufficient.
Finding appropriate answers for this almost horizontal 
fan of countries in conflict, in a strategy that must sure have 
common features and broad international participation, is also 
a challenge for those who somehow participate in creating the 
conditions needed to begin a peace process. For the time being, 
humility is needed, along with the need to have a middle- and 
long-term view, not just short-term reactive actions. It would 
also be wise not to limit ourselves to the simplistic tack of 
“demonising” all the actors, despite the extreme cruelty of the 
groups or governments that are playing a leading role in these 
conflicts, as it is better to have a broader, more peripheral view 
in order to grasp what is happening and why. This is only a 
hypothesis, but perhaps the most strategic tack would be to 
control and lower the violence through inclusive negotiations 
in a few from these conflicts, adding the symbolic, contagious 
and reparative potential that resolving the conflict between 
Israel and Palestine could bring, or at least getting it on the 
right track. The United States has a great deal to say about this, 
23
as does Russia in the future of Syria, since it was incapable to 
stopping the barbarism led by president Bashar al-Assad in 
the early stages of the conflict in Syria; indeed, even though 
Assad is an ophthalmologist, he refuses to see the lethal, 
criminal sweep of his decisions. If we add to this self-interested 
myopia the widespread inaction of what we erroneously call 
the “international community”, since it is hardly a community, 
we inevitably get the result we are witnessing today. Finally, we 
should not forget the fact that two-thirds of the armed conflicts 
today are already in the negotiation phase. We have the duty 
to support them so that they conclude with a peace agreement. 
Ultimately, this possibility will clearly help to better deal with 
the conflicts that seem intractable today.
However, the current failure of the way we are dealing with 
these conflicts should not negatively influence the numerous 
attempts to channel many of the remaining armed conflicts 
into the pathways of peace in order to reach agreements that 
will finally put an end to the violence.
In addition to the armed conflicts, in the sphere or global 
conflictiveness we should also consider situations of tension, 
meaning situations in which the pursuit of certain objectives 
or the failure to meet certain demands made by different actors 
leads to high levels of political, social or military mobilisation 
and/or the use of violence at a level of intensity that does not 
quite reach an armed conflict, but which may entail clashes, 
repression, coups d’états or any other kinds of attacks whose 
escalation could degenerate into an armed conflict in certain 
circumstances. According to the figures from the School of 
Peace Culture, in June 2015 there were 94 scenarios of tension 
in the world, most of them in Africa (37) and Asia (25). The 
opposition of political and social sectors to certain government 
policies was the leading cause of the tensions and sometimes 
sparked a harsh response from the authorities. Almost half of the 
conflicts (both armed and those pending resolution that do not 
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currently have an armed expression) are based on a given region’s 
demands for self-governance, either to become autonomous or 
to flatly demand independence, as in Senegal, Sudan, Western 
Sahara, China, Myanmar, India, Thailand, Kurdish Turkistan, 
Chechnya, Kashmir and others. In these cases, the debate 
revolves around how to construct an intermediate political 
architecture that satisfies the identity-based demands. These 
conflicts are difficult to resolve, since they have to deal with 
centralised states and nationalisms that reject other expressions 
of regional nationalism. Furthermore, the widespread fear of 
shifting borders or dividing states hinders the negotiations in 
these conflicts, which tend to reach entrenched impasses. 
Conflicts and peace processes in June 2015
Conflicts and 
peace processes 
ending with a peace 
agreement in 2015
Sudan (Darfur) SLM-MM 1
Armed conflicts 
underway
With consolidated 
peace process
Sudan (Darfur), South Sudan, 
Colombia (FARC), Myanmar 
(NCCT). 
4
With interruptions 
in the process
Mali (north), Ethiopia (ONLF), 
Sudan (Kordofan-Blue 
Nile),  Libya, Central African 
Republic, DR Congo (east), 
Afghanistan, Philippines 
(NPA), India (Assam), Thailand 
(south), Turkey (PKK), 
Ukraine, Israel-Palestine, 
Yemen (al-Houthists).
14
Without formal 
negotiations
Algeria (AQMI), Nigeria 
(Boko Haram), Somalia (al-
Shabaab), Colombia (ELN), 
China (Eastern Turkestan), 
Philippines (Abu Sayaf), 
India (Jammu and Kashmir), 
India (CPI-M), Myanmar 
(KIA), Pakistan (Waziristan), 
Pakistan (Balochistan), Russia 
(Dagestan), Egypt (Sinai), Iraq, 
Syria, Yemen (AQPA).
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Subtotal 38
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Former armed 
conflicts that are not 
resolved and still 
require negotiations 
With consolidated 
peace process
Senegal (MFDC), India 
(NSCN-IM), Cyprus, Kosovo, 
Moldova (Transnistria), 
Armenia-Azerbaijan, Georgia 
(Abkhazia and South Ossetia)
8
With interruptions 
in the process
Sudan-South Sudan, Western 
Sahara, India-Pakistan, 
Philippines (MNLF)
4
Without formal 
negotiations --- 0
Subtotal 12
TOTAL (June 2015)
%
Ended in 2015 (until June) 1 2.1
With consolidated peace process 12 25.5
With interruptions in the process 18 38.3
Without formal negotiations 16 34.0
TOTAL 47 100
In the other half of conflicts, we find struggles to gain 
political power or make structural changes that allow a country 
to become democratic. Numerous guerrillas are fighting for this 
goal, although it is equally true that most of the armed groups 
today lack a specific ideology o politic programme
and are motivated more by interests of political or 
economic power, often linked to the domination and control 
of illicit activities (drug trafficking or the trade in strategic raw 
materials).
It is a proven fact that many conflicts which have peace 
processes end up with deadlocks in the negotiations. The 
years go by and the conflict remains the same, without the 
mechanisms of dialogue bearing fruit. This deadlock is even 
more obvious in conflicts where a ceasefire has been achieved, 
and therefore where there is no significant violence or clashes, 
which leads to the question of whether the lack of violence 
with its consequent loss of media coverage is precisely the 
reason or one of the main reasons for this deadlock. Two of 
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these conflicts (Western Sahara and Cyprus) started in the 
mid-1970s, so they have been underway for 40 years. Except 
in the case of Western Sahara, which had to wait 16 years, all 
the others achieved a ceasefire within a brief period of time. 
They have all had external mediation, with the UN present 
in three of them, and the OSCE, the USA, Russia and the 
EU participating in two of them. In four territories (Western 
Sahara, Transnistria, Nagorno-Karabakh and Abkhazia) there 
is a debate over independence or a formula of self-governance 
expressed through a kind of autonomy which would allow the 
displaced population to return home. In the five territories 
analysed, confidence-building measures are important, either 
to alleviate the current situation or as the first step towards 
future decisions on the intermediate political architecture to 
be determined. In four cases (all except Cyprus), Russia plays 
a more or less decisive role, either from the UN Security 
Council or directly, which places it in a position of the utmost 
responsibility for finding definitive solutions. The mediations 
are not always effective, and they have been questioned in 
more than one case, which has sparked numerous crises in the 
negotiation process. It is worth noting that only two of the five 
conflicts (Western Sahara and Cyprus) are on the UN Security 
Council’s agenda, albeit with totally opposing results. Finally, 
the commitment not to use force and to use exclusively peaceful 
methods is on the agenda of all the conflicts mentioned and is 
vitally important in order to lower the tensions that arise quite 
frequently in some of the sites.
Above we said that the culture of negotiation might gain 
ground in the first few decades of the 21st century, when peace 
processes are destined to be the main figures in the world of 
conflicts. Given that two-thirds of the armed conflicts underway 
today are in negotiations, it is important to know how these 
peace processes that try to put an end to these conflicts are 
faring. This is one of the goals of this book.
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In the prologue to the 2010 “The State of the World” 
report published by the Worldwatch Institute, the founder of 
Grameen Bank, Muhammad Yunus, referred to the shift from 
consumerism to cultures of sustainability as one of the greatest 
cultural shifts imaginable. Almost 40 years since the publication 
of “The Limits of Growth”, the influential report by the Club of 
Rome, no one doubts that now it is both possible and necessary 
to base our future policies on the principles of sustainability, 
revealing that those who predicted precautionary practices and 
environmental care to guarantee the survival of humans decades 
ago were right. However, this paradigm shift has taken place in 
the midst of dynamics that are still catastrophic and damaging. 
But the change lies in the fact that no one can defend them 
now, even if they do persist, and that a future might come in 
which these dynamics are a thing of the past, although for this 
to happen humanity must become aware of its vulnerability as 
a species. A world in which billions of people have to survive on 
less than two dollars a day and where millions of people die of 
hunger as unbridled capitalism lines the pockets of speculators 
is a world condemned to conflict and disorder.
Yet another culture shift that might flourish in the 
forthcoming decades is the end of armed conflicts. By now, as a 
social institution created by humans, war has lost all legitimacy 
as a means of resolving conflicts, and it is increasingly perceived 
as an obsolete instrument of the past. And never before have we 
had as much preventative information to empower us act with 
the weapons of diplomacy at times of tension, when it is still 
possible to alter the destructive course of a spiral of conflict. 
Recalling Yunus’ words, and even appealing to Kant’s thinking, 
we could say that we are witnessing a categorical imperative, 
getting rid of war, in order to instate the reign of ongoing 
dialogue as a way of ensuring our friend Kant’s “perpetual 
peace”. Two hundred and twenty years have gone by since 
this illustrious philosopher wrote his futuristic work, but only 
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a few decades will be needed for humanity to articulate the 
mechanisms with which it can manage and transform conflicts 
to make a lasting, universal peace possible.
We are clearly at a time of transition towards this new 
world. One indicator of this transition is the fact that of the 
conflicts that have ended in the past 40 years (59), 44 were 
through a peace agreement (74.6%) and 11 a military victory 
(18.6%), which reaffirms the route of negotiation as the most 
optimal means of resolving conflicts. At the same time that we 
see these promising figures, we also have to deal with situations 
of extreme violence and political and humanitarian crises. In 
this book, we shall also analyse the conflictive contexts that 
have arisen in recent years, but we also aim to highlight the 
opportunities for intervention in these contexts, which could 
be turned into situation of possible – albeit imperfect – peace 
within a performative continuum that instates new realities and 
an evolution towards this necessary cultural shift which would 
inevitably affect the world of conflicts, so that human beings 
can be free of the threat of destruction.
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II – WHEN WARRIORS VISUALISE PEACE
“After the war there will have to be some great penance done for the killing. 
If we no longer have religion after the war then I think there must be some 
form of civic penance organized that all may be cleansed from the killing or 
else we will never have a true and human basis for living.” 
Anselmo’ thoughts while watching the enemy from the snow, 
in For Whom the Bell Tolls, by Ernest Hemingway
One of the inevitable jobs that any person who analyses 
armed conflicts has to do, especially if they are interested or 
involved in peace negotiations, is ascertaining the reasons that 
influenced the creation of the group and its choice to take 
up weapons, its evolution over the years, and the discourse 
it maintains today to justify its armed struggle or to enter a 
new terrain of peace-building. There is a long list of reasons 
to explain the pathways chosen by these groups at the start of 
a negotiation process, and they are usually political but also 
economic, ethnic, religious and even cultural, and oftentimes 
several of them simultaneously. 
If any of these armed groups considers or agrees to enter 
a negotiation process, the counterpart (the government) and 
the facilitator (if external mediation has been chosen) must be 
totally confident that the armed group is willing to take a very 
difficult step in the future, namely setting down their weapons 
and, if so decided, entering politics with exclusively peaceful, 
democratic instruments. This observation is equally valid for 
governments, since when they enter into negotiations with 
armed groups they have to know that they must give way in 
something and pay a “political price”, a highly demonised term 
among those who think that peace should come at no cost. 
However, it simply does not.
Quite a few years ago, when my youngest daughter was only 
14 years old, she gave me a drawing with the following slogan: 
“War without guns. Fight writers and poets”. Only recently I 
found out that she had copied it from graffiti she saw on the 
street, but it does not matter. I have it hanging to the left of 
my computer, and it always reminds me of the challenge facing 
warriors, who are used to weapons, to continue defending their 
ideas by other means, as writers and poets do. Hence, too, the 
title of this chapter. I planned it in the form of a question: Can 
warriors visualise peace, with the necessary shift in mindset that 
this entails? Can warriors adopt the words of Nelson Mandela 
when he collected his Nobel Peace Prize: “We speak here of the 
challenge of the dichotomies of war and peace, violence and non-
violence, racism and human dignity, oppression and repression 
and liberty and human rights, poverty and freedom from want. 
We stand here today as nothing more than a representative of the 
millions of our people who dared to rise up against a social system 
whose very essence is war, violence, racism, oppression, repression 
and the impoverishment of an entire people”?
In the history of peace processes, there are several examples 
of leaders or prominent commanders of armed groups who, 
usually in a longer or shorter process, have viewed the horizon 
with other eyes, have been awed by a sunrise or sunset and have 
been capable not only of admiring nature but also seeing the 
humanity behind every individual, even if he is their military 
enemy. This process is usually associated with an eye towards 
the future, and with the question of what has been achieved 
so far, sometimes for quite a few decades, through the use of 
weapons. An honest answer means quantifying the number of 
deaths on one’s own side and on the other, the destructuring 
of communities, mass displacements and similar phenomena 
which are in no way creative but instead only destructive. This is 
the Gandhian question on the means that generate terror, hatred 
and repulsion, and it questions the fantasies about whether the 
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armed group is an expression of the people rising up in arms or 
whether it is the living representation of grassroots movements. 
It is extremely easy for the members of armed groups to fool 
themselves about this for a long time, treating social and 
grassroots movements as infantile, vulnerable projects which 
need the support of an armed group. Doing away with this 
false belief is not easy, but it is the necessary condition so that 
when negotiations begin it is the group itself, nothing else, that 
balances the assets, even if it has some degree of social support.
This entire reflection is relevant because all too often the 
exploratory motions to see whether the conditions are in place 
to start peace negotiations show us that some or all the parties 
involved actually do not want to or are not yet prepared to take 
the huge leap forward. Oftentimes, a negotiation can be a pretext 
to buy time, to strengthen militarily, to hide a diminished or 
lost military capacity and many other motives that will never be 
explained to the opponent. Unmasking this deceitful strategy, 
which ends up harming all sides, is crucial from the very start. 
And seeing what is true and false in the parties’ first expressions 
is in no way easy due to the sophistication of the language 
used, designed to trick by using generic, abstract words or 
expressions that are devoid of content. In other words, there 
is no commitment for peace but war tactics and strategies via 
manipulating the offer to begin negotiations.
Going from a discourse that legitimises violence and armed 
confrontation to a new discourse that begins to demythify 
physical violence or war as a means of achieving political ends 
takes time. I shall cite two examples from totally different 
contexts. The first is the Basque pro-independence left 
(Abertzale) and the other is the Colombian guerrillas in the 
FARC. In the former, the organisation Batasuna went from 
being something like the armed wing of ETA, although not 
exactly, to being an organisation that publicly delegitimised the 
use of violence and adopted a nonviolent strategy to achieve its 
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political objectives. This transition, which was misunderstood 
by many Spanish political sectors, required a little over a 
decade. I had the opportunity to watch it very closely, to meet 
some of its main players and to analyse all of their words, either 
aloud or in writing, in interviews and public declarations. ETA, 
on the other hand, barely changed its discourse, or at least it 
was not convincing, meaning that the evolution or conversion 
of its political expression, Batasuna (with the different names 
it was forced to adopt) was what forced ETA to abandon its 
armed struggle through the total lack of grassroots support 
except for highly effective political pressure. This transition to 
the abandonment of physical violence has personal names, and 
strangely some of them have paid for it with prison sentences, 
something that is inconceivable in any other part of the world, 
where despite the pain and suffering caused during the years 
of violence, the merit of those who change their attitude and 
spearhead a peace process is recognised.3
The other example is the FARC in Colombia. From 1999 
to 2002, it was negotiating with the government despite its 
impressive strength in terms of both military troops and territorial 
domination. The peace negotiations turned into a piece of theatre 
on a stage where power could be demonstrated, with a dreadful 
methodology that prevented reasonable agreements from being 
reached. It is likely, according to many people in Colombia 
and the diplomatic corps affected directly by the scene created 
for the event, that the FARC and the Colombian government 
at that time had no real desire for peace, with all this entails 
in terms of ceasing fighting, undertaking structural reforms 
and ultimately disarming the guerrillas. There was no bilateral 
ceasefire during the negotiations, and the FARC dominated 
the theatre of military operations. It was an utter disaster.
3  Fisas, Vicenç, ¿Llegó la hora? Propuestas de paz para el País Vasco, Icaria 
editorial, Barcelona, 2010, 95 p.
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However, in 2012, after several years of military defeats and 
the loss of many members of its Secretariat, new negotiations 
got underway in Cuba with a totally changed FARC that 
was much more realistic, aware that they would never gain a 
military victory (nor would the government), with less popular 
support and in a Latin America governed by the left through 
democratic means. The armed struggle of the Colombian 
guerrillas had become extraordinarily strange, outside of 
history, out of time. However, the most interesting part of 
the story is that several of its top leaders gradually began to 
realise this during the decade between 2002 and 2012. I also 
had the chance to monitor all the pronouncements of these 
leaders day by day during that decade. “Alfonso Cano”, the top 
FARC leader, who was pursued and ultimately murdered in 
cold blood in November 2011, totally unnecessarily since the 
FARC was disarming at that time, had this vision of the future. 
Furthermore, he had been recognised as having the wherewithal 
to lead his organisation along a new pathway, which took shape 
the following year in the start of formal talks in Havana, but by 
then without him. In the “Yearbooks of Peace Processes” from 
2010, 2011 and 2012, which summarise the events from 2009 
to 2011,4 I included each of the communiqués issued by FARC 
during those years, when it was totally clear how far advanced 
the organisation’s new political discourse was, despite the fact 
that it continued to wage its armed struggle in view of the lack 
of a bilateral agreement. In May 2009, the commander who 
later became the top leader of the FARC, “Timochenko”, stated 
that his organisation was fully committed to the quest for a 
negotiated political solution because they were convinced that 
the solution should not come through military confrontation. 
In July 2010, “Alfonso Cano” recorded a celebrated video 
which became famous for his plea to engage in talks and seek 
4  Fisas, Vicenç, Yearbook of Peace Processes from 2010, 2011 and 2012, Icaria 
editorial, Barcelona.
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a political solution to the conflict. The ELN guerrillas, in turn, 
also started their own process of demythifying war, especially 
after 2011, and began to use terminology that is common in 
education for peace, which was quite a contradiction since 
they were simultaneously maintaining their armed struggle and 
defending their right to an armed rebellion to the end. However, 
my goal is not only to expose their contradictions but also to 
note whether a discourse that finally translates into peace began 
to mature, without entering into contradictions and justifying 
the old and ill-fated principle of “combining all the forms of 
struggle”, which had such tragic consequences in Colombia.
Continuing in this same country, but now further in the 
past, we should recall the visionary attitude of Jaime Bateman 
Cayón, the head of the M-19 guerrillas, who defined himself 
in an interview as a “prophet of peace”. In April 1980, in an 
interview with the journalist Germán Castro Caycedo, he 
invited several politicians, scholars, literati and military officers 
to meet in Panama to discuss where the country was heading 
and whether there was any possibility of halting the war. As a 
core point, he suggested that the state of siege and the Statute of 
Security be lifted. Only under those conditions, he said, would 
his group be willing to shift to legal activity.5 Unfortunately, 
the government rejected the proposal. Upon Bateman’s death, 
those who followed him in command (Iván Ospina, Alvaro 
Fayad and Carlos Pizarro) continued waving the banners of 
political negotiation and peace. Pizarro finally signed the peace 
agreement in March 1990. Previously, he had had this ability to 
serve as a “guide” and to visualise peace, with the full conviction 
that the time had come to lay down weapons and instead engage 
in politics. M-19’s final route had a decisive influence on the 
peace project of the Colombian guerrillas, who laid down their 
weapons in 1992.
5  Villamizar, Darío, Jaime Bateman. Biografía de un revolucionario, Taller de 
Edición Rocca, Bogotá, 2015. 
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To pose an example of the opposite of this visualisation that 
the time has come to build a scenario without armed violence, 
even to combat the other types of violence that are equally or 
even more deadly, such as the kind caused by structural violence 
in numerous countries on the planet, I shall discuss an Asian 
guerrilla group which I prefer not to identify, which has been 
trying to negotiate with several governments of its country for 
decades, without any tangible results. I had the chance to speak 
with its negotiators ten years apart and I truly had the sense 
that in this intervening decade their discourse, an authentic 
apologia for the armed struggle, had not changed one iota. 
Why, then, make the effort to try negotiating again? The top 
leader of the group explained this unabashedly in a book he 
had written, where he explained that “negotiation is part of our 
war strategy”. After the last attempt, which also failed, to try to 
reopen negotiations, I wrote a letter to this leader with courteous 
yet clear language, perhaps overly clear, with the following 
reflection, ending with a question: “Based on my experience of 
observing how all the peace negotiations in the world have fared 
in the past 20 or 30 years, I have reached the conclusion that the 
only negotiations that move forward and be successful are those in 
which from the very start the two clashing parties have both a clear 
desire and a profound conviction about reaching a final agreement, 
with the flexibility that this means throughout the process, and 
both parties are convinced that continuing the armed struggle will 
never be the way to reach an agreement. The historical time always 
comes in which the two parties reach the conclusion that political 
participation and the fulfilment of human rights are or should 
be two complementary pathways through which they can achieve 
political, social and economic transformations. It is a time when 
the use of weapons as an instrument of change ends up making no 
sense … I wonder whether you have reached this time of conviction 
about the need to shift from an armed to a political struggle through 
negotiations, as the majority of armed groups in the world are doing.”
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As I assumed from the start, the letter received no 
response, confirming my suspicion that they were unable to 
openly state that they had not reached the conclusion that 
the time had come, after decades of armed struggle, to take 
the step towards politics as an instrument of transformation. 
Therefore, clarifying this point is the first step in knowing 
whether starting negotiations makes sense or not. I have 
spoken a lot about the attitude of armed groups, but the same 
holds true for the governments that have to negotiate with 
them. If they are truly willing and do not demand too many 
preconditions, the explorations will make progress and an 
agreement on how to carry out the negotiation will be reached, 
along with the topics to appear on the agenda of the talks.
Everything said so far is valid for negotiation attempts in 
which armed groups with a specific agenda and ideology and 
governments that are more or less democratic participate. 
However, I should warm that in more than half of the cases 
today and in recent times, those who have sat at a negotiation 
table have not met these requirements. Unfortunately, there are 
numerous armed groups that only want to take their share of 
the loot, be it economic, military or political, or that want to 
control the natural resources in a region. In these cases, they have 
neither ideologies nor praiseworthy or humanist underpinnings. 
It is a pure power struggle. Hence the considerable number of 
“peace processes” that actually are not peace processes at all 
because they do not entail the advent of democracy or greater 
freedom for individuals or improvements in their wellbeing and 
everything else that can be expected when weapons are silenced. 
What is more, in some cases the situation becomes even worse, 
and internal struggles to wrest control of the country or part 
of it emerge. And if we are honest, we have to recognise that 
the signing of an “agreement” does not necessarily mean the 
arrival of peace, which is a concept linked to social justice, 
good governance, respect for human rights and meeting the 
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population’s basic needs, among other things.
There are “peace agreements” (sic) two or three pages long 
in which the parties forgive each other for their past sins and 
divvy up the power. Nothing else. I recommend a perusal of 
some of these agreements to see the abysmal differences between 
these “content-less pacts” and the ones that truly try to change 
scenarios.6 Without a doubt, the latter require more time, they 
sometimes seek societal participation and they encounter severe 
resistance in dominant sectors. In the first kind of agreement, no 
“guides” are needed, nor visionary warriors nor bold politicians 
with a capacity to transcend themselves; instead, ambition 
and power are the only requirements. Negotiations with these 
groups are merely bargains for favours and sinecures. Therefore, 
we shall focus on the second kind of negotiations, the only ones 
that are capable of creating the conditions needed to transform 
society and benefit the people. Here is where a methodology is 
needed, where past experiences must be taken into account and 
where a great deal of imagination must be applied to the effort 
to achieve a peace agreement.
6  Peace Accords MATRIX,  https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/, United Nations 
Peacemaker, http://peacemaker.un.org/
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III - DESIGN AND ARCHITECTURE OF 
PEACE PROCESSES: LESSONS LEARNED 
SINCE THE CRISIS7
This study aims to propose frameworks and models for 
the initial stages of negotiations, and make suggestions for 
their redesign that take into account the most common crises 
inevitably arising part way through the process. A range of 
variables will be used to analyse different methodologies and 
forms of mediation and facilitation, along with the kinds of actor 
that may be involved, resulting in some 120 recommendations. 
This work is based on the author’s own experience both of 
monitoring the peace processes of the last 15 years and of being 
actively involved in a number of them.
Common options in the initial design of negotiations
Definitions and arrangements in peace processes
A negotiation is understood as being the process by which 
two or more opposing parties (either countries or internal actors 
7  This chapter was originally published in English by the Norwegian Peace-
building Resource Centre (NOREF) in April 2015. (http://www.peacebuilding.
no/var/ezflow_site/storage/original/application/4408bde5007e7fe2698cdb-
b81c4790e0.pdf ). The author wishes to thank NOREF for its cooperation.
within a country) decide to discuss their differences within an 
agreed framework in order to find a satisfactory solution to 
their demands. This negotiation may be direct or facilitated 
by third parties. Formal negotiations usually have a prior or 
exploratory phase during which the framework (format, 
place, conditions, guarantees, etc.) of the future negotiation 
is established. A peace process is understood as being the 
consolidation of a negotiation once the thematic agenda (the 
list of substantive issues forming the object of negotiation), 
the procedures to be followed, the timetable and facilitation 
have been defined. Negotiation is therefore just one stage in a 
peace process. There are also, albeit rarely, negotiations that 
take place without any “negotiating architecture”, in other 
words, when a conflict is approached via a number of different 
directions or actors and within what may be either a more or 
less frequent timeframe but without one single methodology 
or dialogue. This is how the conflict in Ukraine was handled in 
2014 and 2015, for example, particularly in February 2015 by 
Germany and France.
A “ceasefire” is understood as being the military decision to 
stop any fighting or use of weapons for a specified period while 
“cessation of hostilities” includes, in addition to a ceasefire, a 
commitment not to kidnap, harass civilians, threaten, etc.
Depending on the final objectives sought and the dynamic 
followed during the different stages of the negotiation, most 
peace processes can be categorised into one of the following 
five categories or models, although there are some examples of 
processes that combine more than one:
a) Simple demobilisation and reintegration;
b) Political, military or economic power sharing;
c) Exchange (peace for democracy, peace for territories, 
peace for withdrawal, peace for recognition of rights, etc.);
d) Confidence-building measures;
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e) Forms of self-government or “intermediary political 
architectures”.
The model normally depends on the kinds of demand 
being made and the capacity of the actors to exert pressure or to 
make those demands (extent of the military, political or social 
symmetry), although the accompaniment and facilitation, the 
exhaustion of the actors, the support they receive and other 
less rational factors linked to leaders’ pathologies, imaginaries 
or historical inertia also have an influence. Occasionally, albeit 
rarely, and particularly if the process is a long-drawn-out one, 
it may be that it starts as one of the indicated categories (“a” 
for example) but the demands increase until the process turns 
into another more complex category. It is also important to 
recall that not all processes or their exploratory, dialogue and 
negotiation phases are conducted with true sincerity, since they 
often form part of a continuing strategy of war, either to win 
time, gain an international dimension and make their struggle 
more widely known, re-arm or even for other reasons.
Finally, it should be noted that what we commonly call a 
“peace process” is actually none other than a “process to bring 
an end to the violence and armed struggle”. The signing of 
a ceasefire and the subsequent signing of a peace accord is no 
more than the start of the real “peace process”, linked to a stage 
known as “post-war rehabilitation” or “post-armed conflict”, 
always difficult but which is really where decisions will be taken 
and policies implemented which, if successful, will enable the 
violence (structural and cultural) to be overcome and people to 
truly speak of having “achieved peace”.
The broad stages of a peace process
All peace processes require a great deal of time, as can be 
seen from the many years that often have to be devoted to 
initiating them and bringing them to fruition. In general, and 
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with very few exceptions, they follow a pattern of fairly well-
known stages with the most time devoted to the negotiations. 
They commence with an initial exploratory phase, also known 
as the pre-negotiation or exploration, in which the people 
involved (“explorers”) gauge the conviction of the parties, i.e. 
whether they truly wish to commence a process of negotiation 
in which they will have to cede something. This is a decisive 
moment as negotiations can often take place without any 
real conviction on one side, either government or armed 
group. If this is the case, the negotiations will be doomed to 
failure. It is during the exploratory phase that the complete 
and absolute security of the future negotiators must also be 
considered, as there have been cases of representatives being 
murdered or attacked, and no-one will venture to establish 
a dialogue without full and clearly-defined guarantees as to 
their security. Moreover, certain guarantees must be sought 
with regard to fulfilling the commitments made at this stage, 
which includes agreeing the timetable and methodology to 
be followed, establishing a pre-agenda or initial agenda 
and clarifying the conflictive aspects around which there is 
basic disagreement or fundamental incompatibilities (the 
meta-conflict). This stage, in short, seeks to create confidence 
in the process, agrees the role to be played by third parties, 
rejects the imposition of plans (which are the basis of the 
negotiation itself ) and results in each party recognising their 
adversary and granting them the necessary legitimacy to 
negotiate. Once the exploratory work has been completed, 
an “agreement on what needs to be agreed” is reached and 
the process can now move onto “how to do it”. The sum of 
all these steps forms what is sometimes known as a “road 
map” or initial framework of what needs to be done to bring 
the process to its successful conclusion. The roadmap is 
simply an outline of work, often with a diagram setting out 
the steps to be taken, that provides guidance to the process.
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Once the formal negotiations have commenced, the parties 
need to make sure that the negotiators are valid, i.e. that they 
do indeed represent the main players with decision-making 
capacity. There is no room for minor players at the negotiating 
table, and so it is always necessary to start from an inclusive 
approach that gives a voice to actors who the other party may not 
want to talk to but who are key to resolving the conflict. There 
is clearly no point in inviting friendly, more accommodating, 
actors to the table if they are not your true adversaries. The 
main purpose of the negotiation is for opposing parties to sit 
down and talk with a view to achieving something of mutual 
benefit in what is known as a “win-win” scenario, foregoing 
zero-sum approaches in which there are winners and losers.
If the negotiations make satisfactory progress then the 
issues on the substantive agenda may be discussed (the 
procedure will already have been agreed in advance). As 
trust will have been created, personal relationships may also 
emerge that will enable agreements (even if only partial) and 
their respective protocols to be more easily achieved, thus 
enabling a final agreement to be reached. This will specify 
how it is to be implemented and by whom. This leads us, 
finally, to the implementation agreements, verification 
methods and ways of resolving the possible disagreements 
that may arise in the final stages.
In the usual scheme of progress, then, one starts with initial 
direct or indirect, formal or informal contacts. Exploratory steps 
with a little more content, whether formal or informal, can lead 
to the start of a more or less formal “dialogue”, or directly to 
a “formal negotiation”. The difference between “dialogue” and 
“negotiation” is very subtle, and these processes can sometimes 
be the same. It depends on the emphasis that one of the parties 
wishes to place on the process, as the public disclosure of the fact 
that a “negotiation” has been commenced with one’s “opponent” 
always has a political cost that the parties will need to gauge.
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Informal indirect contact
Formal indirect contact
Informal direct contact
Formal direct contact
Informal explorations
Formal explorations
Informal dialogue
Formal dialogue
Formal negotiations (Formal process)
The time needed for negotiations
One of the most hotly discussed issues at the start of a 
peace process and which, once negotiations are underway, 
may be a cause for crisis, is the optimum duration of the 
negotiations. Governments often set conditions or take a firm 
stance with regard to achieving rapid negotiations that can be 
completed within their term of office. A comparative analysis 
of 13 completed negotiations shows, however, that it is not 
always possible to reach a rapid agreement, and that periods 
ranging from 4 (Nepal) to 21 years (Northern Ireland) are more 
usual, bearing in mind that a number of cycles or attempts are 
necessary in some cases. A classic discussion in this regard is 
the situation of Colombia and the FARC, where the president 
initially indicated that the negotiations had to be completed 
within a year, a statement that later had to be amended a 
number of times given the reality of the situation, for which a 
period of at least three years was more prudent.
Period of
negotiation Years Mediation Main reason
El Salvador 1984-1994 10 UN Democratisation of the country
Guatemala 1985-1996 11 UN Democratisation of the country
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Northern 
Ireland 1987-2008 21 - Self-government
Angola 1988-2002 14 Portugal, Russia, USA. Political power sharing
South Africa 1989-1994  5 - Democratisation of the country
Liberia 1990-2003 13 ECOWAS Political power sharing
Tajikistan 1992-1997  5 UN Political power sharing
Sierra Leone 1994-2002  8 UN Political power sharing
South Sudan 1998-2005  7 IGAD Self-government
Burundi 1998-2008 10 TanzaniaSouth Africa Political power sharing
Indonesia 
(Aceh) 2000-2005  5
HDC
Finland Self-government
Nepal 2002-2006  4 - Democratisation of the country
Philippines 
(MILF) 2001-2014 13 Malaysia Self-government
Source: Fisas, Vicenç, Yearbook 2015 on Peace Processes, School for a Culture of 
Peace, 2015
The total time a negotiation takes normally depends 
on two factors: first, the number of cycles needed to reach 
an agreement (more than one cycle needs to be held if an 
agreement has not been reached at the end of the first cycle and 
a deep crisis ensues, forcing the process to begin again - possibly 
after a lengthy period of time and even possibly with a new 
methodology and new accompaniers); and, second, the pace 
and frequency of the rounds of talks in a particular cycle.8 A 
8  A “cycle” is a series of meetings or “rounds” that take place regularly. When 
the negotiations break down, a period of time needs to pass (possibly a number 
of years) before starting a new cycle, which will again consist of a number of 
meetings or rounds. For example, between 2005 and 2007, the Colombian ELN 
held a “cycle” of meetings with the Colombian government, in Cuba, consisting 
of 8 meetings or “rounds”. Each “round” lasted 2, 3 or 15 days. In 2007, the 
negotiations broke down and thus also the cycle, and it was not until 2013 that 
further exploratory talks commenced which, if successful, will enable a new 
“cycle” to commence, with a particular number of “rounds” as yet unknown.
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monthly frequency (as in the case of the FARC in Cuba or, at one 
point, the negotiations between Sudan and what was to become 
South Sudan) will always give better results than a frequency, 
for example, of every 11 months (as in the extreme case of the 
Philippine NDF, doomed to continual failure at such a dilatory 
pace), every 6 months (Senegal-MFDC) or every 3.7 months 
(average in the last cycle for the Western Sahara). This can be 
seen from the following table. It should be noted, however, that 
the complexity of the agenda and other circumstances (which 
we consider later) mean that some negotiations require almost 
100 rounds (there were 80 rounds with the NSCN-IM in 
Nagaland), while others may need just 10 or 20. It depends on 
many variables. The following table does not show negotiations 
that were previously conducted and then paused for a long 
period of time, breaking the cycle. The table thus refers only 
to the last cycle or attempt. In any case, the best thing is to 
agree an intensive pace of talks (as previously mentioned, 
once a month is the best option) and to block out all external 
factors linked to the political and military confrontation. A 
round tends to last between 3 and 15 days, depending on 
the availability of the parties and the complexity of the agenda.
Intensity of rounds of talks (situation in December 2014)
Country Armed Group
Cycle of last 
negotiation 
analysed
No. of 
rounds
Average 
frequency of 
rounds
Mali MNLA 12/2012 – 12/2014
(3 in November 
2014) Irregular
Senegal 
(Casamance) MFDC
4/2012 – 
12/2014
Exploratory 
phase
5 (minimum) Every 6 months
Sudan 
(Darfur)
JEM 
(Bashar)
10/2012 – 
10/2013 5 (minimum) Every 2 months
Sudan 
(Darfur)
JEM 
(Ibrahim)
4/2014 – 
12/2014 6 (minimum) Every 1.3 months
Sudan 
(Kordofan and 
Blue Nile)
SPLM-N 12/2013 – 12/2014 4 (minimum) Every 3 months
47
South Sudan SPLA-IO 1/2014 – 12/2014 8 Every 1.5 months
Sudan- South 
Sudan ---
9/2012 – 
12/2014 8 Every 2.6 months
Western 
Sahara
Polisario 
Front
8/2009 – 
9/2012 10 Every 3.7 months
Colombia FARC 9/2012 – 12/2014 31 Every 0.9 months
Colombia ELN 12/2005 – 8/2007 8 Every 2.5 months
India 
(Nagaland) NSCN-IM
1997 – 
12/2014 80 Every 2.5 months
Burma UNFC 1/2013 – 12/2014 8 Every 2.9 months
Philippines MILF 12/2009 – 1/2014 29 Every 1.7 months
Philippines NDF 2/2011 – 12/2014 4 Every 11 months
Thailand BRN 3/2013 – 12/2014 7 Every 3 months
 Cyprus
(Not an 
armed 
conflict)
2014
In May 2014, the 
two communities 
decided to meet 
every 15 days
Moldova 
(Transnistria)
(Not an 
armed conflict)
12/2011 – 
12/2014 8 Every 4.5 months
Armenia-
Azerbaijan
(Not an 
armed 
conflict)
2014
The two 
presidents met 
three times in 
three months
Georgia 
(Abkhazia 
and South 
Ossetia)
(Not an 
armed 
conflict)
2008-2014 30 Every 2.4 months
Mediation
Eighty percent (80%) of the negotiations taking place 
in 2014 made use of external mediation, whether from 
neighbouring countries, countries with a long tradition of 
facilitation (Norway, for example), regional organisations 
(African Union and the OSCE, for example), specialist centres 
(Community of Sant’Egidio, HD Centre for Humanitarian 
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Dialogue, Crisis Management Initiative, etc.), individual 
countries, a group of countries established as a “troika”, 
“quartet” or “contact group”, the United Nations, or even 
remote countries that offer some confidence to the armed group 
entering into negotiations.
As will be seen further on, the correct choice of facilitating 
persons, countries or organisations is essential for a good 
start, although never an absolute guarantee that this 
facilitation will work for the whole process. Mistrust can 
often arise, along with accusations of bias, verbal disagreements, 
abandonment, proposals for sudden changes, etc., which call 
for a complete redesign of the negotiating framework and its 
accompaniers. As of the end of 2014, the situation was the 
following:
Facilitation in 2015 
Mali Algeria
Senegal 
(Casamance) Community of Sant’Egidio
Ethiopia (ONLF) Kenya
Sudan (National 
Dialogue) AU, Troika (USA, United Kingdom, Norway)
Sudan (Darfur) AU, Chad, Berghof Foundation
Sudan (South Kordofan 
and Blue Nile) AU (Thabo Mbeki)
Sudan-South 
Sudan AU (Thabo Mbeki), UN (Francis Mading Deng)
South Sudan AU, IGAD (Seyoum Mesfin), Tanzania, CMI (Itonde Kahoma), Ethiopia
CAR  Gabon, International Contact Group, Kenya, Community of Sant’Egidio, HD, Chad, Congo
DR Congo (FDLR) Uganda, Community of Sant’Egidio
Libya UN (Bernardino León), Algeria
Western Sahara UN (Christopher Ross)
Colombia (FARC) Norway, Cuba (guarantors)
Colombia (ELN) Ecuador, Brazil, Norway (guarantors)
Afghanistan Qatar, China, Pakistan
India (Assam) -
India (Manipur) -
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India (Nagaland) -
India-Pakistan -
Philippines (MILF) Malaysia 
Philippines (MNLF) Indonesia, OIC
Philippines (NDF/
NPA) Norway (Elisabeth Slåttum)
Thailand (south) Malaysia (Aksara Kerdpol, Datuk Seri Ahmad Zamzamin Hashmin)
Burma -
Cyprus UN (Espen Barth Eide)
Kosovo Troika (Russia, USA, EU), UN (L. Zannier)
Moldova OSCE (Radojko Bogojevic)
Turkey -
Ukraine OSCE (Heidi Tagliavini), Contact Group (Russia, OSCE, Ukraine), Germany, France, EU (Federica Mogherini), USA
Armenia-
Azerbaijan Minsk Group of the OSCE (France, Russia and USA) 
Georgia UN, OSCE, EU, Russia
Israel-Palestine USA, Egypt
Crisis situations in recent years
The annual monitoring conducted through its Yearbooks 
by the Peace Process Programme of the School for a Culture 
of Peace has enabled a cumulative total of 116 reasons for 
crisis to be listed over the 2010-2013 period (those for 2014, 
broken down by country, are given in the following chapter). 
Some of them are repeated across a number of years, indicating 
that there are recurrent problems and concrete processes that 
are having persistent difficulties. Crises are therefore not always 
fleeting but may be structural or due to an unresolved 
defect in the negotiation design. The following table lists 
these reasons, without repeating cases that occurred more than 
once over the four-year period, and highlighting those that are 
related to the design of the process and/or mediation, i.e. 
41 cases, or 35.3% (a little more than a third). This enables 
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us to conclude that there is a high probability of risk in 
the early stages of the process, i.e. the design stage, which 
normally takes place during the exploratory phase. This table 
enables us to anticipate the kinds of problem that can arise 
in a negotiating process. It may therefore be useful, for a given 
situation, to consider in advance the possible crises that could 
arise during the process, thus enabling a preventive strategy to 
be designed aimed at avoiding these situations.
Reasons for crisis in the exploratory phase of recent negotiations9 
(2010-2013)
Imposition of preconditions
Differences between the subjects to be decided on in the initial phase
Disputes between countries in terms of leading the negotiations
Disagreement with the government negotiator
Declaration of one of the parties as “persona non grata” to the representative 
of the regional mediating body
Withdrawal of mediator
Criticism of mediator
Rejection or mistrust of facilitator or mediator
Unease at the mediation of a third country
Reduction or expansion of the frequency of rounds of talks
Criticism of the negotiating model
Rejection of a ceasefire at the start of negotiations
Imprisonment of members of the negotiating team or team of consultants
Non-recognition of the other party’s representatives
Demand for an end to the violence or abandonment of armed struggle at the 
start of the negotiations
Disagreement over where to hold the meetings
Demand for international accompaniment
Ban on negotiators travelling
Refusal to dialogue with a government in exile
Overlap with a peace accord signed with another group in the region
Disagreement over the format of the negotiations and the countries to be involved
Infiltration of secret negotiations
Demand for greater involvement from a neighbouring country
Murder of a mediator
Prior requirement for clarification of political positions
9  Linked to the design of the process and/or mediation.
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Refusal of a country’s armed groups to conduct separate negotiations1
Demands for freedom of movement for an armed group’s negotiator
Rejection of external mediation
Refusal by one of the parties to hold a new round of talks
Refusal to grant a general amnesty to members of an armed group
Rejection of the mediating body or mediation format
Mediator’s bias
Detention of lead negotiators from the armed opposition
Failure to release some lead negotiators from the armed opposition
Lack of trust
Refusal to share negotiations with other groups
Lack of valid spokesperson
Lack of freedom of movement for negotiators
Lack of guarantees of negotiators’ safety
Requirement for the presence of mediators in the negotiations
One party in a coalition government disagreed with the negotiations
Recommendations aimed at commencing the exploratory 
phase with a good negotiation process
Based on the above table, common sense shows that the parties10 
involved in agreeing the design of the negotiation process in the 
exploratory phase should bear the following aspects in mind:
•	 The first and overall objective of an exploratory phase is 
to reach the compelling conclusion that both parties are 
fully prepared to put an end to the armed confrontation 
and to reach sufficient common positions in order to sign, 
in the final stage, a peace accord, on the premise that 
everyone will come out as a winner and no-one will lose 
everything, the classic “win-win” scenario.11
10. This refers to the opposing parties (government and armed group) and not the 
facilitators, who can make suggestions, in some cases, but not take decisions.
11  If one of the parties does not trust in the good intentions of the other, an 
agreement to begin negotiations will not be reached. If external facilitation has 
already been agreed in this exploratory phase, this third party can be of great 
help in establishing whether there is a real will on the part of both parties to 
negotiate seriously.
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•	 To reach this first conclusion on the sincere willingness 
of the parties, there is a need to observe and analyse the 
non-verbal communication and “underlying culture” 
of the actors, their fears, their dreams, their deep-rooted 
ideals, their basic needs, their age and sex, their family 
circumstances, their military and negotiating history, their 
concept of “peace”, their vision of systemic issues, their 
international relations, the importance of their support 
base, their social and community dimension, their level of 
popular acceptance, etc.
•	 As an exercise, it is interesting to take a look at photos of how 
delegation members look or act towards each other, whether 
they are smiling or are serious and formal, if they greet each 
other with affection and humanity or refuse to say hello, 
whether they eat together or separately. These observations, 
which may change over the months or years of contact, can 
notably influence confidence building and whether risky 
steps are taken. The case of the FARC and Colombian 
government negotiators in Havana is a case in point.
•	 It is common for one of the parties to send out “smoke 
signals” (insinuations which may or may not be clear) as 
to their willingness to commence an exploratory dialogue. 
Both parties need to be alert and assess the real meaning of 
these possible approaches.
•	 It is advisable to analyse the positive role that diasporas can 
play, as many leaders of armed groups are living in exile in 
another country, and the first contact may be made from there.
•	 During the exploratory phase, it is often advisable to spend 
time clarifying the “meta-conflict”, in other words, 
each party’s concept and interpretation of the origins 
and development of the conflict. Reaching a minimum 
number of points of agreement (which is probably the 
most that can be expected at this stage), will help in 
sharing a minimum “meta-peace”, i.e. what each party 
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understands as “peace”. In this regard, it should be recalled 
from the above that, in some negotiations, there are some 
governments who want no more than to disarm the 
armed group, possibly accompanied by a Disarmament, 
Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) programme but 
without addressing the structural causes of the conflict. 
It should, however, be noted that most armed groups 
currently in existence do not have a political programme 
that includes socio-economic reforms and are content 
to participate in political, military and economic power 
sharing (sharing of the “booty”). Because of the above, all 
government delegations and external facilitators needs 
to know precisely what the armed group in question 
wants out of the process. Getting this wrong means 
immediate failure in the attempt to negotiate.
•	 The exploratory phase needs to be confidential and 
protected from internal and external pressure on the part of 
people who may want to know “what’s going on”. This aspect 
must be addressed at the start of the exploratory phase. If 
confidentiality is agreed then the issue of avoiding any 
infiltration by one of the parties must be taken seriously 
because this always creates a great deal of “noise” and 
misinterpretation. Many armed groups would prefer more 
transparency in this phase but this creates difficulties in terms 
of ensuring the flexibility of initial positions which, if made 
public, could be criticised by the parties’ support bases. One 
must not “play to the gallery”, or send only messages of 
strength, toughness and immovability to “one’s supporters”, as 
this attitude runs counter to the very nature of the negotiation 
process, which involves making mutual concessions.
•	 An agreement needs to be reached as to whether or not a party 
can place preconditions on commencing the exploratory 
phase. Ideally, there should be no preconditions at the start 
although, as this phase proceeds, both parties may agree 
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initial undertakings in order to build confidence and 
enter the next stage, that of the “formal negotiations”, with 
a greater degree of trust and less pressure.
•	 Many negotiations fail in their initial phase because one of 
the parties, normally the government, imposes a unilateral 
ceasefire or cessation of hostilities on the armed group as 
a precondition. Ideally, the ceasefire should be bilateral, 
whether from the start or middle of the process or in the 
final phase. This aspect needs to be clearly specified in the 
exploratory phase. It should also be noted that a ceasefire 
is often flouted and this serves as an excuse for breaking 
off negotiations, sometimes permanently. Hence the 
importance of the negotiations being shielded from the 
course of the war from the start. It is desirable that the 
parties agree not to leave the table for whatever reason.
•	 The political level required of the negotiators needs to be 
clarified to ensure they are able to take initial decisions even 
though both parties will need to consult either the Head 
of State or Government (in the case of the government 
delegation) or the highest political or military leader of the 
armed group on a number of occasions. If there is no valid 
representative, the process will fail. Very often, in the first 
and highly tentative stages of the exploratory phase, people 
of a lower level participate who are unable to take decisions 
but only to pass them on to their superiors. Later, however, 
high-ranking individuals need to be involved. An imbalance 
in the decision-making capacity of the two delegations, 
as was the case in the initial meetings with the ELN in 
2013, can temporarily paralyse the exploratory phase. 
In this regard, it is essential that both parties recognise 
each other as legitimate representatives in the dialogue 
from the start, however distant they may be politically and 
however terrifying their past may be.
•	 Very early on, the parties must come to an agreement 
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as to whether they want or need external mediation or, 
in contrast, if they prefer direct negotiations, without 
intermediaries, as in India’s historic position with regard 
to the dispute over Kashmir with Pakistan, in which it 
has never accepted outside mediation. In the first case, 
when third-party facilitation is accepted, the parties need 
to carefully evaluate the pros and cons of choosing a 
particular country, regional or international organisation 
or concrete person. “Forced facilitation” by a superpower, 
a body or country with great influence, must be avoided at 
all costs. There are often hordes of offers, some generous, 
others self-serving and which it is best to dismiss, at least 
as regards the role of facilitator. It is highly inadvisable, 
given the experience of many different processes, to 
have “multiple facilitators” or an approach that involves 
many accompaniers, as this creates confusion as to the 
role each of them is to play. If it is agreed that a country 
or organisation will intervene as official facilitator, then 
the capacity of the people allocated to the process by 
said countries or organisations also needs to be considered 
because it will be these people and teams that have ultimate 
responsibility for professionally steering the negotiations in 
the right direction. In any case, it is important that the 
two parties share the same conviction that the person 
chosen is the most appropriate at that time.
•	 External mediation, in whichever phase, must be neutral 
and impartial, it must not express preferences towards 
either party even if it has them, and must fulfil its mission 
of helping the parties themselves to progress towards a 
consensus on the issues raised.
•	 A well-known and high-ranking person (president or 
former president, for example), does not necessarily have the 
practical knowledge to handle negotiations. Experience 
in this field is of considerable value.
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•	 If serious difficulties emerge with the person conducting 
the facilitation in the exploratory phase, the problem 
needs to be addressed with the utmost honesty and as 
soon as possible, in order to decide whether to change the 
person or the whole team. There have been situations in 
which one of the parties has ended up calling the facilitator 
“persona non grata”. There are also facilitators that lack 
patience and who give up on their task very early on, when 
patience is of the utmost importance. Being involved in an 
exploratory phase or a formal negotiation is not the same as 
attending a hospital “emergencies” department, it is more 
like attending therapy. It is always best to change rather 
than to continue with poor facilitators or simply with a 
person who does not enjoy the trust and respect of both 
parties. It is also clear that it is not at all positive to keep 
changing facilitator, as this could suggest that the problem 
lies not with the facilitation but with the positions of 
the parties, which are often “intransigent”. The case of 
the Western Sahara is typical of a peace process in which 
no-one wishes to take responsibility for the historic lack 
of progress made in the negotiations. It may be that the 
facilitators are not particularly capable but the problem 
does not always lie with them.
•	 The time lag between meetings has been shown to increase 
in line with a sense of failure. It is therefore advisable 
that both parties agree to meet at a certain frequency. 
When this is not possible, for whatever reason, and the 
rounds of meetings are postponed significantly (silences 
of six months or a year, for example), it may be better 
to end the cycle and wait a certain time before starting 
again, perhaps with a new approach, methodology, 
accompaniers and rules of play. Breaking a cycle is serious 
and counterproductive and the parties need to be aware 
of the price they will pay for this.
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•	 It is necessary at whatever stage of the process, including the 
exploratory phase, to guarantee the security and physical 
integrity of all team members. There are numerous 
examples of captures, murders and disappearances of 
people involved in negotiations, particularly from the 
armed groups. The State must make a commitment clearly 
and in writing not to arrest any of the members of the 
negotiating team, and this means lifting arrest warrants 
and other similar aspects. The members of a negotiating 
team must, at all stages, be able to travel freely to the agreed 
meeting places. There is in this regard a problem of groups 
affected by the existence of lists of terrorists, in the EU 
and USA primarily, which explains why, in Europe, many 
of the negotiations with these groups can only take place in 
Norway or Switzerland, countries that are outside the EU.
•	 It has, on a number of occasions, been necessary to 
release people from prison so that they can form part 
of a negotiating team, whether on parole, under house 
arrest or by some other means. There are also just a few 
(albeit interesting) examples, such as the case of the ELN 
in Colombia, whereby a government has allowed a “peace 
office” to be established inside a prison so that the 
imprisoned leaders of an armed group can participate in the 
exploratory phase or formal negotiations. Many of the initial 
contacts with an armed group begin in prison or in the 
countries in which one or more of their leaders are exiled.
•	 The country and place where the initial meetings are to 
take place will need to be agreed during the exploratory 
phase. Subsequently, also by mutual agreement, the 
country and place of the formal negotiations will need 
to be agreed, which may be different from the exploratory 
phase. They may take place in the country of origin of 
the facilitators (for example Norway in the case of the 
negotiations with the Philippine NDF) or of the guarantors 
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or observers (case of Cuba for the FARC, currently).
•	 At the formal stage of the negotiations, as opposed to the 
exploratory phase, which requires a simple outline, it is 
advisable to consider the accompaniment for the process. This 
aspect will be analysed later, with reference to the “toolkit”.
•	 During the exploratory phase, the broad components of 
the negotiation agenda are established, without entering 
into the details. If one of the parties does not agree to the 
agenda then the negotiations cannot commence.
•	 In countries with more than one armed group, 
consideration must be given from the start as to whether 
the talks initiated with one group might interfere with 
what has already been agreed with another (MILF and 
MNLF in the Philippines, for example) or, in contrast, 
if what has already been agreed with one group 
(Colombian FARC, for example) will place conditions 
on the negotiating agenda with another (ELN, in the 
same country). It would seem advisable to consider (which 
is different to copying) what has already been agreed with 
one group to see if it would be fully or partially accepted 
by the other. In some countries, admittedly very few, it has 
been the case that various armed groups have wanted 
to negotiate at the same time and within the same 
framework (current case of Burma) rather than separately, 
which necessarily requires cross-referencing and unifying 
the agendas of the armed groups and creating an 
“umbrella” organisation to protect and represent all the 
groups, with a view to ensuring a more viable negotiation. 
The opposite situation has also arisen, whereby armed 
groups have flatly refused to participate in joint negotiations 
with other groups, requiring a dispersion of teams, agendas 
and methodologies that is difficult to handle. During 2014, 
for example, the AU mediator in the peace process in the 
Sudanese regions of South Kordofan and Blue Nile, Thabo 
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Mbeki, stated that “one process, with two paths” was taking 
place in Sudan, referring to the fact that parallel negotiations 
were also being held in the Sudanese region of Darfur and 
that both negotiations needed to be “synchronised”.
•	 During the exploratory phase, agreement needs to be 
reached as to whether or not the principle of “nothing 
is agreed until everything is agreed” is to be followed 
or, in contrast, whether each point agreed will be valid on 
its own, and may even be implemented during the course 
of the negotiations. An intermediary position may be 
agreed whereby the former principle is adopted but 
excluding humanitarian issues, such as a ceasefire, partial 
mine clearing, compliance with international humanitarian 
law or aspects related to human rights, as was the case in the 
El Salvador peace process.
• Recommendations for controlling crises that may arise 
during the formal negotiations
• We have already referred to the crisis factors that may arise 
in the exploratory phase, so we will now turn our attention 
to common crises that arise during the course of the 
formal negotiations. Some of these may already have 
emerged during the exploratory phase, if any controversial 
issues were discussed at that point. The following table lists 
75 different crises that occurred over the 2010-2013 period.
Crises arising during formal negotiations, 2010-2013
Differences and disagreements between the substantive issues on the agendas 
of the parties
Intransigent positions
Negative influence of a neighbouring country, downplaying the importance of the 
negotiations
Guarantees of safety of a leader of the armed opposition
Refusal of an armed group to disarm
Temporary withdrawal of one or all of the parties from the negotiation process
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Failure to release prisoners
Failure of armed groups to withdraw
Demand for a ceasefire or cessation of hostilities
Breakdown or violation of ceasefire
Slow implementation of peace agreement
Lack of financing to fulfil the peace agreement
Murder of leaders by members of a dissident group
Murder of leaders of the armed opposition
Discrepancies in the amnesty of leaders of an armed group
Confrontation between members of the State over the peace process
Unilateral decision-making
Kidnappings
Requirement to hold political negotiations before disarming
Arrest of leaders or consultants of an armed group
Armed clashes between the government and the armed opposition group
Government’s economic crisis
Lack of democratic reforms
Refusal of one of the parties to participate in an incident prevention body
Lack of political dialogue
Distrust of the government or armed group’s goodwill
Requirement to release imprisoned members
Situation of the prisoners of an armed group
Conducting of military exercises and operations
Failure to withdraw government troops from a zone controlled by an armed group
Refusal to withdraw heavy artillery from a buffer zone
Accusations that a third country is supporting dissidents from an armed group
Lack of agreement over prisoner exchanges
Solitary confinement in prison of the head of the armed group
Disagreement over whether a new Constitution is needed
Requirement to recognise the Constitution
Difficulties in obtaining support that would enable the Constitution to be amended
Arms purchases during the negotiations
Human rights violations in the occupied territories
Internal divisions within an armed group
Marginalisation of one faction of the armed group
Differences over the status of a region
Increased military activity by the armed group
Military attacks by a third country
Calls for a referendum
Differences over the continuity of sanctions
Disagreement over commitments not to use force
Disagreement over the date for holding a referendum
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Prohibition of an armed group
Refusal to accept cooperation between opposition groups pursuing a unity 
government
Refusal to release collaborators of an armed group
Refusal of an armed group to become a border guard
Plans by a third country to locate military facilities on disputed territory
Requirement to withdraw military troops from a region
Disagreements over territorial waters
Disagreement over the return of refugees
Insecurity in the country
Delays in implementing disarmament and reintegration programmes
Existence of terrorist lists
Promises of development and job creation unfulfilled
Coup d’état
Political power vacuum
Refusal to extend a truce to other regions
Arrest of opposition members
Failure of one of the parties to give an opinion on the peace proposal
Clashes with paramilitary groups
Border clashes
Occupation by foreign forces
Constitutional limitations
Court judgements
Overruling of electoral results
Ban on representative opposition parties
Settlement of occupied territories
The following recommendations can be drawn from this list of 
crisis factors, based not on mere speculation but on real conflicts 
that have emerged during the course of formal negotiations 
(where such negotiations have been made public), regardless of 
their level of transparency or lack thereof.
•	 On commencing the stage of “formal negotiations”, the 
parties need to ratify everything agreed in the exploratory 
phase, in order to avoid any doubt or new interpretations. 
Everything must be put in writing and, if possible, in the 
presence of observers/witnesses.
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•	 The public announcement of the start of negotiations 
with an armed group may generate dissent and deep 
opposition on the part of some political, economic or 
military sectors, often because they have benefited from 
the existence and continuation of the armed conflict or 
simply because they do not believe it possible to achieve 
peace through negotiations, despite the fact that 80% of 
the conflicts that have ended over the last 30 years have 
done so in this way. The government therefore needs to 
draw up an authentic “text” on the advantages of ending 
the armed conflict, as do all the social sectors involved in 
negotiating an end to the armed conflict. It is important in 
this regard to enjoy the cooperation of the media.
•	 A negotiation can quite easily last two presidential terms 
and so any new president will need to ratify what has 
been agreed by the previous government, to ensure that 
it remains valid during the second presidential mandate. It 
should be noted that partial agreements reached during the 
first presidential term do not have the status of law.12 They 
are simply commitments made by a particular government.
•	 Entering into negotiations, with all the risks this entails, 
means that the government should speak with just one voice 
and one rhetoric, favourable to the negotiations, avoiding 
bad experiences in which some ministers, particularly the 
Minister of Defence, maintain a contradictory position, 
probably to avoid upsetting the military. The message 
broadcast to the public must be clear and unified.
•	 Although the broad agenda points or “framework 
agreement for the negotiations” are normally agreed during 
the exploratory phase, it is during the negotiation phase 
that each of the sub-points or substantive issues on this 
12  Until the final peace agreement is signed, the agenda points that have been 
approved during the negotiations have no validity. This is often explicit in the 
diplomatic principle of “nothing is agreed until everything is agreed”.
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agenda are made concrete, negotiated and approved. If 
any changes need to be made to the items on the agenda, 
adding an aspect, for example, or changing the order in 
which the issues are to be discussed, this must always be 
mutually agreed and not imposed.
•	 The preamble or recitals that precede the agenda 
points to be discussed must never replace or add to 
the substantive issues on the agenda. They are simple 
references that set the frame for the agenda, put it into 
context and give it some meaning, nothing more, as in any 
UN Security Council Resolution. This preamble has to be 
drafted by joint agreement between the parties but does not 
form part of the agenda.
•	 The discussion of the agenda is the central point of 
any negotiation. It is the section that requires most time 
and devotion, and is also the weakest link because starting 
positions are normally very different, and concessions will 
need to be made throughout the negotiations, until a point 
of mutual agreement is reached. Further on, we will refer to 
the existence of negotiation structures that can help this 
discussion to take place in the most effective and least 
time-consuming way.
•	 Half of all armed conflicts are disputes over territorial 
control, with demands for independence or self-
government. Experience shows that an armed group 
normally ends up renouncing independence for some 
form of advanced autonomy, i.e. with significant power. 
In these kinds of negotiations, the parties have to be able 
to consider different options for “intermediary political 
architectures” (autonomy, co-sovereignty, commonwealth, 
asymmetrical federalism, etc.), and this requires a widening 
of the viewpoint of both parties and the exercise of political 
realism. In any case, the final solution must enjoy all 
guarantees of being fully implemented.
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•	 A requirement to disarm prior to commencing the 
negotiations makes no sense. Disarmament can only be 
proposed in the final stages of the negotiation process. 
Processes in which there is no negotiation of an agenda are 
different, as the only thing being agreed is the demobilisation 
and disappearance of a group, normally very small, in 
exchange for an amnesty, return to their places of origin and, 
in some cases, participation in a reintegration programme.
•	 Negotiations may take place in an internal context of 
great insecurity, with attacks, political or economic crises, 
democratic weakness, widespread corruption, repression, 
the presence of paramilitary groups, social protest, looming 
elections, a ban on opposition parties, etc., and this can 
affect the negotiations because of the demoralisation it 
causes. The parties need to sincerely consider whether 
they are in a position to continue to negotiate, or 
if it would be better to call a temporary halt until the 
environment improves. If this is the case, they may agree that 
the next cycle will continue at the point where they left off.
•	 The presence of an armed group on terrorist lists can be 
a disadvantage to making progress in a negotiation, insofar 
as it limits the mobility of the negotiators. It is advisable 
to propose their “delisting”, i.e. the conditions under 
which a group could be removed from terrorist lists.
•	 If, an armed group in a ceasefire situation is not banned 
then consideration must be given to the effect that 
banning them in the middle of the process would have 
on the negotiations, with the likelihood that this would 
include the arrest of one or more of their leaders. In this 
case, the group may make continuing the negotiations 
conditional on the freedom of these individuals.
•	 In negotiations between countries, in particular, 
unnecessary provocation should be avoided, such as 
conducting military manoeuvres off the coast of one of the 
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countries involved. Continued threats, of whatever kind, 
whether real or symbolic, are counterproductive to creating 
conditions favourable to the negotiations.
•	 There have been cases where, following many attempts 
to negotiate, neither of the parties has changed its initial 
position, which thus becomes totally intransigent. This may 
even lead one of the parties to abandon the negotiations, or 
the facilitator to call a halt to the negotiating cycle. Such 
has been the case, for example, in the Western Sahara. In 
these cases, once a number of years has passed with no 
progress (5, 10 or 15 years, for example), it is best to end 
the negotiations in their current format, as it has been 
clearly inefficient, and not to recommence discussions 
until one of the parties places something new on the 
table that would justify resuming the talks, in a new cycle 
and probably with a new format and even new mediation, 
where appropriate.
•	 All observations made with regard to the necessary physical 
safety of the people involved in the negotiations during 
the exploratory phase are also valid here, and these people 
also need to be able to have every opportunity to move and 
travel to the places of negotiation. Unfortunately, there 
have been cases of executions or kidnappings of negotiators.
•	 At the start of or during a negotiation, factions of the 
armed group will often emerge that are opposed to the 
negotiations for whatever reason (culture of war, profits of 
war, inability to do anything else, fear of losing authority, 
etc.), and they become “spoilers” or saboteurs of the 
process. In this regard, and particularly when there are 
many dissenters, it is advisable to introduce a “unifying” 
figure, a person with responsibility for bringing the 
factions or marginalised groups back into the fold or, at 
least, attempting to reach a common agenda. This figure 
may be internal or external to the armed group. It will very 
66
often be a person who enjoys the trust and respect of all 
dissenters. This is not always possible to achieve, in which 
case a number of negotiations may end up taking place 
simultaneously. There is also a place for “incentivising” 
figures, normally countries with economic resources, 
or regional or international bodies with financial means. 
Should economic sanctions be in place or a group be on a 
terrorist list, the withdrawal of this may be an important 
trump card that can be played as an incentive.
•	 Both in the exploratory phase and in the formal negotiations, 
the armed group’s negotiating team may include people 
currently being held in prison, and their release may 
be demanded. It may also be the case that, during the 
negotiations, members of the negotiating delegation are 
imprisoned, forcing the government to consider a number 
of options: firmly refuse to release these individuals, 
with the risk of boxing themselves into a corner; release 
certain prisoners solely for the purpose of attending the 
negotiations and then returning to prison; release certain 
individuals on parole, with a written commitment not to 
use arms in the future, or agree to house arrest. There are 
numerous examples of such cases.
•	 One measure that favours a climate of negotiation is if the 
government improves the prison conditions of prisoners 
from armed groups.
•	 An interesting precedent was set with the Colombian 
ELN guerrilla force, for whom consecutive governments 
have allowed some guerrilla prisoners, acting as guerrilla 
spokespersons or contacts, to set up a “peace office” in 
prison, with access to the Internet, telephone, meeting 
room and so on. This has enabled a prison space to be 
turned into a zone of negotiation or exploration.
•	 When an armed group’s spokesperson is in prison, it is 
advisable to allow them visits from members of their 
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group or similar, as this can help to consolidate any future 
negotiations. This facility depends on what progress is being 
made in the current talks. If they are going well, it is easier 
for a government to accept this recommendation. It is also 
important in terms of the political wing and the armed 
wing having the same position. During 2014, for example, 
there were monthly meetings in Turkey between the leader 
of the PKK guerrilla group, Öcalan, and Kurdish deputies 
who were acting, in turn, as intermediaries between Öcalan 
and the highest Kurdish politico-military leaders with bases 
in northern Iraq. Öcalan had previous spent long periods 
in solitary confinement.
•	 In some negotiations, the armed group has teams 
of consultants or advisors who may be members 
or supporters of the armed group, or simply centres 
specialising in handling negotiations, helping one or all 
parties to be realistic or giving advice on how to resolve any 
crises. The parties to the negotiation must be clear on the 
role of these teams, which may be very formal or, equally, 
totally informal. There are cases, such as in the Philippines 
with regard to the NPA armed group and its negotiating 
team, the NDF, in which a number of these consultants 
were arrested and held in prison. Both parties must agree in 
writing the role these people will play and whether they are 
to be released to participate in the rounds of talks, and they 
must renew this commitment at every cycle of negotiations.
•	 As already mentioned, a recurrent cause of crisis is the 
government’s demand that the armed group should declare 
a unilateral ceasefire before commencing negotiations, a 
condition that is not normally accepted as it places one of 
the parties in a situation of greater vulnerability. Ideally, the 
two parties should agree a bilateral ceasefire, if possible at 
the start of the negotiations and, if not, part way through, 
when some trust has been built. This may be with or without 
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internal or external verification but with a real and sincere 
commitment not to take the opportunity of this agreement 
to re-arm or take offensive positions. It is always advisable 
that verification mechanisms are put in place, which may 
be joint. A joint verification team is responsible for analysing 
any complaints regarding violations of the ceasefire, and 
has the power to take decisions to resolve this situation.
•	 Given the possible difficulty of “selling” a bilateral ceasefire 
agreement to some sectors of public opinion, there is a 
possibility (which has, in fact, been tried and tested) that the 
parties could agree to a “de-escalation of the conflict”, with 
zero deaths, which would imply a “tacit bilateral ceasefire”.
•	 Whenever possible, depending on the geographical nature 
of the conflict and what control the parties have over specific 
areas, it is advisable to assess whether a “buffer zone” or 
“separation zone” can be created, with a several kilometre-
wide demilitarised area along the border in which there are no 
heavy weapons. In some cases, as a condition for continuing 
the negotiations, the armed group has demanded that the 
Armed Forces withdraw from their zone of influence, 
something that is difficult to fulfil until there has been a 
long ceasefire and the negotiations are at an advanced stage.
•	 In conflicts with a regional dimension, the support given 
to armed groups by neighbouring countries must be 
analysed and neutralised, as many armed groups use 
neighbouring countries as “refuges” in which to lie low and 
from which to launch surprise attacks. Many negotiations 
require the active involvement of neighbouring countries 
in order to achieve peace.
•	 In many cases, the negotiations will be strengthened if the 
parties implement confidence-building measures (CBMs) 
such as prisoner exchanges, establishing humanitarian 
corridors, enabling communication between divided 
families, etc.
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•	 Public opinion and governments always view an armed 
group’s unilateral decision to take measures in line with 
international humanitarian law positively. These can 
include conducting mine-clearing operations, for example, 
and refraining from kidnapping, harassing civilians, 
recruiting minors or sexually abusing women, etc. These 
measures generate a great deal of confidence and increase their 
legitimacy to propose social, political and economic change.
•	 Given that it has been a cause of breakdown in a number 
of negotiations, it is not advisable for the government to 
demand the relocation of armed groups into identifiable 
areas at any time, nor the identities of members of the 
armed group to be revealed. This requirement creates a 
great deal of mistrust and vulnerability, and is not necessary 
in order to implement a ceasefire or move forward in the 
negotiations. Such a demand led, for example, to the 
breakdown of the Colombian government’s negotiations 
with the ELN in 2007.
•	 All negotiations have an economic cost, and this 
increases in line with the time spent and the number of 
people involved. Very often, this cost is covered by the 
mediating countries or organisations, “friendly countries” 
or observer countries. The donors, however, need to be very 
careful in this regard, as there are numerous precedents in 
which negotiations have turned into big business for 
the participants. In the negotiations between Sudan and 
South Sudan in 2014, the negotiating teams were receiving 
2,00 dollars a day per person plus the costs of a luxury hotel 
(320 dollars a night), bar and night club. Such malpractice 
needs to be avoided from the start.
•	 In the final stages of the negotiation, the parties will 
need to agree on the legal position of the people to 
be demobilised and other actors (soldiers in particular) 
accused of crimes during the period of conflict. Although 
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it is common to declare an amnesty following the signing 
of a peace accord, the application of transitional or 
restorative justice has become established in some 
countries. While the opinions of the victims must always 
be listened to and considered, it must ultimately be for the 
parties to the negotiation alone to decide how to resolve the 
dilemmas of the inevitable exercise of truth, justice and 
reparation, three areas that will not necessarily be of the 
same intensity, with the aim of getting the armed groups 
to put down their weapons.
•	 One recurrent theme of confrontation is whether, once 
the negotiations are at an end, the Constitution should 
be amended or a new constitutional assembly formed. 
The parties should not leave this issue to the last but nor 
should they discuss it at the very beginning, without 
knowing how the negotiations will go on the different 
agenda points. It is also common for a government to 
demand, as a precondition for negotiating with an armed 
group, that the Constitution should not be touched. 
Experience shows, however, that it is best not to make 
this aspect a “red line” but to leave some margin for 
manoeuvre, particularly when the armed groups date 
back to before the current Constitution came into effect.
•	 There are cases (the Philippines with the MILF, for example) 
of a Constitutional Court declaring a recently signed peace 
process inadmissible, thus forcing a rethink of the final 
phase in order to find a legal solution to the process.
•	 The parties must, during the negotiating phase, consider 
whether or not they will put the final agreement to 
public consideration, via a referendum. This is not usual, 
and to do so is not without risk, as in the case of Guatemala, 
but to do this and win strengthens the transparency and 
democratic legitimacy of the agreement.
•	 Following a peace accord, there is always a reform of the 
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security apparatus, resulting in a significant reduction in 
the numbers and budget of the Armed Forces (the so-called 
“disarmament dividend”), the delinking of the police 
from military tasks, and reforms of military legislation. 
Sectors of the Armed Forces often resist these reforms amid 
fears that they may lose their privileges but defence and 
security policies need to change deeply following the 
end of an armed conflict. All these issues have to be on 
the negotiation agenda, otherwise there will in contrast be 
a scaling-up of military activity following the peace accord, 
a possibility that must be ruled out at all costs.
•	 If the negotiations go well and a peace accord is reached, it 
is usual to then proceed to a DDR process, of which there 
are multiple variants for each of the three aspects. In this 
regard, the parties must agree the kind of DDR that will 
take place at the end of the process, along with all the 
details, as many processes fail due to this stage not having 
been sufficiently agreed or implemented, either for political, 
military or economic reasons, and the agreed timetable 
not followed. All DDR processes must dignify the ex-
combatants’ return to civilian life (or partial reintegration 
into the Armed Forces or police, in some cases), and 
never demonise or stigmatise them. The State must, with 
all necessary internal and external support, ensure that 
this stage takes place correctly and within a reasonable 
timeframe, with the active involvement of the communities 
and places of origin of the demobilised individuals and of 
the socio-economic fabric of the places where they are to be 
received, if they are to be settled in another area.
•	 During the stages of DDR, in some countries, such as 
Colombia, the term “surrender of arms” has been used by 
the armed group (the FARC in this case), an apparent subtle 
use of language that in actual fact conceals an intention not 
to hand arms over to the Armed Forces and government, 
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considering this a humiliating act, but instead preferring 
to stop using the arms for a time and then hand them over 
to an international commission, without photographers 
or journalists, as was the case in Northern Ireland. This 
possibility requires a bilateral ceasefire agreement, whether 
explicit or tacit. Military operations simply do not take place 
and the combatants remain in their barracks. Although this 
option may prove difficult for the government to accept, it 
is an option that should not be discounted because the aim 
is actually for the arms to be rendered inoperable, out of 
use, “decommissioned” and, if possible, destroyed.
•	 Although the “post-armed conflict” phase is not formally 
included in the negotiations, given the enormous number of 
peace processes that have subsequently failed to implement 
what was agreed, or have done so only partially or with 
great delay, it is advisable during the negotiation phase 
to agree the mechanisms for verifying compliance with 
the agreements signed, whether internal, external or joint. 
If not, there is a risk that further violence will erupt, other 
than what was at the root of the armed conflict and more 
closely linked to organised crime. Very often, particularly 
in peace processes that involve structural change, political, 
economic or military pressure groups can emerge after the 
signing of the accord that reject or hinder fulfilment of the 
agreements because there are no national or international 
verification mechanisms.
•	 Implementation of the negotiated agreement may come at 
a high economic price. In this regard, before requesting 
external support or calling a donors’ pledging 
conference, an analysis needs to be made of what the 
direct and indirect actors in the conflict can contribute 
financially. It must be recalled that the end of an armed 
conflict, in most cases, enables the release of a sum of 
money previously devoted to military aims and which, in 
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some countries, may be as much as 2% of GDP, an amount 
that should be channelled fully into implementing the 
peace accords. In the Colombian case, for example, the 
guerrillas’ assets should first be quantified, along with the 
value of the lands taken by the guerrillas and paramilitaries, 
the contributions of national and multinational companies 
to the paramilitary groups, what the State could contribute 
through “peace funds” and the already stated “disarmament 
dividend”, etc.
•	 Following on from the above, there is no point, either at an 
advanced stage in the negotiations with an armed group or 
after signing a peace accord, in the government deciding to 
buy heavy weapons of high value (as in the case of Colombia 
in 2015) that would prevent military expenditure from 
being reduced in times of peace.
Recent Crisis 
This section provides an overview of the main crises that 
occurred during 2014 in 29 different contexts, both open 
armed conflicts and other currently unarmed conflicts but 
which were armed in the past and for which negotiations 
aimed at reaching a peace agreement have not been 
completed. This mix is already a warning that a ceasefire 
or a de-escalation of military activity is not always 
synonymous with achieving peace, the completion of 
a peace process or the final resolution of the conflict, 
which may extend over time until the negotiations come to 
a satisfactory conclusion. The decline or even disappearance 
of physical and armed violence therefore does not necessarily 
mean that the conflict is at an end, as can be seen from 
the following diagram, valid for processes such as in the 
Western Sahara, Moldova (Transnistria), Cyprus and others.
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Listing the crises for just one year by country sheds light on the 
enormous number of factors that can negatively influence 
the way negotiations develop, along with the idiosyncrasies 
of each case. In addition to factors more commonly found 
in all negotiation contexts, processes may thus be affected 
by very specific factors. Given that there are often “models” 
or “reference points” for many negotiation processes, i.e. 
other peace processes that demonstrate similarities in terms of 
the nature of the conflict or the kind of actor or methodology 
chosen, these can be drawn upon (rather than copied) and 
their useful aspects adapted to the situation at hand. These 
methodological aspects will be considered in another section. 
The following table shows, by country, the kinds of crisis, as 
indicated in the previous section.
Main crises in 2014
Mali
• Existence of multiple armed actors.
• Disagreement re. other groups participating in the negotiations.
•Government not keeping its commitment to release prisoners.
• Lack of coordination and overlapping attempts at external facilitation.
• Escalation of violent clashes.
• Pressure from third countries.
• Request from an armed group to hold negotiations outside the country.
• Non-participation of some armed groups in the negotiations.
• Federalism vs. decentralisation.
• Risk of wanting to reach a hasty agreement.
Final outcome: First framework agreement to resolve the conflict 
in 2015.
Conflict curve
Violence curve
Negotiating space to avoid further 
violence and resolve the conflict
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Senegal
• Divisions within the armed group.
• Multiplication of internal intermediaries.
• Request by one faction of the armed group to hold negotiations 
outside the country.
Final outcome: No significant change.
Ethiopia 
(Ogaden)
• Arrest of two negotiators in the mediating country.
Final outcome: Unresolved.
Somalia
• Virtual paralysis of the Somali government.
• Constant disputes between the prime minister and president.
• Internal tensions within al-Shabaab (the armed group).
Sudan 
(national 
dialogue)
• Multiple armed actors and politicians in the dialogue.
• Arrest of opposition leaders.
• Government’s desire not to delay the elections
• Criticism of the government for not wanting a government of 
national transition.
• Government’s demand that the “National Dialogue” last no more 
than three months.
• Delay in signing a cessation of hostilities due to the partisan 
needs of the government.
• Possible government ploys to divide the opposition.
Final outcome: Unresolved, but with possible progress in 2015.
Sudan (Darfur)
• At the meeting between the government and Gabril Ibrahim’s JEM, 
at the end of the year, the government delegation only wanted to 
discuss security issues, while the JEM had a longer agenda.
• Insufficient capacity of the AU negotiating team.
Final outcome: Unresolved.
Sudan (South 
Kordofan and 
Blue Nile)
• Accusations that the government did not want to stop the 
humanitarian crisis or resolve the political crisis.
• Accusations from the government that the armed group was 
bringing up issues unrelated to the war.
• Government mistrust of the AU’s mediation.
• Differences with the government over whether a ceasefire should 
be reached in the regions before holding the “National Dialogue”.
• The government was in favour of finding partial solutions while 
the SPLM-N wanted a general agreement.
• The SPLM-N wanted a peace agreement to be reached in Darfur 
as well before participating in the National Dialogue. 
• The SPLM-N criticised the government for wanting them to hand 
over their arms before a political agreement had been reached.
Final outcome: Unresolved.
76
South Sudan
• Violations of the ceasefire.
• Disagreement over release of prisoners.
• Arrest of senior commanders of the armed group.
• Differences between leaders of the armed group and the IGAD’s 
mediating team.
• Requirement to withdraw foreign troops.
• Escalation of the violence.
• Differences over the creation of a federal system of government 
and constitutional reforms.
• Insulting remark made by IGAD mediator to the government and 
armed group.
• Threats of sanctions by the facilitator.
• The Government of South Sudan criticised the three countries of 
the Troika  (United States, United Kingdom and Norway) for 
wanting regime change.
• Change of host country for the mediation (Tanzania replaced 
Ethiopia) and strengthened mediation through Finland and the CMI.
• Accusations between the armed groups of not wanting peace.
Final outcome: Change of mediation.
Sudan – South 
Sudan
• Proliferation of small arms
• South Sudan’s protest at the decision that Abyei region should be 
included in the 2015 elections.
• Lack of local government and public order.
Final outcome: Unresolved.
Central African 
Republic
• Low level of the armed group’s representatives.
• Internal struggles to represent the armed groups.
• Divisions in civil society.
• Divisions over whether the national dialogue should be conducted 
in the country or outside.
• Condition made by one armed group to negotiate only if the 
country is divided.
• Internal divisions within the armed group.
• Doubts over the efficacy of peacekeeping operations.
• Change of mediation, with diplomatic crisis at the last minute 
between CAR and Kenya, due to the holding of meetings with 
opposing militia, in the Kenyan capital, without informing the CAR 
government in advance.
Final outcome: Change of mediation not agreed, uncertainty as to 
the immediate future.
DR Congo
• Mistrust due to the unclarified death of the leader of an armed 
group.
• Doubts over the real willingness of an armed group to disarm.
• Requirement on the part of a government that an armed group 
should not  demand a political negotiation to disarm.
• Ban on the leader of an armed group attending negotiations 
abroad.
Final outcome: Unresolved.
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Libya
• Lack of dialogue between the two governments and parliaments 
existing in the country.
• Very low turnout for the parliamentary elections.
• Rivalry between countries willing to provide facilitation.
• Military combat in the middle of the negotiations.
• Inclusion of some armed groups on the UN list of terrorist groups.
• Decision of the Constitutional Court to declare the parliamentary 
elections illegitimate.
• Attack on a UN representative by an armed group.
• Constant cancellation of talks organised by the UN.
Final outcome: Unresolved.
Western 
Sahara
• Possible disillusionment of one of the parties with regard to UN 
mediation.
Final outcome: Unresolved.
Colombia
• Government’s refusal to sign a bilateral ceasefire with the FARC.
• Suspicions that, in the future, the police would no longer report to 
the Ministry of Defence.
• Statements by the president that there would be no reform of 
the forces of law and order as a result of the negotiations with the 
guerrillas.
• Doubts over the FARC’s interpretation of “surrender of arms” and 
whether they would agree to commence a classic DDR process.
• Party political accusations over the possible secret signing of 
agreements.
• Threats against human rights defenders, union members and 
demobilised combatants.
• Interception of the communications of the negotiating delegations.
• Chance capture by the FARC of a general, with a discussion on 
whether they were “holding” him or had “kidnapped” him, which led 
to a temporary suspension of the negotiations.
• Warning from the International Criminal Court on the application 
of transitional justice.
• Government’s rejection of international oversight of the ceasefire 
and hostilities unilaterally decreed by the FARC.
• Excessive duration of the exploratory phase with the ELN and 
excessive length of time in initial meetings.
• Differences over the agenda and concepts of “peace” and “social 
participation” between the government and ELN.
• Differences between the ELN and the government regarding 
“methodological criteria” for the initial talks.
• Capture by the army of a member of the ELN’s negotiating team.
Final outcome: Unilateral steps by the FARC to consolidate 
the negotiations and clarification of the progress made in the 
exploratory phase with the ELN.
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Afghanistan
• Divisions within the Taliban.
• Government disagreement with unilateral decision-making on the 
part of the US.
• Arrest of a Taliban leader who was acting as an intermediary.
• Enormously volatile political context, with difficulties in forming a 
government.
• Insecurity.
Final outcome: Unresolved but with possible new mediation in 2015.
India 
(Nagaland)
• Resignation of a government spokesperson.
• Hostilities between Naga factions.
• Government’s refusal to allow Naga leaders to attend a 
unification meeting.
• Government’s refusal to negotiate with all groups simultaneously.
Final outcome: Negotiations only with the NSCN-IM.
India-Pakistan 
(Kashmir)
• Violations of the ceasefire.
• Deep unease on the part of the Indian government after 
a Kashmiri separatist leader was received by the Pakistan 
government.
• Attack in the Indian zone of Kashmir.
Final outcome: Unresolved.
Pakistan 
(Waziristan)
• Murder of kidnapped soldiers.
• Differences between Taliban factions.
• End of ceasefire.
• Terrorist attack on school.
Final outcome: Unresolved.
Burma
• Demand by armed groups that the political dialogue should run 
parallel to the ceasefire.
• Initial disagreement with the formation of new inclusive Armed Forces.
• Government’s refusal to accept a more inclusive agreement as it 
did not recognise the small armed groups.
• Armed Forces attack on a KIA training centre.
• Differences over the issue of federalism.
Final outcome: Possible agreement at the start of 2015.
Philippines
• Delays in the government’s approval of the Fundamental Law of 
Bangsamoro.
• In the middle of the year, the President’s Office presented various 
amendments to the Law, resulting in the MILF’s disagreement.
• Possible existence of a MILF faction opposed to disarmament.
• The government ended the “special path” for negotiations with the NDF.
• The government accused the NDF of making proposals through 
the media and not directly to the government negotiating team.
•The NDF stated that it was impossible to reach a peace agreement 
with the current government, as it considered it too conservative.
• Internal divisions and struggles for leadership of the MNLF.
• MNLF criticism of the government for having ignored it during 
negotiations with the MILF.
•Differences between the MNLF’s and the MILF’s approach.
Final outcome: Possible new negotiations with the NDF in February 
2015, and difficulties in negotiating with the MNLF.
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Thailand 
(south)
• Military strategy of encouraging desertions.
• Lack of unification of armed groups’ demands.
Final outcome: Military control of the negotiations, which has 
created mistrust.
Cyprus
• Influence of Cyprus’s economic crisis on the negotiations.
• Temporary breakdown in the negotiations due to differences over 
oil exploitation rights in the area.
Final outcome: Possible resumption of negotiations at start of 2015.
Kosovo
• Internal tensions led to the holding of early elections.
• Delays in forming a new government.
Final outcome: Unresolved.
Moldova 
(Transnistria)
• Impact of the conflict in Ukraine, and deterioration in the relations 
between Russia and the West.
• Pressure on schools in Transnistria that were providing education 
in the Moldavian language.
• Delays in the rounds of talks.
• Criticism from Moldova for not having been informed of the 
Russian representative’s visit to Transnistria.
• Russian reprisals following the EU/Moldova Association Agreement.
• Possibility that USA may establish a base near the Romanian capital
• Fear of a loss of Moldova’s neutrality.
• Fear of the unification of Moldova with Romania.
Final outcome: Unresolved.
Turkey (PKK)
• Delaying tactics on the part of the government with regard to the 
negotiation.
• Interference from Turkish elections in summer 2015.
• Impact of the delicate situation of the Kurds in Syria.
• Accusations from PKK of Turkey’s alleged support of ISIS.
• Law and order problems.
• Lack of negotiating experience on both sides.
Final outcome: Possibility of commencing formal negotiations, with 
new methodology.
Ukraine
• Struggles for political and economic power.
• Rivalry between regional political and economic institutions.
• Russian occupation of Crimea due to its military / strategic value.
• Opposition to Russia’s aspiration to create a Russian-speaking space.
• Ukrainian government’s desire to join NATO.
• Early militarisation of the conflict, despite diplomatic initiatives.
• Presence of mercenaries and irregular forces.
• Sanctions against Russia and Crimea.
• Military manoeuvres on both sides.
• Return to language and threats from the Cold War era.
• Insecurity in the supply of Russian gas.
• Rejection of federalism by the Ukrainian government.
• Refusal to recognise the elections held in eastern Ukraine.
• Cancellation by the Ukrainian government of concessions and 
commitments previously made for the east of the country.
• Russia’s concealed provision of arms to rebels in the east.
Ukraine
• Mutual accusations of a failure to respect the ceasefire.
• Ukraine’s abandonment of its status of neutrality.
• President Putin signed a new military doctrine that considered the 
advance of NATO to be one of the main dangers to national security.
Final outcome: Unresolved.
Armenia-
Azerbaijan
• Increased incidents and fighting along the ceasefire line.
• Increased rearmament and militarisation of both countries.
Final outcome: De-escalation of tensions.
Georgia 
(Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia)
• Violations of air space.
• Social and political crisis in Abkhazia.
• Demand by Abkhazia and South Ossetia for the issue of 
displaced persons to be kept off the negotiation agenda.
• Abkhazia’s request to change the format of and agenda for the 
negotiations.
• Disagreements between Abkhazia and the EU with regard to the 
mechanism for preventing and responding to incidents.
• Mistrust between Georgia and Russia over Russia’s signing of a 
treaty with  Abkhazia, which increased this latter’s dependence.
• Russian refusal to sign an undertaking not to use force.
Final outcome: Unresolved.
Israel-
Palestine
• Recognition of Israel as a Jewish state.
• Hamas’ rejection of the possible presence of NATO troops on 
Palestinian territory.
• Israel’s policy of building settlements in the West Bank and East 
Jerusalem.
• Israel’s opposition to Palestinian membership of various 
international treaties.
• Failure to release Palestinian prisoners held in Israeli prisons.
• Israel’s refusal to negotiate with Palestine.
• Escalating conflict in the Gaza Strip.
• Presentation to the UN Security Council of a draft resolution 
on behalf of Palestine to revive the negotiations with Israel. The 
Security Council did not approve the proposal.
•Threats against Palestine for gaining membership of the 
International Criminal Court
Final outcome: Unresolved
Source: Fisas, Vicenç, Yearbook 2015 on Peace Processes, School for a Culture of 
Peace, 2015.
Proposals for a redesign of both methodology and actors in 
the wake of crises
The serious nature of some of the crises that occur during 
negotiations, or sometimes the mere fact that the very dynamic 
of the negotiations requires unanticipated action to be taken, 
often means the initial format needs to be redesigned to 
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adapt it to the changing needs, and this should always be done 
by mutual agreement between the parties. In the negotiations 
with the FARC in 2014, for example, disarmament and gender 
sub-commissions had to be created in the form of parallel 
working groups which, on finishing their work, presented their 
conclusions to the plenum (the formal negotiation meeting). 
This helped save time, particularly on highly complex issues 
related to disarmament or the “surrender of arms”. Civil society 
participated in various ways, in addition to those already 
planned at the start (interactive web), such as regional working 
committees and the International Victims’ Forum.
By calculating the probability of a crisis arising, it is possible 
to consider in advance some corrections to the initial work 
plan that may prove necessary, so that they can be initiated 
as soon as they are needed. As previously noted, if many years 
of fruitless work under the same format call for a totally new 
design, then this decision has to be made even though it will 
never be completely risk-free. The following are some actions 
that can be taken:
•	 Due to oversight or initial difficulties, some of the actions 
specific to the exploratory phase may not be discussed 
until the stage of “formal negotiations”. In this case, if 
recommendations were not made for some issues during 
the initial stage then this has to be done subsequently.
•	 Introduce the concept of a facilitator, if there has not 
previously been one and it is thought that this might help 
to improve the negotiation.
•	 Change the status of “guarantor” or “observer” to 
“facilitator in times of crisis”, as was the case at the 
end of 2014 with Norway and Cuba, guarantors in the 
negotiations with the FARC. Faced with the crisis due to 
the capture of a general, the parties decided that these two 
countries would change their status in times of crisis.
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•	 Forego the mediation of third countries, if the experience 
has been highly negative in this regard and the parties 
prefer direct dialogue.
•	 Change mediating country or person, if the final 
assessment of their handling of the process over a number 
of years is not positive, even if it is not their fault. In this 
case, care needs to be taken that there is not a proliferation 
of candidates wishing to take the lead in the mediations, 
as was the case in Libya in 2014-2015.
•	 Change one or more individuals within the negotiating 
teams of the two parties if their behaviour, character or 
rhetoric is perceived as hostile by the other party.
•	 Increase or reduce the number of members of each 
negotiating team, depending on the backlog of work and 
size of the agenda.
•	 Create the status of “friendly countries” in the peace 
process, with a detailed explanation of their tasks. It is 
not advisable for these countries to have any clear public 
proximity to or economic or geopolitical interest in either 
of the parties, as this would prevent them from enjoying 
the necessary impartiality.
•	 Create “parallel working groups” through which to move 
the most complex issues forward.
•	 Change the country in which the negotiations are taking 
place, if this might create new positive expectations and act 
as an incentive to all parties.
•	 Invite independent people and experts on particular 
issues on the agenda to make recommendations that could 
help find common ground.
•	 Organise meetings with the armed groups, in another 
country, to strengthen their negotiating capacity. For 
example, in 2014, the Berghof Foundation held a meeting 
in Berlin with the different leaders of the armed groups 
in Sudan forming part of the SRF coalition, and who 
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undertook to participate in any political process that would 
lead to peace in the country.
•	 Leave the issues that are blocking the negotiations to the end.
•	 In times of crisis, the armed groups have to assess the 
importance of taking unilateral steps to build greater 
confidence in the process and, at the same time, increase 
their legitimacy. In this regard, they make take steps 
related to complying with international humanitarian law 
(releasing kidnap victims, handing over child soldiers, mine 
clearing, etc.). This also includes the possibility of declaring 
a temporary ceasefire and/or cessation of hostilities.
•	 In extreme circumstances, although it is not at all desirable, 
the negotiation cycle may be halted (while maintaining 
close contact with all parties and neighbouring 
countries, either directly or indirectly) if none of the 
parties are willing to bring anything new to the table 
and the negotiations have been stalled for a number 
of years. For example, following the last round of visits 
to the Western Sahara region, in October 2013, the UN 
special envoy stated that a new session of formal meetings 
between the parties would not be organised until there were 
expectations that the dialogue would move forward.
•	 When a cycle of negotiations breaks down, in the case of two 
countries in conflict, the negotiations can temporarily be 
replaced with other diplomatic measures, such as trade, 
culture, sports, music and art, etc., with the aim of maintaining 
the channels of communication open and avoiding the 
political temptation to “paint the other party an enemy”.
•	 Returning to the case of the Western Sahara, during a 
breakdown in the cycle of negotiations, it can be useful to 
temporarily replace the rounds of talks with a written 
exercise of questions and answers to the parties on the 
issues at the root of the conflict. In January 2014, the 
UN Secretary General’s personal envoy met with working 
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groups recently formed by the parties in Rabat and Tindouf 
to confidentially submit questions formulated specifically 
for each of them. The questions were deliberately difficult 
and aimed at getting the parties to venture beyond the 
easier issues, introducing them to different conversations 
and encouraging them to show flexibility as they began 
to consider alternatives to their initial positions and seek 
elements of a compromise solution. After a few months, 
the Polisario Front stated that it was not in agreement 
with this exercise. Something similar was conducted by the 
School for a Culture of Peace over the 2000-2003 period, 
in complete confidence, with all parliamentary groups of 
the Basque Country (from the Popular Party to Batasuna), 
with good results. The exercise came to a halt when Batasuna 
was banned and placed on the EU list of terrorist groups.
•	 Simplify the framework of participating actors, if this 
is causing confusion as to the tasks to be carried out by 
each one, although this is no guarantee that the process will 
improve. The case of the Sahara is proof of this. The outline 
of this process is a simple one: sole mediation of the UN, 
and different alliances between the two actors. Morocco, 
with the support of three permanent members of the 
Security Council (USA, France and the United Kingdom) 
and the Polisario Front, with the support of Algeria. This 
is often not the case, however. There are situations where 
there is a proliferation of special envoys (from the UN, EU, 
AU, other important countries, etc.), countries offering 
themselves as new facilitators or hosts for a further phase of 
negotiations, organisations holding seminars or meetings 
to help improve the negotiations, etc., all at the same time 
and in relation to the same conflict. It is always good for the 
process to be accompanied, but only as far as is necessary.
•	 There is a completely different stakeholder table, with a 
great profusion of actors of all kinds. This framework 
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is also not a positive one because it creates confusion 
and there are serious difficulties in getting all actors 
to sit down at the same table. This is the current case 
in Libya, where there is a competition among various 
countries to lead the peace process. At the start of 2015, 
there were two possible mediation teams in Afghanistan. 
One was a troika formed of China, Afghanistan and 
Pakistan, the other a group of countries from the 
region, known as the “6+1” and formed of the USA, 
Russia, China, India, Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan. 
This group has already met twice.
•	 Clarify who the government facilitators are and what 
their decision-making capacity is. In Senegal, in 2014, 
there was a great deal of confusion in this regard.
•	 Create pauses in the negotiations in order to refocus on 
what has been achieved so far and start afresh.
•	 Do not forget the positive impact of including women in 
the negotiating teams or as facilitators, as they tend to have 
a greater capacity for empathy and for de-escalating tension.
•	 Talk to former leaders of other armed groups who 
have successfully signed a peace accord in order to 
exchange experiences.
•	 Promote, albeit confidentially, a direct meeting between 
the highest authorities of the country and the leader of 
an armed group. Getting to know each other personally 
and being able to directly express their points of view may 
help to reduce the initial “preconditions” of either party 
and make their positions more flexible. In 2014, a meeting 
took place in Hiroshima, Japan, between the President of 
the Philippines, Benigno Aquino, and the leader of the 
MILF, Murad Ebrahim.
•	 Release, if only on parole, prisoners who carry political 
weight within an armed group so that they can participate 
in the negotiations.
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•	 Agree on the creation of a Truth Commission, if this has 
not already been done.
•	 Encourage government investment in areas controlled 
by the armed group, as a confidence-building measure and 
an incentive to negotiate, with the knowledge and approval 
of the armed group.
•	 Invite the main regional and international bodies, 
particularly the UN, to express their satisfaction at the 
commencement of or good progress in negotiations. This 
is also a good incentive and enhances the self-esteem and 
international recognition of those participating in the process.
•	 Assess the positive impact that a political amnesty might 
have on the course of the negotiations.
•	 In border disputes, the mediating body can propose 
co-sovereignty over or the neutrality of a particular 
geographic area. In October 2014, for example, the UN 
Secretary General’s special envoy, Francis Mading Deng, 
proposed a new agreement for Abyei, an oil-rich border 
town between Sudan and South Sudan, which was to be 
declared a neutral region, warning of the need for each of 
the affected countries to resolve their internal conflicts and 
giving guarantees to the Misseiriya community.
•	 Create a fund for the full reparation of the victims of the 
conflict, once they are known. In Colombia in 2014, the FARC 
proposed that this fund should be set at 3% of GDP. The dilemma 
here lies in establishing responsibility for contributing to this.
•	 Create a special commission to study the situation of 
political prisoners, as a confidence-building measure for 
the armed group.
•	 Agree whether the final peace accord should be submitted 
to a referendum or not. This is a hot topic of discussion 
in the negotiations with the FARC in Colombia. In the 
Philippines, in 2014, it was agreed to hold a referendum for 
the areas affected by the agreement with the MILF.
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The actors’ “toolkit”
As already mentioned, there are extremely simple models 
with which to initiate negotiations, but there are also other 
much more complex ones, as different actors get involved. This 
is particularly the case in conflicts of long duration. No model 
is able to guarantee anything, however, and it is always a 
challenge to ascertain and build a “specific” process at 
any given time, especially as this may change as particular 
circumstances arise that require the model to be reviewed.
The number of negotiations taking place, and their wide 
variety of structures, means we can produce a kind of “toolkit” 
in which actors can find the advice they need at any given time. 
The challenge is not to make a carbon copy of a model that may 
or may not function well for a given conflict but to find the 
model that is most suitable and appropriate for the case at 
hand. It is a matter of building a “unique jigsaw” for a specific 
negotiation in the knowledge that there are more pieces that 
can be added to the initial layout. It should also be recalled that 
not all solutions to the crises that may arise in a negotiation 
process will necessarily be found in the “toolkit”. Occasionally, 
we have to use our imagination and “serendipity” to 
propose new things, clearly adapted to the specific conflict 
in question. One recent example can be seen in the failed 
attempts to find a solution to the conflict in Ukraine in 2014. 
Initial responsibility lay with the EU High Representative for 
Foreign Policy and the OSCE special envoy but the process 
was stalled until the highest level of Franco-German diplomacy 
took conflict resolution into their own hands, resulting in an 
agreement on 12 February 2015.
Let us return, however, to considering the different options 
that have been used in terms of players involved, as given in the 
following table, referent of 2015.
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Elements Examples
Government structures
Presidents or prime 
ministers involved
South Sudan, CAR, Afghanistan, Turkey (PKK), India 
(with regard to Pakistan), Pakistan (with regard to 
India), Pakistan (Waziristan), Cyprus, Ukraine, Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Moldova, Georgia (Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia), Israel, Palestine
Peace Commissioners 
/ Advisors / Special 
Envoys
Senegal (Casamance), Colombia, Afghanistan, Pakistan 
(with regard to India), India (with regard to Pakistan), 
Philippines, Azerbaijan(for the conflict of Nagorno 
Karabakh with Armenia), Israel, Palestine
Other official negotiators
Sudan (South Kordofan), South Sudan, Afghanistan, 
India, Burma, Philippines (a person with a team for 
every armed group), Thailand, Cyprus, Serbia-Kosovo, 
Transnistria, Turkey (PKK), Georgia, Palestine
Ministers for Reconciliation 
/ Union / Reintegration / 
Conflict resolution
Mali, India, Moldova, Georgia
Other ministers Thailand, Israel
Regional Governors Sudan (South Kordofan), India (Assam, Nagaland)
Other government 
representatives Mali
Intelligence Services Thailand, Turkey (PKK)
Peace agreement 
monitoring offices Sudan
Other government or 
State structures
Senegal (ANRAC), Morocco-Sahara (Economic, 
Social and Environmental Council/ CESE, Consultative 
Commission for Regionalisation / CCR), Burma 
(Myanmar Peace Centre, Nationwide Ceasefire 
Coordination Team), Moldova-Transnistria (expert 
committees), Pakistan (Parliamentary Committee)
Academic centres Sudan (Future Studies Centre, with regard to the conflict with South Sudan), South Sudan (Centre for Strategic Studies)
Armed groups’ 
structures linked to the 
negotiation
Coordinating bodies Mali, Sudan (Darfur), Burma, Thailand (south)
Group leaders
Senegal (Casamance), Ethiopia (Ogaden), Sudan 
(Darfur), Sudan (South Kordofan and Blue Nile), South 
Sudan (SPLA/AIO), CAR, Rwanda (FDLR), Libya, 
Afghanistan (Taliban), India, Pakistan (TTP), Turkey 
(PKK), Ukraine (east) 
Formal negotiators South Sudan (SPLM/AIO), Western Sahara (Polisario Front), Colombia (FARC, ELN), Philippines (NDF, MILF, MNLF)
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Active diasporas / exiles
Senegal (Casamance), Ethiopia (Ogaden), Rwanda 
(FDLR), Western Sahara (Polisario Front), Colombia 
(FARC, ELN), Philippines (NDF), Turkey (PKK)
Allied countries Nearly all have these
The mediation space
UN mediation
(personal envoys or 
special representatives)
Sudan-South Sudan (SESG, UNISFA), Libya (SRSG), 
Western Sahara (PESG, SRSG), Cyprus (Special 
Advisor)
Regional mediating 
bodies
AU (Sudan, Sudan/Darfur, Sudan/South Kordofan and 
Blue Nile, Sudan-South Sudan)
AU-UN (Sudan/Darfur)
IGAD (Somalia, South Sudan)
OSCE (Moldova, Ukraine, Armenia-Azerbaijan, Georgia 
(Abkhazia, South Ossetia))
EU (Ukraine)
Mediation of groups of 
countries
Sudan (Troika: USA, United Kingdom, Norway), CAR 
(International Contact Group), Moldova (5+2 Format: 
Moldova, Transnistria, OSCE, Russia, Ukraine + USA, 
EU), Armenia-Azerbaijan (Minsk Group: USA, France, 
Russia), Georgia (Geneva Process: UN, OSCE, EU, 
Georgia, South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Russia)
Mediation of countries 
(including Colombia’s 
guarantors)
Germany (Ukraine)
Algeria (Mali, Libya)
Brazil (Colombia)
Cuba (Colombia)
China (Afghanistan)
Ecuador (Colombia)
Egypt (Israel-Palestine)
United States (Israel-Palestine)
France (Ukraine)
Gabon (CAR)
Kenya (Ethiopia, CAR)
Malaysia (Philippines, Thailand-south)
Norway (Colombia, Philippines)
Qatar (Afghanistan)
Russia (Ukraine)
Sudan (Libya)
Uganda (DR Congo)
Mediation of specialist 
centres
HD Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue
Community Sant’Egidio (Mali, Senegal, Rwanda/DR Congo)
Crisis Management Initiative (South Sudan)
Peacekeeping missions 
or similar
UN: Mali (MINUSMA), Somalia (UNPOS, UNSOM), 
South Sudan (UNMISS), Sudan-South Sudan (UNISFA), 
CAR (MINUSCA), DR Congo (MONUSCO), Libya 
(UNMIL), Western Sahara (MINURSO), Afghanistan 
(UNAMA), India-Pakistan (UNMOGIP), Cyprus 
(UNFICYP), Kosovo (UNMIK)
AU: Somalia (AMISOM), CAR (MISCA)
EU: CAR (EUFOR-CAR), Kosovo (EULEX)
Others: Moldova (Joint Peacekeeping Forces: Russia, 
Moldova, Transnistria)
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UN accompaniment
Somalia (SRSG), South Sudan, DR Congo (SESG, 
SRSG), Colombia (UNDP), Burma (observer, SESG), 
Kosovo (SRSG), Israel-Palestine (UNSCO)
Accompaniment of 
regional bodies
AU (Mali, South Sudan, Libya, Western Sahara)
EU (Mali, Somalia, Philippines, Kosovo, Armenia-
Azerbaijan)
ECOWAS (Mali)
OCI (Mali, Philippines, Thailand-south)
CEEAC (CAR)
Arab League (Libya, Israel-Palestine)
OAS (Colombia)
ASEAN (Burma)
OSCE (Kosovo)
NATO (Kosovo)
European Parliament: (Turkey/PKK)
Accompaniment of 
groups of countries 
Somalia (International High-Level Partnership Forum 
on Somalia), South Sudan (Troika: USA, Norway, 
United Kingdom), DR Congo (International Conference 
on the Great Lakes Region), Western Sahara (Group 
of Friends: USA, France, Spain, United Kingdom and 
Russia), Philippines (Third-Party Monitoring Team), 
Kosovo (Troika: USA, EU, Russia), Georgia (Incident 
Prevention and Response Mechanism: Georgia, 
Abkhazia, Russia and EU), Israel-Palestine (Diplomatic 
Quartet: UN, EU, USA, Russia)
Accompaniment of 
groups of countries, 
government bodies and 
civil society
Somalia (High-Level Task Force), Philippines (International 
Support Group to the Negotiation Process: Japan, United 
Kingdom, Turkey, HD Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, 
The Asia Foundation, Muhammadiyah, Conciliation 
Resources, Community of Sant’Egidio), Kosovo (diplomatic 
academies in Kosovo and Vienna)
Accompaniment of 
countries
Germany (Sudan, Sudan/Darfur, Afghanistan, Armenia-
Azerbaijan)
Saudi Arabia (Afghanistan, Philippines, Israel-Palestine)
Belgium (Sudan/Darfur)
Brunei (Philippines)
Congo (CAR)
Cuba (Colombia)
Chad (Mali, Sudan/Darfur)
Chile (Colombia)
China (South Sudan, Sudan-South Sudan, Burma)
Denmark (Somalia)
Dubai (Afghanistan)
Spain (Libya)
United States (Senegal, Sudan-South Sudan, India-Pakistan)
Ethiopia (South Sudan, Sudan-South Sudan)
Finland (Burma)
France (Sudan/Darfur, Israel-Palestine)
Gambia (Senegal)
India (Afghanistan)
Indonesia (Philippines, Thailand-south)
Iran (Afghanistan)
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Accompaniment of 
countries
Italy (Libya)
Japan (Burma, Philippines)
Kenya (Sudan-South Sudan)
Malta (Libya)
Mauritania (Mali)
Niger (Mali)
Norway (Philippines)
Netherlands (Philippines)
Qatar (Sudan/Darfur, Libya, Philippines)
United Kingdom (Afghanistan)
Russia (Afghanistan)
South Africa (South Sudan)
Sweden (Thailand-south)
Switzerland (Western Sahara, Israel-Palestine)
Tanzania (South Sudan, DR Congo)
Turkey (Somalia, Libya, Philippines, Armenia-Azerbaijan)
Venezuela (Colombia)
Accompaniment of 
academic centres 
Asia Foundation (Philippines)
Berghof Foundation (Sudan, Sudan/Darfur)
Beyond Borders (Turkey/PKK)
Carter Center (Sudan-South Sudan, Israel-Palestine)
Centre for Conflict Studies and Cultural Diversity 
(Thailand-south)
HD Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (Burma, 
Philippines, Thailand-
 south)
Centro de Pensamiento y Seguimiento al Diálogo de Paz 
(Centre for Thought and Peace Dialogue Monitoring)
(Colombia)
Community of Sant’Egidio (Philippines)
Conciliation Resources (Philippines, Armenia-
Azerbaijan)
Crisis Management Initiative (Afghanistan, Moldova, 
Ukraine,
 Armenia-Azerbaijan)
Eurasia Foundation (Armenia-Azerbaijan)
Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique (Foundation 
for Strategic Research) (Afghanistan)
International Alert (Armenia-Azerbaijan)
International Centre on Conflict and Negotiation 
(Georgia)
International Peace Research Institute (Turkey/PKK)
Muhammadiyah (Philippines)
Pax Christi (Armenia-Azerbaijan)
Payap University’s Institute of Religion, Culture and 
Peace
(Thailand-south)
UNDP (Colombia)
Saferworld (Armenia-Azerbaijan)
USIP (Armenia-Azerbaijan)
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Accompaniment of NGOs 
and other structures 
Senegal (Council of Elders for Peace in Casamance, 
Mon Ku Mon), Sudan (Democracy First Group), 
Colombia (Consejo Nacional de Paz/National Peace 
Council), India-Assam (All Bodo Peace Forum), India-
Nagaland (Forum for Naga Reconciliation), Turkey 
(Group of Wise Men, Abant Platform)
Accompaniment of 
political groups
India-Pakistan (APHC Coalition), Pakistan-Waziristan 
(Jamiat Ulema Islam-Sami, Jamat-e-Islam), Turkey/
Kurds (HDP, DTP)
Accompaniment of 
churches
Senegal (Bishop of Zinguinchor), India-Pakistan (OCI), 
Philippines (Philippine Ecumenical Peace Platform), 
Thailand-south (The Inter-religious Council for Peace)
Accompaniment of 
women’s groups Senegal
Accompaniment of 
businessmen, financial 
bodies and donors
Senegal (CRAES), India-Pakistan (World Bank), Burma 
(Peace Talk Creation Group), Burma (Peace Donor 
Support Group: Norway, United Kingdom, EU, Japan, 
Switzerland, USA, Australia)
Accompaniment of 
individuals Burma (Aung San Suu Kyi)
On the basis of the above, we can draw the following conclusions:
•	 At government level, many negotiations rely on the 
leadership of a country’s president or prime minister, 
who directs the negotiation process in a highly 
personal manner. There are now few cases where peace 
commissioners or advisors lead the negotiations, with 
the president’s blessing, unlike 10 years ago or so when 
there were more than 15 examples. In these cases, the 
commissioners (or similar posts of responsibility) always 
tend to have a negotiating team, although with highly 
varied profiles in terms of their decision-making capacity.
•	 If a country has a number of armed groups at the negotiation 
stage, it is normal to have a different negotiating team 
for each group, although ultimate responsibility rests with 
just one person appointed by the country’s president.
•	 On some occasions, the person responsible for the 
negotiations may be a minister, a governor (particularly in 
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regional conflicts) or other public official.
•	 With the exception of the Philippines, the vast majority of 
people responsible for government negotiations are men.
•	 There are scarcely any official organisations or bodies 
monitoring the peace accords, which considerably 
weakens the level of guarantees and confidence that the 
agreements will be fulfilled. The most sensible thing 
would be to have such an organisation, if possible with 
the involvement of regional or international bodies.
•	 With regard to the negotiating structures of the armed groups, 
there are at least three countries in which the groups 
have joined together in a coordinated body in order to 
negotiate. This is a good example of the need to simplify 
and link agendas, in order to facilitate the negotiations.
•	 The most common situation, as in government structures, 
is that the leaders of the armed groups are the ones who 
participate directly in the negotiations. It is less common 
for these groups to have a negotiating team that does not 
include their highest leaders.
•	 The negotiations with the FARC of Colombia, in Cuba, 
is a less common but probably quite sensible example 
whereby the level of political and military leadership 
within their delegation increases as the negotiations 
progress and new issues are addressed that require the 
presence and opinion of new people.
•	 We must not forget the positive role that diasporas can 
play, in terms of making exploratory contact with exiles 
who have decision-making capacity over some groups or, at 
least, influence within them.
•	 The countries allied to a government or armed group in 
conflict may be wide-ranging but it is important to know 
who they are in order to be able to sound out their possible 
involvement in the first approaches or to consolidate an 
already advanced process. An ally does not always behave 
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as a “spoiler” in the process although there is a risk of them 
behaving as such. Nonetheless, these influential countries 
may be an advantage during the negotiations in terms of 
ensuring their continuity and good implementation.
•	 In terms of the mediation space, this offers multiple 
opportunities for a great diversity of actors who can help 
in the initial stages and in ensuring the good progress of the 
negotiations.
•	 The United Nations takes part in few negotiations formally 
although it tends to be very active in terms of its good 
offices. Where it does lead negotiations, this is through 
personal envoys or special representatives of the Secretary 
General. The overall results have not been particularly 
positive in recent years.
•	 In terms of the involvement of regional bodies, the African 
Union is the most active, due to its involvement in the 
different Sudanese conflicts, while the European Union 
rarely steps in to lead a negotiation.
•	 The OSCE has played a difficult role as mediating body as 
it is responsible for a number of processes that have been 
at a standstill for some years.
•	 There are various cases where the negotiations have been in 
the hands of a group of countries: via “troikas”, “quartets”, 
“contact groups”, etc. The experience is not positive when 
one or more of the member countries is not impartial and 
is, instead, allied to one of the parties, particularly in 
conflicts between countries. These groups of countries are 
most active as “accompaniers” to a process but not leading it.
•	 In 2014, around 17 countries were participating as 
facilitators or guarantors in public negotiations. This 
is therefore the most commonly used method. There are 
countries, such as Norway or Switzerland, that intervene 
discreetly in some processes.
•	 Mediation through specialist centres (HD, CMI, 
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Community of Sant’Egidio, etc.), is often confidential, 
and so the statistics in the table are not complete.
•	 There are quite a few peacekeeping operations that provide 
support for negotiations, or take responsibility for the final 
phase but never take charge of the actual facilitation. Most 
of these operations are under the mandate of the UN, which 
provides political accompaniment to some peace processes.
•	 There is a wide range of regional bodies accompanying 
negotiations.
•	 The Philippine negotiations with the MILF enabled 
cooperation between countries and NGOs as 
accompaniers of a negotiation process (with the MILF, 
concretely) to be put to the test. It is an experience that will 
need to be evaluated in 2015, in order to draw conclusions 
and see if this model may be of use in other processes.
•	 Around 40 countries have accompanied ongoing 
negotiations in some way, with different degrees of 
intensity. Most noteworthy in 2014 were the cases of 
Germany and Turkey. It is advisable to specify the kind of 
cooperation that these countries can provide.
•	 A minimum of 20 academic or specialist centres have 
participated publicly, accompanying some of the stages of 
negotiation processes. The HD Centre for Humanitarian 
Dialogue (Switzerland) and CMI (Finland) are the most 
active. These and other centres have also provided their 
services confidentially. They can play an important role at 
times when there is a need to re-channel the process due 
to a serious crisis, by generating new ideas, considering a 
concrete theme on the agenda in more depth, conducting 
comparative studies or gathering proposals from society.
•	 There are also organisations linked to civil society, 
Churches, businessmen or donor countries who can help 
create a favourable environment for the negotiations or 
strengthen the post-armed conflict stage.
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•	 Finally, on a very few occasions, prestigious public figures 
get involved, acting in a personal or individual capacity to 
accompany a negotiation or provide their good offices.
Final recommendations
•	 Although there is no “perfect model” for negotiating the 
end to an armed conflict or conflict that had an armed 
phase in the past, the methodologies and designs used in 
numerous negotiations over the last few years, along with 
their subsequent moments of crisis, enable a number of 
recommendations to be made, both to prevent these 
crises and to resolve them, either fully or partially.
•	 All negotiations need to take many different but possibly 
well-known factors into consideration in their design. As 
every conflict is different from the last, the negotiations 
also have their own personality. The people involved in 
their initial design must consider all these factors, including 
the involvement of all parties to the conflict.
•	 The most notable aspect required before work can begin on 
a negotiation process is the need to be fully assured that all 
parties believe the time has come to negotiate, knowing 
that the price will be one of flexibility and mutual concessions.
•	 There are enough examples to be able to advise on a certain 
frequency of rounds of talks, as well as the kind of facilitation 
or accompaniment best suited to these negotiations.
•	 The initial framework must have the flexibility to be 
redesigned should the need arise, without necessarily 
parting with the basic principles of a good negotiation.
•	 Given that it represents one of the main reasons for crisis, 
it is advisable to reaffirm every so often whether the 
negotiating model and its facilitators are appropriate or if 
they need to be reconsidered. Faith in the abilities, reliability 
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and professionalism of the mediating body is essential.
•	 It is worth remembering that the negotiation phase is only 
one stage in a peace process, and that this also includes a 
final stage in which the agreements are implemented, and 
which is often a cause of failure. To prevent this, the final 
agreements need to be realistic, viable and achievable.
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IV – ROLES IN A PEACE PROCESS
We should thank Chris Mitchell for the first proposal on how 
to systematise the roles of mediation, which I shall develop in 
this essay by adapting them to a peace process. Our point of 
departure involves clarifying a popular misconception, which is 
the assumption that mediation is an act performed by a single 
person (Bill Clinton in Israel and Palestine, Nelson Mandela 
in Burundi, Kofi Annan in Syria and Christopher Ross in 
Western Sahara, just to cite a few examples). What I am going 
to explain here, following Mitchell’s proposal, is that mediation 
is a process in which multiple actors participate by playing 
different roles, all of them complementary, and that the more 
complete the map of functions is, the better the process fares. 
What is commonly called a mediator is actually just one figure 
in the process, the core figure, it is true, whom we know as 
the facilitator, but in reality this person does not act alone but 
instead needs a series of other people who play equally necessary 
roles in the peace process.
Mediation is the intervention of third parties in a conflict 
in which two or more actors have an initial incompatibility, 
and this third party tries to help the conflicting actors to find 
a satisfactory solution to the problem by themselves. The 
facilitator does not provide a solution but helps them to find 
one through the right techniques and procedures. We should 
also note that mediation is not needed in all conflicts because 
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sometimes the clashing parties can also talk and negotiate 
directly, without the need for third parties. However, the aid of 
third parties is enlisted in more than half of the conflicts.
When we talk about mediation in a peace process, we are 
therefore referring to the actions of different people in the 
three basic stages in a peace process: the pre-negotiations, 
the negotiations and the implementation of the agreements. 
Certain figures may take part in each of these stages, each of 
whom plays a specific role. They are usually individuals, but 
sometimes they can be centres, organisations or bodies.
Creating the atmosphere 
Starting a negotiation when opinion is contrary or indifferent 
is more difficult than if there is the right atmosphere, that is, 
public opinion in favour of negotiations or a peace process. 
This favourable attitude helps the government to begin a 
rapprochement with the armed group, or the armed group 
to make the gestures needed so that the government agrees to 
negotiate. However, this atmosphere does not emerge on its 
own, spontaneously; instead, it must be created patiently and 
strategically. People or organisations in favour of negotiations 
have to create a supportive public opinion through opinion 
articles, demonstrations and public acts. This participation 
by civil society not only creates the right atmosphere but 
also helps to shape the agenda and negotiation times, which 
will enable certain issues to be considered. People who 
generate opinions through the media are the primary ones in 
charge of creating this atmosphere that is sensitive to and in 
favour of rapprochement, counterbalancing the voices from 
the sectors against any negotiations, which always exist and 
can be quite influential at times. The goal is to generate the 
opinion that it is possible, the time is right, it is necessary 
and an attempt must be made. To do so, many actors are 
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needed, including artists. Concerts for peace have been held 
countless times to not only encourage the common folk to 
support a peace process but also stimulate the government 
and armed groups to start talks.
The exploration
A negotiation can begin directly when the parties take the 
decision to do it because they believe that the time has come. 
However, oftentimes the previous intervention of a third party, 
the explorer, is needed, who discreetly listens and weighs each 
party’s willingness to enter pre-negotiations. The explorer 
fulfils a vital role in the process because they have the ability to 
approach both parties involved and determine whether or not 
the time has come to begin the process. This is a confidential and 
little-appreciated job because the person who acts as an explorer 
tends not to appear in the official history of peace processes.
Whoever performs this role must have the ability to contact 
one of the parties or, if possible, all of them, because in this 
way they can act as a messenger; that is, they can tell each party 
that the other is ready and willing to begin negotiations or 
pre-negotiations. To do so, they have to know how to contact 
the parties, either the leaders directly or the people near the 
leaders who have access to them. In some cases, the person who 
acts as the explorer can also actually influence the opinion and 
decision-making of the actors with whom they are talking. By 
sounding them out, they can influence the creation of a posture 
more favourable to starting talks, or convince one party that the 
other is now prepared and willing. To do so, they need good 
information, and this information can only be obtained through 
direct contact. An explorer can also serve as an intermediary; 
that is, they can carry messages from one party to the other, 
always confidentially. In this case, they are not acting on their 
own account but at the request of one of the parties. 
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The preparation, the training
The members of armed groups have spent many years of their 
life in the mountains, countryside or jungle, far from real life. 
They are skilled at the use of weapons, but they lack training 
in vital things that people who live a normal life have. When 
negotiating, armed groups tend to lack the knowledge needed 
to properly discuss the topics on the agenda. To remedy this, it is 
common for the country in question to authorise the members 
of the armed group to travel abroad in order to receive training 
in a series of issues (economics, parliamentary life, armed forces, 
democratic institutions, public management, municipalism, 
etc.). For example, the guerrillas from El Salvador travelled to 
Spain to take courses organised by the Spanish government. 
The guerrillas from Mozambique did the same in Italy. In both 
cases, this was done with discretion. With more fanfare, the 
Colombian guerrillas from the FARC travelled around Europe 
in the early 1990s to learn about the democratic institutions of 
several countries. In 2012, the delegates from the Philippine 
guerrillas MILF visited Catalonia to learn about the regional 
experience of autonomous communities. New ideas for 
negotiation arose from this trip, such as including the demand 
for a public defender. Sometimes what are called “friendly 
countries” are in charge of this training.
The organiser
When the parties have reached the conviction that they want to 
engage in talks, sometimes the figure of the organiser is needed, 
who formally performs the job or publicly requests the start 
of talks. This can be a prestigious person or an organisation 
(the Church or a region or international organisation). The 
organiser can also provide a physical venue where the talks can 
be held, although this is not strictly necessary. Organising talks 
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always gives the negotiations a sense of formality. The actors in 
a conflict frequently meet with the organiser, who often also 
plays the key role of facilitator.
The facilitation
What is commonly called a mediator is actually a facilitator. This 
is the key figure in the mediation process because it is the person 
who will be present in all the phases of the mediation, attend all 
the meetings and help the parties to find a solution. It can be a 
prestigious person; in this case, it is common for the mediator 
to be surrounded by a team of technicians, professionals to 
help them in their job of mediating. The facilitator is limited to 
presiding over the meetings, but the real work will be done by 
the team of assistants. The facilitator is the one who is the most 
visible in the process, the most public figure and the one who, 
if successful, will be praised for their actions. It is the person 
who appears in the final photograph. But, as mentioned above, 
their job would be impossible without the participation of all 
the actors that take part in the mediation process.
Many peace processes are plunged into crisis because they 
did not choose the right mediator or because one of the parties 
has a falling out with the mediator. There can also be crises over 
the facilitation model, that is, over the technical aspects of the 
process. Therefore, it is important to choose the right person 
and the right procedure.
To be the facilitator, a series of conditions must be met: 
knowledge of the problem, perseverance, neutrality, impartiality, 
patience, empathy and imagination. The facilitator has to have 
the ability to keep the parties seated at the table, even at the 
most difficult times, and the ability to suggest proposals that 
allow impasses to be overcome. The facilitator never imposes 
solutions but instead limits themselves to helping the parties to 
find them. This is related to viewing the glass as half-full; that 
is, stressing the progress that has been made and showing the 
parties this. When needed, the facilitator should suggest a break 
so that ideas can be refreshed or a dead-end can be avoided.
It is important for the facilitator to have precise knowledge 
of the conflict in which they are mediating. Mohamed 
Sahnoun, an Algerian diplomat who took on the role of special 
envoy for the UN Secretary General for Somalia in the early 
1990s, gathered together the top Somalia experts in the world 
to teach him about Somalia’s culture, economy, politics and 
society. In this way, he was able to design an action plan based 
on the unique features of the Somali people. Unfortunately, his 
honesty and sound groundwork cost him the job.
The witnesses
Many negotiation processes are interrupted or enter into crisis 
because of disagreements between the parties in the course of the 
process. This is quite common, and in the worst-case scenario 
it can lead to a rupture in the negotiations. Sometimes the 
same issue is interpreted differently by the parties, which leads 
to misunderstandings. In order to avoid misinterpretations, it 
is recommendable to have the figure of the outside observer 
in talks to act as the witness or overseer of the process. The 
observer has the ability to clarify to the parties the meanings 
of the points on which they cannot reach an agreement. In 
2002, for example, the government of Indonesia and the GAM 
guerrillas reached a dead-end due the differences in the way they 
interpreted the cessation of hostilities to which they had agreed.
The figure of the witness in negotiations helps the parties 
to clarify their proposals and staves off meta-conflicts, that is, 
problems of meaning. At any given time, the witness can say 
whether a given thing was said or not and thus clarify the different 
interpretations of what has been said at the negotiating table. Thus, 
they guarantee that the process unfolds as smoothly as possible.
The witness does not act as a mediator or facilitator but 
instead simply serves to clarify matters. Their goal is transparency 
in the communication between the parties. If there is a formal 
mediator or facilitator, they can also serve as a witness because 
they are present at all the meetings.
More than half of the negotiations in the world today have 
the figure of the mediator-facilitator, which are the witnesses 
of what happens. However, the parties may decide to have 
another set of eyes and enlist the aid of an outside observer, 
who will attest to what is said and agreed. The other half of the 
negotiations are direct negotiations between the parties. In this 
kind, which has no mediation, there may not be a witness, as in 
the first six rounds of talks between the ELN and the Colombian 
government in Havana between 2005 and 2007. When there 
are witnesses but no mediators, there may also be an outside 
observer with the participation of the Friendly Countries or the 
International Contact Group. Regarding Friendly Countries, 
the parties may seek the presence of a professional, such as 
Álvaro de Soto in the second face-to-face meeting between 
the Cristiani government of El Salvador and the FMNL in 
October 1989, held in San José, Costa Rica. Later, Álvaro de 
Soto became the mediator. This kind of role was also played 
by the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue in the talks between 
the Spanish government and ETA held in Geneva in 2005 and 
2007.  The Caracas agreement (1991) and Tlaxcala agreement 
(1992) in the peace process in Colombia between the Simón 
Bolívar Guerrilla Coordinator (made up of the FARC, the 
ELN and the EPL) and the Colombian government, had an 
international word witness (Emilio Figueredo Planchart).
Another variation is the participation of civil society, as in 
the state of Assam in India, where the People’s Consultative 
Group acted as the facilitator and witness of the talks with 
the ULFA guerrillas. Observers from Colombian civil society 
took part in the talks between the Colombian guerrillas and 
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the country’s government in Caracas and Tlaxcala, including 
Nelson Berrío, Álvaro Vasquez del Real, Rafael Serrano Prada 
and Miguel Mottoa Cure.
The Church often acts as a witness. The Bishop-Ulama 
Conference (BUC) has been asked to serve as a witness several 
times recently and as the Advisor on Religious Matters in the 
peace process between the Philippine government and the 
MILF guerrillas. A professional politician can also act as a 
witness, sometimes a head of state or president, such as Bill 
Clinton in July 2000 in Camp David, who was the attester 
in the negotiations between the Israeli Prime Minister 
Ehud Barak and the president of the Palestinian National 
Authority, Yasser Arafat. 
In some peace processes, the role of Friendly Countries is 
to simply monitor the process or to participate more actively 
in the negotiations. For example, in Colombia, Mexico and 
Venezuela were the witnesses and attesters of the peace 
process and disarmament of the EPL and the indigenous 
movement Quintín Lame in 1991. Finally, another kind of 
participation is exemplified by the International Contact 
Group, such as the kind used in the Philippines in the talks 
between the government and the MILF guerrillas, where a 
group made up of several NGOs made up of the Centre 
for Humanitarian Dialogue (Geneva), The Asia Foundation 
(USA), Muhammadiyah (Indonesia) and Conciliation 
Resources (London) participated in all the meetings. This 
group also included diplomats from Japan, the United 
Kingdom, Turkey and Saudi Arabia.
In short, in the negotiation rounds it may be very useful to 
have the figure of the witness, as the overseer or attester of what 
happens at the negotiating table. Even though they do not have 
the right to take the floor in the course of the talks, they do 
have the authority to later express their opinion to the parties, 
especially when they cannot agree on what they have said.
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Incentives
When a negotiation takes place at a difficult time, it is a good 
idea to enlist the participation of an organisation or a country 
that can offer political or economic incentives to unblock the 
process. The European Union has played this role several times, 
and numerous countries have offered economic resources in 
exchange for continuing the negotiations, or with the promise 
of providing these resources once a peace agreement has been 
reached. For example, in 2012 the Norwegian government 
offered more than 60 million euros for the development of the 
Karen people (Myanmar), which stimulated the negotiations 
being held at that time between the Karen guerrillas and the 
government of Myanmar. Another incentive is promising to 
remove an armed group from the list of terrorists if they sign a 
cessation of hostilities. In 2012, in Myanmar, one incentive was 
to allow offices representing the different ethnic armed groups 
to be opened. A visit by the United Nations Secretary General to 
the negotiating parties can also be a good incentive. In India, one 
incentive for moving ahead in the negotiations with the armed 
group ULFA in 2001 was the release of its imprisoned leaders.
Generating ideas
All negotiations go through difficult times when the facilitator 
has to gauge whether it is a good time for a break in order 
to regroup. To do so, they can resort to third parties, usually 
scholars, or specialised centres to develop new ideas. An 
academic centre like the School of Peace Culture, for example, 
summoned the negotiator of the Frente Polisario, the delegates 
of the King of Morocco, the representative of the UN 
facilitator, the African Union and the European chancelleries 
with experts on the Arab word and formulas of self-governance 
in order to try to generate new ideas at a time of impasse in the 
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negotiations on Western Sahara, which were later taken by the 
United Nation facilitator in this conflict. The witness of peace 
talks does not have the right to take the floor but can make 
suggestions in a written document which they make available 
to both parties. This is what Kristian Herbolzheimer did, the 
representative of Conciliation Resources in the International 
Contact Group, who was monitoring the negotiations between 
the MILF guerrillas and the Philippine government. The 
representatives of this guerrilla group visited several countries 
in order to gather experiences from other negotiations. This is 
quite common in peace process.
The unifier
When preparing for peace negotiations, it is common for an 
armed group to undergo one or several divisions and to split 
between those who are in favour of and against negotiations. 
This can, in turn, be the source of further divisions, as happened 
in Darfur (Sudan), where at first there were two armed groups 
and a year later there were at least 13, rendering negotiations 
impossible. In this case, the figure of the unifier is needed, a 
person who tries to unify if not all the groups at least their 
agendas so that there are as few as possible and it becomes 
feasible to carry out successful negotiations.
The guarantor
It is common for a drawn-out conflict to lead to a great deal of 
mistrust between the parties. For this reason, all peace processes 
should be accompanied by the figure of the guarantor, who 
guarantees that the parties fulfil what they have agreed to. 
Obviously, fulfilment of the agreements is the responsibilities 
of the conflicting parties, but it is positive for a third actor to 
accompany them and monitor the agreements. The guarantor 
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must have some power, so it cannot be just anybody. It can be 
a regional or international body. The guarantor brings security 
to the process. Sometimes, such as in the negotiations between 
the FARC and the Colombian government, the guarantors 
(Norway and Cuba) also act as observers.
The verification
In the course of the negotiation, measures are taken, such as a 
ceasefire or a cessation of hostilities, which must be verified. To 
do so, the participation of civilian and military experts from 
several countries is needed to attest to the fact that the agreements 
are being fulfilled. This is a technical job, so some training is 
needed. Sometimes United Nations staff takes care of this job. 
It is also necessary to verify fulfilment of peace agreements, so 
people are needed to join the verification teams on political, 
economic, police, military and other issues. These teams are 
often mixed, that is, they are made of people from the armed 
group, the government and third countries. Verification teams 
should investigate complaints of violations of the agreements, 
and they should provide mechanisms to resolve these problems. 
Therefore, they must have the authority to issue sanctions.
Conclusion
All the roles mentioned above should participate in a peace 
process. They are usually different people, and working in one 
role is incompatible with taking on another. Only occasionally 
can a person do two jobs at once. In the pre-negotiations, the 
exploratory phase, it is a good idea to define which people 
or institutions will take on these roles, and it is important to 
clarify how decisions are going to be taken when appointing 
these actors. The success of the negotiation depends on this 
being done correctly and choosing them well.
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V. ALTERNATIVE DIPLOMACIES IN 
CONTEXTS OF CONFLICT
In any one of the stages of peace processes (exploratory 
contacts, initial informal dialogues, formal negotiation, peace 
accord, fulfilment of the agreements), or in negotiations in 
contexts of a socio-political crisis, there exist a series of actions 
that pertain to conventional and official diplomacy, but which 
are frequently accompanied by initiatives of a highly diverse 
kind, almost always of an imaginative nature, in which other 
non-official players also tend to take part. Although they are 
related to “multi-track diplomacy”, it would perhaps be more 
appropriate to call them “alternative diplomacies”, which are 
frequently confidence-boosting measures (CBM), and which 
help to ensure that the process works better, and even make it 
possible to unblock certain difficult negotiations. 
What follows below are some of the initiatives set out in 
the Peace Process Yearbooks published by the Autonomous 
University of Barcelona’s School for a Culture of Peace, and 
which covers the period 1995-2015.
Crossing point diplomacy
• In January 2007, the Turkish-Cypriot authorities of Cyprus 
demolished a controversial footbridge in Nicosia, the divided 
capital of the island, constructed in 2005. Instead of the 
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footbridge a crossing point was opened that communicates 
the two communities - an addition to the five other crossing 
points already existing on the island since 2003. In April 
2008 the crossing point in Ledra Street in Nicosia was 
reopened. As a positive symbolic gesture, the leader of the 
Turkish Cypriot community, Mehmet Ali Talat, crossed over 
to the Greek Cypriot part of Ledra Street, in a gesture aimed 
at promoting reconciliation. During the crossing, which had 
not been announced, Talat bought Greek music and sent 
a message of friendship. In 2010 a new crossing point was 
opened in the northwest of the island.
• In 2011, the Egyptian authorities decided to reopen the 
Rafah border crossing that connects with the Gaza Strip, as 
part of the efforts aimed at consolidating the reconciliation 
between Palestinians.
Diplomacy of the elders
• In January 2008, a group mediators made up of three 
Oromo elders met in Amsterdam with the leaders of 
the armed group OLF, and signed an agreement to hold 
peace talks with the Ethiopian Government, accepting in 
principle the Constitution.
Congratulation diplomacy
• In August 2004, the Nagaland armed group NSCN (IM) 
made the gesture of congratulating the India      population, 
for the first time, on the occasion of Independence day.
Women diplomacy
• At the end of 2007, 122 women from Turkey, many of 
them singers, writers, academics and journalists, initiated 
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a campaign in favour of peace, consisting of sending 
messages over the internet that were an alternative to the 
war discourses. The organisers called on men to initiate a 
similar campaign.
• In February 2008 the first political party whose programme 
was the defence of the rights of women was set up in 
Afghanistan. The party, called National Need, was headed 
by the member of parliament Fatima Nazari, who indicated 
that her party had 22,500 members throughout the country.
• In November 2008, as a new example of the confidence-
boosting measures initiated in Cyprus by the two 
communities, the spouses of the leaders of both sides met 
in the north of the island.
Transportation diplomacy
• In 2005, India and Pakistan established a bus route to unite 
the two Kashmirs, suspended 60 years ago.
• In June 205, Georgia, Russia and Abkhazia met in Moscow, 
under the auspices of the United Nations, to discuss the 
reopening of the railway line that unites Sochi with Georgia 
and Russia.
• In 2008, India and Pakistan decided to double the number 
of weekly flights that unite the two states, as well as 
increasing the number of destinations connected and the 
number of airlines authorised to carry out these flights.
Sports diplomacy
• In March 2005, the government of India invited the 
president of Pakistan to attend a cricket match held in 
India between the two countries.
• In 2008, as a confidence-boosting measure, the different 
factions of the armed group NSCN from Nagaland (India), 
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agreed on a cease-fire to play a “Naga reconciliation” 
football match. The teams were made up in a mixed way 
of the combatants of the armed groups and militants from 
organisations of the Naga civil society. The match, the 
second of this kind, was designed to foster reconciliation 
between the different Naga organisations.
• Diplomats from Armenia and Turkey met in July 2008 
in Switzerland to make progress in the normalisation of 
the relations between the two countries, blocked since 
Armenia’s independence in 1991. As a symbolic gesture, 
the Armenian president invited his Turkish counterpart 
to attend the World Cup football match between Turkey 
and Armenia that took place in the Armenian capital in 
September 2008. In 2009, the presidents of Turkey and 
Armenia were present together at another football match. 
• The Moldavian prime minister and the leader of Transnistria 
held an informal meeting in August 2010 in the framework 
of a football match held in the capital of Transnistria, 
Tiraspol. In July 2011, the Moldavian prime minister and 
the leader of Transnistria met in the capital of the separatist 
region within the framework of a football match.
• In 2011, the Indian prime minister invited his Pakistani 
counterpart to be present at a cricket match that the two 
countries were contesting in India. The Pakistani prime 
minister invited Indian prime minister to travel to Pakistan, 
and expressed his desire for a similar match to take place on 
Pakistani territory.
Energy diplomacy
• In 2005, India and Pakistan discussed the construction of 
a gas pipeline that would run between  Iran and India, and 
that would cross Pakistan and ensure the energy supply to 
both countries.
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Telephone diplomacy
• In October 2005, and after the earthquake that affected the 
area of Kashmir administered by Pakistan, the latter and India 
restored telephone communications, cut off for 15 years.
• In 2007, the president of Burundi and Agathon Rwasa, 
leader of the armed group FNL, exchanged mobile phone 
numbers in order to accelerate the implementation of the 
agreement to cease hostilities.
The diplomacy of continuous meetings
• In August 2008, the president of Burundi and the leader 
of the FNL group, Agathon Rwasa, decided to meet twice 
a week to set up a commission that would meet whenever 
there was a problem in the negotiations. 
 
The diplomacy of visits
• From 2004 on, Burma began a process that was led to the 
freeing of political prisoners before or after the periodic 
visits of the special envoy of the Secretary General of the 
UN, the special reporter on human rights and political 
leaders of different countries.
• In February 2006, and probably linked to the visit made 
by the presidents of France and the United States to India, 
the Indian prime minister announced the holding of a 
conference in which Kashmir politicians and separatist 
leaders would participate, with the aim of expanding the 
dialogue on the peace process.
• In November 2007, a delegation of the armed Ugandan 
group LRA succeeded for the first time in ensuring that 
the government would accept the idea of the rebel group 
visiting the capital of the country, where it met with 
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political groups and the president himself.
• In August 2007, the Israeli prime minister, Ehud Olmert, 
and the Palestinian president, Mahmoud Abbas, met in 
Jericho, in Palestinian territory, for the first time in several 
years, within the framework of a series of meetings prior 
to the peace conference that was held in November and 
promoted by the United States.
• At the beginning of 2008, the Palestinian president, 
Mahmoud Abbas, revealed that confidential contacts 
between Israel and Hamas were being developed in 
Switzerland. In these conversations, the prime minister 
of Gaza, Ismael Haniya, would also have participated. 
In June, and with Egyptian mediation, Israel and Hamas 
agreed to a total ceasing of hostilities for six months in 
Gaza.
• In January 2009, a delegation of the armed Sudanese group 
JEM travelled to Washington as part of the initiative of the 
American government to support the peace process in the 
Darfur region. Representatives of this group also travelled 
to Norway, where the authorities stressed he importance 
of their participation in the peace process under Qatari 
mediation.
• In August 2009, the Turkish prime minister met for more 
than an hour with the leader of the Democratic Society 
Party (DPT), a Kurd nationalist grouping, in order to make 
progress in solving the Kurdish conflict.
• In 2012, the Pakistani president visited India, on a private 
trip, and met with the Indian prime minister. This was the 
first visit of a Pakistani head of state to the neighbouring 
country in seven years.
• In 2014, the Pakistani prime minister attended the 
inauguration of the recently elected Indian prime 
minister.
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Mirror diplomacy
• In 2005, a delegation of the LTTE group from Sri Lanka 
visited various European countries and South Africa. 
• In 2006, Umar Farook, the leader of the Kashmiri 
organisation to APHC, visited Northern Ireland to study 
the peace process in this territory.
• In 2007, the president of the Federal Transitional 
Government of Somalia visited Rwanda to meet with his 
Rwandese counterpart and in to learn about that country’s 
experience in reconstruction and reconciliation.
• At the beginning of 2007, a delegation of the Iraqi parliament, 
made up of parliamentarians from the main Shiite, Sunni 
and Kurd parties and other minorities, visited Spain and 
Germany to learn about the territorial model in both 
countries before the debate for constitutional reform in Iraq.
• In August 2007, a dozen Iraqi political leaders met in 
Finland, under the Crisis Management Initiative, to 
learn lessons from other peace processes, such as those in 
Northern Ireland and South Africa.
• In June 2008, an Australian newspaper published the 
news that Indonesia could be preparing a plan to help the 
Military junta in Burma in a transition towards democracy 
based on its own experience.
• After the formation of a new Government at the beginning 
of 2008, Thailand’s interior minister declared that the 
government was considering granting a certain degree of 
autonomy to the southern provinces with a Muslim majority. 
The minister also declared that the autonomous Chinese 
region of Xinjiang, also with a Muslim majority, could act 
as a model. In June, the government of Thailand instructed 
the Minister of the Interior, the intelligence services and the 
Administrative Centre of the Border Provinces in the South 
to study ways of resolving the conflict in Aceh (Indonesia).
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• In 2008, representatives of Armenian and Assyrian NGOs met 
in Brussels to discuss the Nagorno-Karabaj conflict. During 
the encounter, models of political architecture such as those 
of the Aland Islands and Northern Ireland were discussed.
• In 2008, the Finland Crisis Management Initiative, presided 
over by the former Finnish president Martti Ahtisaari, 
revealed that a three-day conference had been held in 
Finland in which 36 Iraqi political personalities from the 
Shii, Sunni and Kurd communities had participated, with 
the purpose of promoting reconciliation in Iraq. They were 
accompanied by participants in the Northern Ireland and 
South Africa peace processes.
• In 2009, the Philippine government carried out consultations 
with various international experts, including a British delegation 
that participated in the peace negotiations in Northern 
Ireland. In June, a delegation of the armed group MILF visited 
Northern Ireland by invitation of the British government.
• In May 2009, the leader of the Kurdish guerrillas PKK, 
Karayilan, reiterated his offer to the Turkish government to 
seek a solution to the armed conflict within the framework 
of the territorial integrity of Turkey, respecting the Turkish 
borders. Karayilan compared the situation of the Kurds in 
Turkey with the relationship between the English and the 
Scots, pointing to this framework as a possible solution to 
the conflict.
• In 2010, the leader of the Kurdish guerrillas PKK, Abdullah 
Öcalan, reiterated his demand for democratic autonomy as 
a solution to the Kurdish conflict. According to Öcalan, the 
model of Catalonia deserved to be studied, and added that 
the Kurds could learn from it.
• In 2010, the foreign minister of Azerbaijan proposed a 
high level of autonomy for the region of Nagorno-Karabaj, 
similar to the one for areas like Tatarstan and Bashkortostan 
in the Russian Federation. 
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• In 2012, a delegation of the Philippine guerrillas MILF, 
visited Catalonia to learn about its model of autonomy.
Mothers diplomacy
• In 2006, Mrs. Anek,  the 83 year old mother of Joseph 
Kony, leader of the Ugandan armed group LRA, asked her 
son to continue participating in the peace negotiations 
under way in the south of Sudan, and prepared to travel 
to the operational base of the LRA in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, where her son was.
• In 2009, in an atmosphere of rapprochement and openness 
in Turkey, relatives of Turkish soldiers and members of 
PKK guerrillas killed in action, met in Diyarbakir, the 
Kurdish capital, to call for peace and reconciliation.  In the 
encounter, mothers of Kurdish insurgents embraced their 
Turkish counterparts and offered them white handkerchiefs 
as a symbol of peace.
Television diplomacy
• In 2006, the governments of India and Pakistan, in conflict 
over the region of Kashmir, decided to allow the re-
broadcasting of Indian programming by Pakistani television.
• In 2012, the separatist region of Transnistria, authorised 
the broadcasting of two Moldovian television channels.
Communications diplomacy
• In May 2008, Niger and Libya signed an agreement for the 
construction of a trans-Sahara motorway that would link 
the two countries. The highway would run from the city of 
Agadez, capital of the region where the armed Tuareg group 
MNJ operated, to the Libyan border. This rapprochement 
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between the two countries could be a strategy to succeed in 
calming the tensions in the north of Niger, by achieving the 
development of the region via communications.
• In 2012, the authorities of Transnistria hoped to be able to 
restore a direct telephone line with Moldavia. In July, the 
leaders of Transnistria and Moldavia decided to re-establish 
all the transport corridors between the two territories. The 
measure included re-establishing all the railway lines, as well 
as lifting the restrictions on carriers.
• In July 2013, and within the framework of the conversations 
between the federal government of Somalia and the self-
proclaimed republic of Somaliland, it was decided to create 
an organism of bilateral control to manage the airspace 
jointly and to distribute the benefits deriving from this.
Civil society diplomacy
• At the beginning of 2005, the Thai government created the 
National Reconciliation Commission, led by ex-minister A. 
Panyarachun, and whose aim was to obtain the pacification 
of the south of the country. The organisation was made up of 
30 representatives from different sectors of society.
• In 2006, the president of Sri Lanka appointed a group of 
experts made up of different sectors of society to draw up 
a peace plan. Months later it was agreed upon to create a 
committee made up of five members of each political party 
to formulate an action programme aimed at reaching a 
consensus about what the solution to the armed conflict 
should be.
• Also in 2006, the International Olaf Palme Centre encouraged 
a meeting in Stockholm between a group of GAM guerillas 
and a group of civilians born in Aceh (Indonesia) but residing 
in several parts of the world, with the aim of providing 
proposals for the negotiators.
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• In May 2007, almost 200 personalities from Jordan, Israel 
and Palestine held a meeting in the Jordanian city of Aqaba 
to discuss ways of promoting the Arab Peace Initiative, which 
offered the establishment of relations with Israel in exchange 
for the withdrawal from the territories occupied in 1967.
• In October 2007, nearly 600,000 Palestinians and Israelis, in 
equal numbers, signed a petition aimed at the governments 
of Israel and Palestine to reach a peace accord based on a 
solution that contemplated the creation of two states and 
Israel’s withdrawal to the borders prior to 1967. The petition 
was promoted by the One Voice Movement organisation.
• At the end of 2008, the University of Guwahati (State of 
Assam, in India) held a meeting in which organisations from 
the civil society participated together with representatives of 
armed organisations who maintained cease-fire agreements 
with the government. The participants in the meeting 
emphasised the need to create a body that could encourage a 
peace process in all the region of northeastern India.
• In November 2009, the joint mediating group of the African 
Union and United Nations summoned all the movements 
of the Darfur civil society (Sudan) to a consultative meeting 
that lasted four days, with the aim of identifying the means 
for supporting the peace process. More than a hundred 
organisations representing the different tribes, traditional 
powers, young people, women and displaced persons met in 
Doha (Qatar).
• In 2007, intellectuals from Armenia and Azerbaijan embarked 
on a joint tour of both countries and the region of Nagorno-
Karabaj, organised by the ambassadors of the two states, and 
in which they both held meetings with the presidents of the 
two countries, as well as political and civilian representatives. 
In 2009 the experience was repeated.
• In 2010, a total of 400 representatives from Darfur (Sudan), 
representing the different communities, leaders of opinion, 
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women, young people, intellectuals, displaced persons and 
the diaspora met in Doha (Qatar) to align positions with 
respect to their stance regarding the peace negotiations that 
were taking place in the Qatari capital.
Incentives diplomacy
• In April 2006, the United States promised 30 million dollars 
for the reconstruction of Mindanao if a peace accord between 
the Philippine government and the MILF were reached.
• In 2007, the Ugandan president promised an investment of 
600 million dollars in the north of the country, once peace 
was attained with the LRA.
• In March 2007, the British government announced that 
it would offer a financial contribution of 53 billion euros 
for public expenditure in Northern Ireland, over four years, 
once autonomy had been restored.
• In 2011, a leak published in Wikileaks indicated that the US 
government had begun talks with the Philippine guerrilla 
group MILF in 2005, and that the US was willing to disburse 
development aid to the MILF if a peace accord were signed.
Identity diplomacy
- In 2005, the government of Thailand decided to carry 
out an educational reform so that students in the provinces of 
the south could have texts written in Yawi, and which their 
cultural and religious identity was recognised.
The diplomacy of discreet encounters
• At the end of 2005, the former Malaysian prime minister, 
Mhathir Mohamad, director of the Perdana Leadership 
Foundation, organised a discreet encounter on the island 
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of Langkawi (northeastern Malaysia) between Thai civil 
servants (with the military included) and Muslim groups, in 
order to achieve peace in the south of Thailand.
• At the end of 2006 it was revealed that the Israeli foreign 
minister, T. Livni, was promoting a peace initiative with the 
Palestinians through secret channels..
• In July 2007, the French government met with various 
Lebanese political players in the castle of Cell-Saint-Cloud to 
bring an end to the tension of recent months. The meeting, 
held behind closed doors, involved 30 representatives 
from some 14 political parties and Lebanese movements , 
including Hezbollah. The participants agreed not to use 
violence to obtain their political aims.
• In 2008, the number two of the pro-government party in 
Turkey and the leader of the pro-Kurdish DTP, who were old 
schoolmates, held an informal meeting about the Kurdish 
question after an apparently accidental encounter in a 
restaurant in Ankara.
• In November 2009, the moderate leaders of pro-independence 
parties of Kashmir (India), met with the Minister of the 
Interior, for the second time in secret, in what the the Indian 
government referred to as “quiet diplomacy”.
• In February 2010, a spokesman for the president of the Maldives 
affirmed that Taliban representatives and those of the Afghan 
government met in these islands for three days in January.
• In 2010, secret meetings between India and Pakistan began 
after the visit to the region by the president of the U.S.A.
• In 2010, the undersecretary of the Turkish intelligence 
services, accompanied by other two people, met in secret with 
the leader of the Kurdish PKK guerrilla, who was in prison.
• In 2011, US representatives met with Taliban officials in 
Germany and Qatar, among other places; meetings in which 
Pakistan would also have participated.
• In June 2012, one of the main Palestinian negotiators, Saeb 
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Erekat, confirmed that there had been secret contacts with 
Israel since April of that year.
Symbolic diplomacy
• In Thailand, the Armed Forces that perpetrated a coup d’etat 
in September 2006, held a seminar some days later in the 
central mosque of Yala (SOUTH), as a sign of truce.
• The local elections that were held in November 2013 in 
Kosovo did not include the Kosovar symbols on the ballot 
papers in the areas with a Serbian majority.
• 
The diplomacy of forgiveness
• In 2007, the president of the Central African Republic, 
François Bozizé, asked for forgiveness from the population 
of the country for all the acts of violence committed 
by the state’s security corps and forces. In his message, 
he combined the official language, French, with the 
national language, Sango, thereby making inter-ethnic 
communication possible.
• In November 2007, a delegation from the armed Ugandan 
group LRA, ask for forgiveness for the atrocities committed 
against the inhabitants of the north of the country during 
the 20 years of armed conflict.
Diplomacy of sharing resources
• In a visit to the region of Jammu and Kashmir, in July 
2007, the Indian prime minister indicated that the 
moment had arrived for an agreement with Pakistan, and 
proposed the joint use of the natural and water-bearing 
resources for the benefit of the two parts of the region, 
divided by a Control Line.
Commerce diplomacy
• In 2008 commercial exchanges were initiated between India 
and Pakistan across the Control Line (the de facto border 
between the two countries), for the first time in 60 years.
• In April 2009, China and Taiwan reached an agreement to 
allow economic investment between the two countries.
• In October 2012, the Pakistani oil minister affirmed that the 
country was willing to buy Indian fuel.
• In November 2013, the new president of Afghanistan visited 
Pakistan, in the hope that increased economic cooperation 
between the two countries would help to revitalise the 
negotiations with the Taliban.
• 
Religious diplomacy
• In January 2008, Buddhist, Catholic, Hindu, Muslim and 
Protestant religious leaders religious from Western Papua 
(Indonesia), affirmed that the law of special autonomy 
approved in Jakarta six years earlier was being ignored both 
by the police and by the government’s development plans, 
which, according to these leaders, would have divided to the 
local population along ethnic lines and would have caused 
the marginalisation of the Papu population.
Business diplomacy
• In 2009, members of the government of Nigeria indicated 
that foreign and national the companies operating in the 
oil region of the Niger Delta would have to cooperate in 
financing the reintegration of the combatants of the armed 
group MEND, since their companies would be the first to 
benefit from the climate of peace.
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• In 2009, the armed group ONLF, which operates in the 
Ethiopian region of Ogaden, urged the Malaysian oil 
company Petronas to instigate corporate responsibility 
measures and to try and play a constructive role in resolving 
the conflict in the region.
• In 2012, 600 Pakistani business people participated in a 
trade fair in India.
• In 2014, several business people from Burma acted as 
intermediaries to aid the negotiations with the armed groups 
from the different ethnic groups.
• Also in 2014, business leaders from the two Cypriot 
communities created the Economic Forum of Nicosia, to 
foster inter-community initiatives from the private sector.
The diplomacy of family visits
• In August 2009, Morocco and the Polisario Front met over 
two days in a hotel in Dürstein (Austria), and agreed that the 
Saharaui families residing in the Western Sahara or in the 
refugees camps in Tindouf (Algeria) could travel overland 
under the supervision of the UN to visit each other.
Tourism diplomacy
• In October 2009 it was announced that China and Taiwan 
would have permanent representatives in each other’s 
territories, in response to the significant increase in the flow 
of tourists in both directions.
The diplomacy of the observers
• In September 2009, the Philippine government and the 
armed group MILF signed a framework agreement in the 
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Malaysian capital for the formation of an international group 
to support the negotiation process, made up of governments, 
mainly those of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference 
and the EU, as well as international NGOs.
The diplomacy of the artists
• In 2009, the leaders of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish 
Cypriots in Cyprus jointly attended a reception for artists of 
both communities, whose works decorate the headquarters 
of the UN in Nicosia, the capital, including the room in 
which the two leaders usually meet.
• In 2012, the Moldavian prime minister and the leader of the 
separatist region of Transnistria met during the concert by 
the singer Lara Fabian in the Moldavian capital, Chisinau.
Diplomacy of the wise people
• In 2009, the leader of the PKK guerrillas, Murat Karayilan, 
stressed in Turkey the willingness of the armed group to enter 
into direct dialogue with the government, or should this not 
prove to be possible, via a “group of wise people”.
Preventive diplomacy
• In February 2009, Georgia, Russia, Abkhazia and Southern 
Ossetia agreed in Geneva, under the  mediation of the 
UN, OSCE and EU, on proposals for establishing joint 
mechanisms for preventing and responding to incidents. 
In a joint communiqué, the mediators indicated that the 
measures included meetings on a weekly basis or more 
frequently between the organisations responsible for security 
and public order.
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The diplomacy of forgiveness
• In March 2009, the Iraqi government made a call for 
reconciliation between the different groups in the country, 
requesting a pardon for those who had worked with the 
Sadam Hussein regime.
The diplomacy of dinners
• In May 2010, the UN organised a dinner for the leaders 
of the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot communities, 
together with their spouses, in a restaurant in the separation 
zone that divides the capital. In addition, two informal 
dinners between the two leaders and their spouses were held 
during the year, in their respective residences. In 2013 the 
experience was repeated.
The diplomacy of offices of representation
• In April 2011, the government of Turkey declared itself to 
be in favour of welcoming a political office for the Afghan 
Talibans to promote the peace negotiations between these 
and the Afghan government; a proposal that had the backing 
of Pakistan. In January 2012, the Taliban announced the 
opening of a political office in Qatar.
The diplomacy of the passport
• In February 2011 the leaders of the armed group NSCN-
IM, which operates in the state of Nagaland, in India, 
accepted the Indian passport, as a symbolic gesture of good 
faith regarding the conversations with the government.
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APPENDIXES13
13 All the appendixes in this book were initially published in the latest 
Yearbooks of Peace Processes.
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Appendix 1 – Conflicts and peace processes in recent years
Most of the armed conflicts analyzed in this appendix began 
in the period spanning from the 1970s to the 1990s. Over the 
years several armed conflicts have come to an end, either with 
the signing of a final peace agreement (regardless of its value) 
or by reaching a provisional cessation of armed hostilities. In 
any case, if we look at most of the conflicts from the 1980s and 
the fact that some are still underway, we can draw some initial 
conclusions regarding the way these conflicts were managed 
from the perspective that thirty years of history provides. It 
should be noted that some of these conflicts have moved from 
an armed phase to an unarmed phase, although this section 
considers them all.
Of the 112 conflicts in the table below, 39.3 % ended in a 
peace agreement. Those that have not been resolved and 
are still active account for 47.3 % of the total and what is 
most significant is that only 9.8 % of these conflicts have 
been brought to an end with a military victory by one of the 
sides; in other words, the vast majority of these conflicts have 
been resolved only through negotiations, by launching some 
kind of process that leads to a final agreement, and not through 
military force. This does not diminish the concern regarding 
the high number of yet unresolved conflicts. 
Regarding the conflicts that have come to an end in the last thirty 
years (59), 44 have been achieved through peace agreements 
(74.6 %), 4 without any formal peace accord (6.8 %) and 11 
were achieved with a military victory (18.6 %), which confirms 
that negotiation is the best path for resolving conflicts.
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Conflicts underway since the 1980s and their resolution until 2015
Countries Period Resolution
Afghanistan 89-… Unresolved
Angola – FLEC 75-… Unresolved
Angola – UNITA 75-02 Peace agreement
Algeria 91-… Unresolved 
Armenia-Azerbaijan 91-… Unresolved
Burma – CNF 88- Unresolved
Burma – KNU 48-… Unresolved
Burma (MNDAA) 09-… Unresolved
Burma – Shan 59-… Unresolved
Burundi 93-05 Peace agreement
Burundi (FNL) 91-06 Peace agreement
Burundi (FNL) 11-13 Peace agreement
Colombia (M-19) 74-90 Peace agreement
Colombia (EPL) 67-91 Peace agreement
Colombia (MAQL) 84-91 Peace agreement
Colombia (CRS) 91-94 Peace agreement
Colombia – ELN 64-… Unresolved
Colombia – FARC 64-… Unresolved
Congo (Ninjas) 98-07 Peace agreement 
Congo, DR (Inter-Congolese dialogue) 97-03 Peace agreement 
Congo, DR (Kivus and Ituri) 96-… Unresolved 
Condo, RD – M23 12-13 Military victory
Ivory Coast 02-07 Peace agreement
Ivory Coast 11 Military victory
Croatia 92-95 Peace agreement
Chad 99-11 Peace agreement
Cyprus 74-… Unresolved
Egypt (Sinai) 14-… Unresolved
El Salvador 80-91 Peace agreement
Eritrea-Djibouti 08-10 Peace agreement
Spain (ETA) 68-11 Ended without negotiations
Ethiopia (OLF) 73-… Unresolved
Ethiopia (faction ONLF) 84-10 Peace agreement
Ethiopia (ONLF) 84-... Unresolved
Ethiopia-Eritrea 98-00 Peace agreement 
Philippines (Abu Sayyaf) 90’s-… Unresolved
Philippines – MILF 78-14 Peace agreement
Philippines – MNLF 70-… Unresolved
Philippines – NPA 69-… Unresolved
Georgia (Abkhazia) 93-… Unresolved
Georgia (South Ossetia) 90-… Unresolved
Guatemala – URNG 82-94 Peace agreement
Guinea-Bissau 98-99 Peace agreement
India (CPI-M) 80-… Unresolved
India (Assam) – BLTF-BLT 92-03 Peace agreement
India (Assam) –DHD 95-03 Peace agreement
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India (Assam) – ULFA 89-… Unresolved
India (Assam) – NDFB 92-… Unresolved
India (Jammu and Kashmir) 89-… Unresolved
India (Manipur) 03-… Unresolved
India (Nagaland) – NSCN-IM 80- Unresolved
India (Punjab) 81-93 Military victory
India (Tripura) – NLFT 89-05 Peace agreement
India-Pakistan (Kashmir) 90-… Unresolved 
Indonesia (Aceh) 76-05 Peace agreement
Indonesia (Western Papua) 65-… Unresolved
Indonesia (Timor Este) 75-99 Peace agreement
Iraq 03-… Unresolved
Iraq-Kuwait 91 Military victory 
Iraq (Kurdistan) 91-05 Peace agreement 
Northern Ireland – IRA 69-05 Peace agreement
Israel-Palestine 64-… Unresolved
Kosovo 98-10 Ended without peace agreement
Lebanon 89-90 Peace agreement
Lebanon-Israel 06 Peace agreement 
Lebanon – Fatah al-Islam 07 Military victory 
Liberia 89-96 Peace agreement 
Libya 11-… Unresolved
Mali 90-09 Peace agreement
Mali (north) 11-… Unresolved
Mozambique- RENAMO 77-92 Peace agreement
Nepal – CPN 96-06 Peace agreement
Niger - MNJ 07-… Unresolved
Nigeria (Delta) - MEND 05-10 Peace agreement 
Nigeria (Boko Haram) 11-… Unresolved
Pakistan (Baluchistan) 06-… Unresolved
Pakistan (Northwest Frontier) 01-… Unresolved
Peru – Sendero Luminoso 70-99 Military victory 
Central African Republic 03-08 Peace agreement
Central African Republic – Séléka 12-13 Military victory
DR Congo (east) 98-… Unresolved
DR Congo – M23 13 Military victory
Rwanda – FPR 94 Military victory 
Rwanda (FDLR) 97-… Unresolved
Russia (Chechnya) 94-… Ended without peace agreement
Russia (Dagestan) 10-… Unresolved
Russia-Georgia 08 Peace agreement 
Russia (Ingushetia) 08-… Ended without peace agreement
Russia (Kabardino-Balkaria) 11-… Unresolved
Western Sahara 75-… Unresolved
Senegal (Casamance) 82-… Unresolved 
Sierra Leone 91-00 Peace agreement
Syria 11-… Unresolved
Somalia 89-… Unresolved 
Sri Lanka – LTTE 72-09 Military victory 
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South Africa 61-93 Peace agreement
Sudan (Kordofan and Blue Nile) 11-.. Unresolved
Sudan (SLA) 03-06 Peace agreement
Sudan – SPLA 83-05 Peace agreement
Sudan (JEM-Ibrahim) 03-… Unresolved
Sudan (JEM-Bashar) 03-13 Peace agreement
Sudan – east 05-06 Peace agreement
Sudan –Southern Sudan 09-12 Peace agreement
South Sudan 09-… Unresolved
Thailand (south) 04-… Unresolved
Tajikistan 92-97 Peace agreement
Turkey – PKK 74-… Unresolved
Ukraine 14-… Unresolved
Uganda – LRA 89-… Unresolved
Yemen North-South 94 Military victory 
Yemen (AQPA) 09-… Unresolved
Yemen  (Al-Houthists) 04- Unresolved
Status of armed conflicts studied
Number Percentage
Ended with peace agreement 44 39.3 %
Currently being resolved   4  3.6 %
Military victory  11  9.8 %
Unresolved  53 47.3 %
TOTAL 112 100
Conflicts ended
Number Percentage
By peace agreement 44 74.6 %
Without peace agreement 4  6.8 %
By military victory 11 18.6 %
TOTAL 59 100 %
Duration of conflicts that ended by a peace agreement
       Years  Number
     1-4   13
     5-9   10
   10-14     7
15-19     6
20-24     3
25-29     2
30-34     1
35-39     2
52.3% of the conflicts ended in less than 10 years, while 11.4% lasted more than 25 years.
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Appendix 2 – Peace agreements and ratification of the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court.
Ever since the establishment of the Rome Statute in 1998, 
which set up the International Criminal Court (ICC), a total 
of 24 countries, 16 of which had signed the treaty, have had 
experiences of peace agreements with a total of 84 armed 
groups, 50 of which were in countries that had signed the 
Rome Statute.
The International Criminal Court has only intervened in one 
case among the countries that have signed a peace agreement 
(DR Congo-MLC), and one ad-hoc court in Sierra Leone has 
arrested three people from an armed group (RUF), meaning that 
a total of 8 people from the armed groups in these countries have 
been affected. In no other case, barring none, have the people 
who demobilised after a peace agreement been the subject of 
sentences which entail imprisonment. The usual norm has been 
amnesty for demobilised groups, not interference by the ICC.
Country Rome Statute Peace agreements
Signing Ratification Year Armed groups
Northern 
Ireland (United 
Kingdom)
1998 2001 1998(2005) IRA (1)
Burundi 1999 2004
2000 CNDD, FROLIMA, PALIPEHUTU
2008 FNL
Sierra Leone 1998 2000 2001 RUF (2)
Angola 1998 --- 2002 MPLA
Liberia 1998 2004 2003 LURD, MODEL 
India --- ---
2003 BLTF-BLT, DHD
2005 NLFT
2009 DHD-J
2010 KNF, KNLF, KCP-MC Lallumba faction
2011 UPDS
2012
APA, AANLA, STF, BCF, 
ACMA, KLA/KLO, HPC, 
IKDA, KRA, DHD(N), DHD(J)
2013 UPPK, KCP-MC faction
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Indonesia --- --- 2005 GAM
Sudan 2000 ---
2006 SLA Minawi, Eastern Front
2010 JRM, SLA-FREES
2011 LJM
2013 JEM (Bashar)(3)
South Sudan ---- ---
2006 SPLA
2012 SSDM/SSDA
2013 SSLA
2014 SSDM-Cobra faction
Congo 2007 Ninjas 
Ivory Coast 2007 FN
Nepal --- ---
2006 CPN
2012 SKTMMM
Mali 1998 2000
2008 ADC
2009 ATNM
Central African 
Republic 1999 2001
2008 APDR, UFDR, UFR, MLCJ
2009 FDPC, MNSP
2011 CPJP dissidents
2012 CPJP
Colombia 1998 2002 2008 ERG
Sri Lanka --- --- 2008 TMVP
Niger 1998 2002
2009 MNJ, FFR, FPN
2010 MNJ
Chad 1999 2006
2002 MDJT
2009 National Movement
2010 UFCD faction, UFR, UFDD, CDR, UFDD/F
2011 FPR
DR Congo 2000 2002
2002 MLC (4)
2009 CNDP
2011 FRF
2013 M23
Somalia --- ---
2009 ARS
2010 ASWJ
Myanmar --- ---
2009 KNU-KNLA Peace Council
2010 SSA-N
2011 NDAA, KHB
2012 SSA-S
Nigeria 2000 2001 2010 MEND
Ethiopia --- --- 2010 UWSLF, ONLF faction
Philippines 2000 2011 2014 MILF 
(*)This does not include the conflicts and peace agreements between countries whose 
only military actors were the armed forces.
Sources: For the Rome Statute, (https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.
aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XVIII-10&chapter=18&lang=en); for the groups with 
peace agreements, School of Peace Culture, “Yearbook of Peace Processes” from 
2006 to 2015 (Http://escolapau.uab.cat); for the cases of the ICC, (http://www.icc-cpi.int/
en_menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/Pages/situations%20and%20cases.aspx)
(1) The IRA did not turn in its last weapons until 2005, seven years after 
signing the peace agreement. 
(2) The Sierra Leone Special Court was established in 2001, which issued 
a ruling against the former president of Liberia, Charles Taylor, in 
2008. In 2003 it issued thirteen accusations, only nine of which were 
effective, including three leaders of the RUF (Issa Sesay, Morris Kallon 
and Augustine Gbao, who were sentenced in February 2009). The 
Court was dissolved in December 2013.
(3) A faction of the JEM (Collective-Leadership) other than Bashar’s has 
had two members (Abdallah Bamda and Bahr Idriss Abu Garda) tried 
by the ICC. This faction, which was created in October 2007, signed 
no peace agreement and therefore does not appear in the table.
(4) Between the 25th of October 2002 and the 15th of March 2003, the 
MLC led by Jean-Pierre Bemba supported the president of the Central 
African Republic, Ange-Félix Patassé, against the “rebels” led by 
François Bozizé, who became the new president of the Central African 
Republic. Bozizé accused the MLC of widespread abuse during these 
interventions. In 2008, Bemba was arrested by the ICC. In 2013, Aimé 
Kilolo Musamba, Jean-Jacques Mangenda Kabongo, Fidèle Babala 
Wandu and Narcisse Arido were also arrested, the latter a citizen of the 
Central African Republic. They were all members of the MLC.
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Appendix 3. Managing the past in the latest peace agreements (does not include 
transition processes without peace agreements)
Country
Year of 
peace 
agreement
Initiatives Year Delay
El 
Salvador 1992
Creation of a Truth Commission 
and subsequent general 
amnesty.
1992 0 years
South 
Africa 1994
Creation of a Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission. 1994 O years
Guatemala 1996
Creation of a Commission for 
Historical Clarification. 1997 1 year
Creation of an International 
Commission against Impunity. 2007 11 years
Tajikistan 1997
Creation of a National 
Reconciliation Commission 
that approved the law on mutual 
pardon and the draft law on 
amnesty.
---- ---
Northern 
Ireland 1998
Creation of a Consultative 
Group on the Past, which got 
no support for creating a Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission.
2007 9 years
Angola 2002 --- --- ---
Sierra 
Leone 2002
Creation of a Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission 
and the existence of the Special 
Court for Sierra Leone.
2002 0 years
Liberia 2003
Amnesty after the peace 
agreements and subsequent 
creation of a Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission.
2005 2 years
Indonesia 
(Aceh) 2005
The peace agreement 
included amnesty for GAM 
members and called for the 
establishment of a Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission. In 
2014, the Parliament approved 
an Ordinance on Truth and 
Reconciliation.
2014 9 years
South 
Sudan 2005 --- --- ---
Nepal 2006
In 2009 there was a verbal 
commitment to create a 
Commission on Disappeared 
Persons and a Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission.
--- ---
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Burundi 2008
The peace agreement included 
temporary immunity for the 
members of the FNL and its 
transformation into a political 
party. In April 2014, the 
Parliament approved a draft law 
to create a Truth, Justice and 
Reparation Commission.
(2014) 6 years
Kenya 2008 Creation of a Truth, Justice and Reparation Commission. 2008 0 years
Ivory Coast 2010
A Commission for Dialogue, 
Truth and Reconciliation was 
created. 
2011 1 year
Sudan 
(Darfur) 2011
The Darfur Regional Authority 
(DRA) created the Justice 
Committee and the Truth and 
Reconciliation Committee.
2014 3 years
Mali 2013
The Parliament created a 
Truth, Justice and Reparation 
Commission.
2014 1 year
DR Congo 
(M23) 2013
Creation of a National 
Reconciliation Commission. 2014 1 year
Philippines 
(MILF) 2014
A Transitional Justice and 
Reconciliation Commission 
will be created.
? ?
Colombia 
(FARC) ----
At the negotiations in Havana 
un June 2014, it was agreed 
to create a Commission 
for the Clarification 
of Truth, Coexistence, and 
Non-Repetition
? ?
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Appendix 4. The unusual “unilateral ceasefires”
According to the figures published in the “2015 Yearbook of 
Peace Processes” published by the School of Peace Culture at 
the Autonomous University of Barcelona, in 2014 43 bilateral 
ceasefire agreements were reached with armed groups in 11 
countries, and 3 unilateral ceasefires were reached (FARC, TTP 
and PKK), meaning that 93.5% of these agreements were 
bilateral, which shows that this is the most common kind of 
ceasefire. The cases of the FARC (Colombia), TTP (southern 
Thailand) and PKK (Turkey) are the only exceptions to the 
general rule.
Ceasefire in 2014
Myanmar Bilateral Christmas ceasefire agreement between the government and the 17 armed groups in the NCCT.
Colombia Unilateral ceasefire of the FARC.
Philippines
At the end of the year, bilateral ceasefire between the 
government and the armed group NPA that lasted just a 
few days (Christmas truce).
India (Manipur) Bilateral ceasefire with 7 armed groups.
India (Nagaland) Renewal of the Bilateral ceasefire with the armed groups NSCN-K and NSCN-KK.
Mali Bilateral ceasefire with 6 armed groups
Mozambique Bilateral ceasefire with the group Renamo.
Central African 
Republic
Bilateral ceasefire with the armed groups AFB, Séléka 
and anti-balaka.
Sudan Bilateral cessation of hostilities with the SRF.
Sudan (Kordofan and 
Blue Nile)
Bilateral ceasefire with the armed group SPLM-N lasting 
3 weeks.
South Sudan Bilateral ceasefire with the SPLA-IO and the SSDM-Cobra Faction.
Thailand (south) Unilateral ceasefire of the armed group TTP lasting one month.
Turkey Unilateral ceasefire of the armed group PKK.
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Appendix 5 - Elections following peace agreements
Peace 
agreement Election date Description
Northern 
Ireland April 1998 March 2007
The Good Friday Agreement took place 
in April 1998. However, the IRA did not 
renounce armed struggle until 2005 and 
began to disarm in September, though 
it would not disappear until 2008. A year 
before, in March 2007, elections were 
held and in May a government shared by 
Catholics and Protestants was formed. 
At first, the IRA delivered its arms to an 
international commission, which later melted 
them all down in the presence of a Catholic 
priest and a Protestant pastor. The event 
occurred with no publicity or photographs to 
avoid a feeling of victory or defeat.
El Salvador January 1992
May 1994
(presidential)
The first exploratory contacts began in 
1984 during the term of José Napoleón 
Duarte. The peace agreement was 
signed in January 1992 during the term 
of the conservative Alfredo Cristiani. 
In December, the FMLN turned into 
a political party. In May 1994, the 
presidential election was won by he 
conservative Armando Calderón. In March 
2009, a member of the FMLN won the 
presidential election.
Guatemala December 1996
December 
1999 
(presidential)
The presidential election held in 1985 was 
won by Vinicio Cerezo, who began the 
democratic transition and the first contacts 
with the URNG guerrilla group. The peace 
agreement was signed in December 1996 
during the term of Álvaro Arzú, which was 
not wholly fulfilled. In 1999 a referendum 
was held to ratify part of the peace 
agreement, which was lost. At the end of 
that same year, the presidential election 
was won by Alfonso Portillo. The URNG 
candidate, Álvaro Colom, came in third, 
but captured the presidency a few years 
later (2008-2012).
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Angola April 2002
September 
2012
(legislative 
and 
presidential)
Before the presidential election in 2012, 
presidential and legislative elections were 
held very early in September 1992, with 
the participation of UNITA in the legislative 
elections, extending their mandates from 4 
to 4 years, until September 2008, when the 
second legislative elections were held, with 
a clear drop in support for UNITA. In the 
September 1992 elections, the ruling party, 
the People’s Movement for the Liberation 
of Angola (MPLA) won the parliamentary 
vote, but UNITA rebel leader Jonas 
Savimbi refused to run against Dos Santos 
in the presidential election. This caused 
the civil war to go on for another decade. 
The definitive peace agreement with UNITA 
came after its leader Jonas Savimbi was 
killed in 2002. At the time, the president 
was José Eduardo dos Santos.
South Africa 1994 May 1994
Due to the loss of seats in the partial 
elections in 1991, President de Klerk 
called for a referendum for 17 April 1994 
on whether or not to continue with the 
peace process. The result was 68% for 
and 31% against. The general elections 
held in May 1994 were won by Nelson 
Mandela and a transitional government 
was established, which led to the 
Constituent Assembly and the formation of 
a Truth and Reconciliation Commission. In 
1996, a new Constitution was approved.
Sudan January 2005
April 2010
(presidential 
and 
legislative)
In June 1989, Omar al-Bashir became 
President after a coup d’état. In 1996, to 
legitimise his power, he held a referendum 
that elected him Head of State with all 
powers. The opposition did not participate 
in the first elections since the coup d’état 
of 1989, alleging fraud and organisational 
shortcomings.  Most international 
observers (Carter Center, EU, IGAD, Arab 
League) noted deficiencies, but endorsed 
the elections. Under the umbrella group 
TAMAM, the 3,500 local observers also 
reported significant deficiencies. Omar 
al-Bashir won 68% of the votes and his 
party, the PCN, won 314 of the 400 seats 
in Parliament. Salva Kiir, of the MPLS, 
was elected President of South Sudan 
and Vice President of Sudan, with 93% of 
the vote, which foreshadowed his victory 
in the referendum in 2011.
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Indonesia 
(Aceh)
August 
2005
December 
2006 
(regional)
A resounding victory for the GAM, the 
former guerrilla militia, which carried 15 
of the 19 districts. Former GAM leader 
I. Yusuf won 38% of the votes and was 
proclaimed Governor. The EU’s Electoral 
Observation Mission was present, which 
identified some administrative problems. 
The Asian Network for Free Elections 
(Anfrel) reported cases of intimidation.
May 2009 
(legislative)
The Aceh Party, the party founded from 
the former GAM guerrilla militia, won 
48.89% of the votes in the province, 
followed by the Democratic Party (led 
by President Susilo Bambang), with 
10.96% of the votes. Various political 
groups denounced intimidation by some 
former GAM combatants. Meanwhile, 
the Aceh Party suffered several attacks 
in the weeks running up to the elections. 
However, the elections were held without 
any significant incidents. They were 
supervised by six local organisations, 
seven governmental ones and eight 
international ones (Carter Center, 
International Republican Institute, 
the Australian and US embassies, 
International Foundation for Electoral 
Systems, Asian Network for Free 
Elections Foundation, and National 
Democracy Institute.
Nepal June 2006
April 2008 
(Constituent 
Assembly)
The Maoist party and former armed 
opposition group CPN (M) won the 
elections to the Constituent Assembly, 
carrying 116 of 240 seats through the 
majority system and 100 more through the 
proportional system, in which it received 
29.28% of the votes. Coming in second 
was the previous majority party, the 
Nepali Congress, and CPN (UML) took 
third place. The Constituent Assembly 
is notably inclusive and representative 
of ethnic, caste, religious and regional 
diversity in the country, as well as gender 
issues (a third of its MPs are women). 
After the elections, the leader of the 
former Maoist guerrilla militia CPN, 
Pushpa Kamal Dahal, also known as 
Prachanda, was appointed Prime Minister. 
143
CAR December 2008
January 2011 
(legislative 
and 
presidential)
(Initially scheduled for October 2010)
Burundi December 2008
May 2010
(local)
The President’s party won an absolute 
majority and the opposing FNL party, 
formerly an armed group, won 14% of 
the votes. Opposition parties denounced 
electoral fraud. The EU deployed an 
Electoral Observation Mission composed 
of 82 people.
June 2010
(presidential)
Pierre Nkurunziza was elected President 
in the election of August 2005. Five 
candidates in the 2010 elections, including 
Agaton Rwasa, leader of the former 
armed opposition group FNL, withdrew 
from the elections to protest the fraud 
committed in the local elections in May. 
President Nkurunziza won with 91% of the 
votes. Turnout was 77%.
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Appendix 6 - The day after a peace agreement
After a peace agreement is signed, a period begins that may be 
long and is usually referred to as “post-conflict”, although the 
correct term would be “post-armed violence”, and is essential 
for a peace process. A peace agreement is only useful when it is 
possible to turn agreements into reality. The table below reminds 
us of some of the many aspects that must be implemented.
Country
Date of peace 
agreement or 
annexes
Some aspects provided for in the agreements
Mali 18-6-2013 Ceasefire followed by disarmament, presidential elections and talks including all political forces.
Philippines
27-2-2013
15-10-2012
Bangsamoro Basic Law, amendment to 
the Constitution, creation of a Bangsamoro 
Transition Authority, creation of a Third Party 
Monitoring Team to supervise implementation 
of the agreements and of a Joint Normalisation 
Committee (until all arms have been 
confiscated). Bangsamoro replaces the 
Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao 
and brings elections, transitional justice, the 
strengthening of Islamic law, consideration 
of the customs and traditions of indigenous 
peoples, the sharing of natural resources, 
sustainable development, the creation of a 
Transition Commission, international monitoring, 
the signing of a final document once all the 
points on the agenda are implemented, the 
MILF disarmament programme, international 
monitoring of the ceasefire until the MILF’s 
disarmament is complete, need for donors.
South 
Sudan 27-2-2013
Ceasefire, amnesty, political representation 
of the SSDM/A in the government, military 
integration of the SSDM into the SPLA, joint 
disarmament programme, acknowledgement of 
the conflict’s impact on the civilian population, 
recognition of the importance of reconciliation, 
release of prisoners of war, creation of a Joint 
Incident Committee.
Central 
African 
Republic
11-1-2013
Creation of an inclusive national unity 
government, early legislative elections, 
reorganisation of the defence and security 
forces, implementation of the DDR process, 
creation of a monitoring committee for the 
agreement, Séléka pledges to cease combat, 
dissolution of the militias, quartering of forces 
under the supervision of the MICOPAX.
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Yemen 5-12-2011
The Vice President assumes the presidency, 
elections, national unity government and 
referendum on a new Constitution. Security 
Council resolutions.
Chad 25-7-2009
Ceasefire and cessation of hostilities, general 
amnesty, participation of the National Movement 
(MN) in managing state affairs, possibility that 
the MN turns into a political party, demobilisation 
or integration of the MN into the Armed Forces, 
organisation of the return of refugees.
Mauritania 3-6-2009
Elections, transitional national unity government, 
inclusive national dialogue. Mediation by the 
African Union.
Burundi 4-12-2008 Name change for the Hutu party, participation in public office, release of political prisoners.
Zimbabwe 15-9-2008
Economic development, agricultural reform, 
referendum for a new Constitution, new 
government, creation of a Joint Observation and 
Implementation Committee.
Central 
African 
Republic
21-6-2008
Inclusive political dialogue, cessation of hostilities, 
amnesty (except for crimes within the jurisdiction 
of the ICC) and DDR. Mediation by Gabon. 
Kenya 23-5-2008
Constitutional and institutional reform, 
agricultural reform, regional imbalances, poverty 
and inequality.
Lebanon 21-5-2008 New national unity government.
Uganda 22-2-2008
Participation of all parties to the conflict in 
government, promotion of education in conflict 
areas, integration of members of the LRA into 
the Armed Forces, assistance for displaced 
persons to return, development plan for the 
areas affected by the conflict, victim support, 
reparations and rehabilitation, DDR.
Chad 25-10-2007
Respect for the Constitution, ceasefire, general 
amnesty and release of prisoners, participation 
in state affairs, possibility of forming political 
parties, DDR, voluntary integration into the 
Armed Forces.
Ivory Coast 4-3-2007
Identification of people, presidential elections, 
refounding of the Armed Forces, DDR, reunification 
of the country, amnesty (except for financial 
crimes, war crimes and crimes against humanity), 
help for displaced people to return, creation of and 
support for an evaluation committee.
Eastern 
Sudan 19-6-2006
Participation of the Eastern Sudan Front in 
government operations, joint management 
of natural resources, ceasefire, reform of the 
security system, voluntary integration into the 
Armed Forces, organisation of a Consultative 
Conference with civil society.
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Nepal 22-11-2005
End of the autocratic monarchy, reestablishment 
of Parliament, formation of an interim 
government, elections for a Constituent 
Assembly, participation of the United Nations in 
the process, commitment from Maoists not to 
repeat the errors of the past.
Indonesia 
(Aceh) 15-8-2005
New law on the government of Aceh, provisional 
government, elections, Aceh controls 70% of 
its oil, creation of a Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission, amnesty, DDR, voluntary 
integration into the Armed Forces, creation of an 
Aceh Observation Mission with the help of the 
EU and the ASEAN.
Sudan 
(Darfur) 5-7-2005
Respect for the diversity of the country, non-
discrimination, federal government system, 
representation of Darfur in state institutions, 
sharing of political power, humanitarian 
assistance, the return of refugees and displaced 
persons, rehabilitation and reconstruction of 
Darfur, promotion of reconciliation, sustainable 
development, security agreements, inclusion of 
these agreements in the Constitution.
Ivory Coast 6-4-2005
Cessation of hostilities, militia disarmament 
and dismantlement, security for the civilian 
population, police cooperation with UN 
forces (UNOCI), integration of the new forces 
in government operations, creation of an 
independent electoral commission, elections.
Burundi 6-8-2004 Democratic system of governance, post-transition Constitution.
Liberia 18-8-2003
Ceasefire, deployment of an international 
stabilisation force, reform of the security system, 
establishment of a Human Rights Commission, 
establishment of a transitional government, 
suspension of the Constitution until a new 
president is appointed.
Afghanistan 5-12-2001 Establishment of transitional authority, new Constitution.
East Timor 5-5-1999
Referendum on self-determination organised 
by the United Nations, rules for the referendum, 
security agreements.
Northern 
Ireland 10-4-1998
Clauses to include in UK and Irish legislation, 
creation of democratic institutions, North South 
Ministerial Council, human rights, reconciliation 
and victims, economic, social and cultural 
aspects, disarmament, security and police, 
prisoners.
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Somalia 22-12-1997
Holding of a National Reconciliation Conference, 
transitional government, the establishment of a 
Constituent Assembly.
Sierra Leona 23-10-1997
Cessation of hostilities, reinstallation of 
legitimate president, sharing of political power, 
DDR, amnesty.
Guatemala 20-12-1996
Full observance of human rights, support for 
return and resettlement, right to know the truth 
about human rights violations, recognition of 
the identity and rights of indigenous peoples, 
participatory economic development, increased 
tax collection and prioritisation of social 
investment, sustainable development, rural 
development, strengthening of civilian power, 
legalisation of the URNG and inclusion in 
security conditions, elections.
Tajikistan 17-8-1995
Continuous round of talks aimed at concluding 
a general agreement on the establishment of 
peace, disarmament of the opposition, voluntary 
incorporation into the Armed Forces or security 
forces, voluntary repatriation of refugees, creation 
of a committee for supervising and ensuring 
compliance with the general agreement, donor’s 
conference, ceasefire extension.
Burundi 10-9-1994
Government pact, new Constitution, creation of 
a National Security Council, creation of a Pact 
Monitoring Committee.
Afghanistan 7-3-1993
Formation of provisional government, elections, 
new Constitution, establishment of a Defence 
Council, release of prisoners, ceasefire and 
cessation of hostilities.
South Africa 21-12-1991
Single citizenship regardless of race, legal 
protection of democratic values, equality of 
opportunities, peaceful constitutional changes, 
multi-party democracy, recognition of diversity of 
cultures, languages and religions.
El Salvador 25-9-1991
Supervision of the National Commission for the 
Consolidation of Peace (COPAZ), empowered 
to prepare the draft legislation necessary for 
implementing the agreements and that will enjoy 
international guarantees, purging of the Armed 
Forces, reduction of the Armed Forces, changes 
in the Armed Forces’ educational system, 
creation of a National Civil Police, the sharing 
of land larger than 245 Ha with peasants and 
small-scale farmers.
Source: Peace Agreement Database Search (http://peacemaker.un.org/document-
search?keys=&field_padate_value%5Bvalue%5D%5Bdate%5D=&field_pacountry_
tid=&field_pathematic_tid%5B%5D=32&=Search+Peace+Agreements)
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Appendix 7. Conflicts that have ended in recent years 
(by both countries and groups)
2000 Burundi, Sierra Leone 2
2001 0
2002 Angola 1
2003 DR Congo (Inter-Congolese Dialogue), India (BLTF-BLT, DHD) 3
2004 0
2005 Indonesia (Aceh), Northern Ireland, Sudan (South), India (NLFT), Iraq (Kurdistan) 5
2006 Sudan (east), Sudan (Darfur - SLA Minawi), Nepal (CPN), Israel-Lebanon 4
2007 Ivory Coast 1
2008
Mali (ADC), Benin-Burkina Faso, Burundi (FNL), Central African 
Republic (various), Kenya, Colombia (ERG), Sri Lanka (TMVP), 
Georgia-Russia, Lebanon
9
2009
Mali (ATNM), Niger, Chad (National Movement), Central African 
Republic (FDPC, MNSP), DR Congo (CNDP), Somalia (ARS), India 
(DHD-J), Myanmar (KNU - KNLA Peace Council), Thailand- Cambodia
10
2010
Nigeria (MEND), Niger (MNJ), Chad (UFCD faction, UFR; UFDD, 
CDR, UFDD/F), Ethiopia (UWSLF, ONLF faction), Eritrea-Djibouti, 
Somalia (ASWJ), Sudan (JRM, SLA-FREES), India (KNF, KNLF, KCP-
MC Lallumba faction), Myanmar (SSA-N)
17
2011 Sudan (LJM), Chad (FPR), Central African Republic (CPJP dissidents), DR Congo (FRF), India (UPDS), Myanmar (NDAA, KHB), Spain (ETA) 8
2012
Central African Republic (CPJP), South Sudan (SSDM/SSDA), India 
(DHD, APA, AANLA, STF, BCF, ACMA, KLA/KLO, HPC, IKDA, KRA), 
Nepal (SKTMMM), Myanmar (SSA-S) 
14
2013 Sudan (JEM-Bashar), South Sudan (SSLA), India (UPPK, KCP-MC faction) 4
2014 South Sudan (SSDM-Cobra faction), Mozambique, Philippines (MILF) 3
2015
June Sudan (Darfur) SLM-MM 1
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Appendix 8  - Websites of interest
•	 African Union (www.peaceau.org/en)
•	 Alertnet (www.alertnet.org)
•	 Armed Conflict Database (acd.iiss.org)
•	 Armed Conflict Location and Even Data Project (www.acleddata.com)
•	 Asia Peacebuilding Initiatives (peacebuilding.asia)
•	 Berghof Research Center (www.berghof-foundation.org)
•	 Center of Conflict, Development and Peacebuilding (graduateinstitute.ch/
home/research/centresandprogrammes/ccdp.html)
•	 Center for Humanitarian Dialogue (www.hdcentre.org)
•	 CICDM (www.cidcm.umd.es)
•	 Clingendael Security and Conflict Programme (www.clingendael.nl)
•	 Conciliation Resources (www.c-r.org)
•	 Conflictbarometer (hiik.de/en/konfliktbarometer)
•	 Crisis Management Initiative (www.cmi.fi) 
•	 Crisis Watch (www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/crisiswatch)
•	 Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford (www.brad.ac.uk/
acad/peace)
•	 Dialogue Advisory Group (www.dialogueadvisorygroup.com)
•	 EEAS Mediation Support Team (eeas.europa.eu/cfsp/conflict_prevention/
index_eu.htm)
•	 School of Peace Culture (escolapau.uab.cat)
•	 European Centre for Conflict Prevention (www.haguejusticeportal.net)
•	 European Forum for International Mediation and Dialogue (www.
themediateur.eu)
•	 European Peacebuilding Office (EPLO) (www.wplo.org)
•	 FEWER (www.fewer.org)
•	 Folke Bernardotte Academy (www.folkebernardotteacademy.se/en)
•	 FriEnt (www.frient.de)
•	 Geneva Call (www.genevacall.org)
•	 Geneva Peacebuilding Platform (www.gplatform.ch)
•	 German Working Group on Development and Peace (www.frient.de)
•	 Gleencree. Center for Peace & Reconciliation (www.gleencree.ie)
•	 Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (www.gppac.org)
•	 Human Security Report (hsrgroup.org)
•	 ICTJ (http://ictj.org/news/ictj-forum-series-truth-commissions-and-peace-
mediation)
•	 Incore (www.incore.ulst.ac.uk/cds/countries)
•	 Insight to Conflict (www.insightonconflict.org)
•	 Inter Mediate (www.inter-mediate.org)
•	 International Alert (www.international-alert.org)
•	 International Crisis Group (www.crisisgroup.org)
•	 International Dialogue on Peacebuilding & Statebuilding (www.
psbdialogue.org)
•	 International Peace Academy (www.ipacademy.org)
•	 Interpeace (www.interpeace.org)
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•	 IPI Global Observatory (theglobalobservatory.org/tag/peace-processes)
•	 Irene Institute for Research and Education and Negotiation. ESSEC 
Business School (sites.google.com/a/essec.edu/essec-irene-english)
•	 Kreddha (www.kreddha.org)
•	 Life & Peace Institute (www.life-peace.org)
•	 Mediateur (www.themediateur.eu)
•	 Mediation Support Network (mediationsupportnetwork.net)
•	 Mediation World (www.mediationworld.net)
•	 United Nations (www.un.org)
•	 Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre (www.peacebuilding.no)
•	 OSCE (www.osce.org)
•	 Peace Accords Matrix (peaceaccords.nd.edu/matrix/topic)
•	 Peace Direct (www.insightonconflict.org)
•	 Peace and Justice Update (peace.sandiego.edu/reports/updates.
html#bottom)
•	 Peace Mediation Project (peacemediation.ch)
•	 Peace Negotiations Watch (www.publicinternationallaw.org)
•	 Peace and Security Department, African Union Commission (www.
peaceau.org/en/)
•	 People Building Peace (www.peoplebuildingpeace.org)
•	 PRIO (www.prio.no/cwp/armedconflict/current)
•	 Project Ploughshares (www.ploughsares.ca)
•	 Public International Law & Policy Group (www.publicinternationallaw.org)
•	 Relief Web (www.reliefweb.int)
•	 Responding to Conflict (www.respond.org)
•	 Saferworld (www.saferworld.org.uk)
•	 SIPRI (www.sipri.org)
•	 Swiss Peace (www.swisspeace.org/fast)
•	 The Conflict Resolution Information Source (www.crinfo.org)
•	 The Joan B. Kroc Institute (kroc.nd.edu)
•	 Today’s Mediation News (www.crinfo.org/news_feeds/v2_negotiation.cfm)
•	 United States Institute of Peace (www.usip.org/library/pa.html)
•	 UN Peacemaker (peacemaker.un.org)
•	 Uppsala University (www.ucdp.uu.se)
151
152
